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I 
Abstract 
Business groups are central organizations in many emerging economies. It is 
theoretically meaningful to investigate the distinct roles of business groups—more 
specifically, the interplay between business groups and the institutional 
environment—in the market-oriented institutional transition of these economies. The 
dissertation devotes itself to investigate fundamental mechanisms that underline 
business groups’ interactions with the institutional environment during the 
market-oriented institutional transition by establishing an integrated framework of 
institutional embeddedness renewal, and econometrically analyzing the resultant 
performance implications for business groups. 
Research Theme and Conceptual Work 
In Chapter 1, my main task is to contrast the environmental determinism in 
mainstream studies by pointing out that the nature of the interrelationship between 
business groups and the institutional environment is mutually shaping. Particularly, I 
focus on business groups’ purposeful efforts to influence institutional structures to 
arouse market-oriented changes that shape them as paragon agents for the 
market-oriented institutional transition. I propose a set of research questions that 
constitutes this central research theme, which are theoretically addressed and 
empirically explored in the following chapters. 
In Chapter 2, I establish a general conceptual framework to operationalize the 
proposed research questions. Taking an institutional strategy perspective, I extend the 
concept of embeddedness into complicated contexts of market-oriented institutional 
transition in which roles of business groups are shaped. First, I propose a dual-process 
model of institutional embeddedness renewal. I argue that systematic institutional 
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embeddedness phenomena can be treated as a collective institutional process 
leveraging isomorphic and other institutional mechanisms to increase the collective 
legitimacy around the chosen institutions, and at the organizational level, as the 
learning, creating and modifying of relevant rules, norms and routines that vary in 
their degree of market orientation. Second, I highlight that the implementation of 
institutional embeddedness renewal requires deliberate resource allocations and 
organizational adjustments inside the business group, which might increase the 
strategic difficulty in conducting business strategies such as diversification. Third, I 
notice that the institutional embeddedness renewal study can be further enriched by 
adding analyses of population dynamics within business groups. I identify two 
important organizational features characterizing business groups’ 
institutional-embeddedness-renewing capabilities and tendencies (political 
embeddedness and market-oriented autonomy). I argue that an investigation of failure 
likelihoods of business groups initiated with different organizational features can 
further provide evidence for revealing mechanisms underlining institutional 
embeddedness phenomena of business groups in given institutional settings.  
Empirical Work 
China is a model illustration of market-oriented institutional transition. Using a real 
experimental setting of Chinese business groups during the period of enterprise 
reform and market liberalization and the textile industry as the specific industry 
background, I conduct a set of empirical analyses to examine the proposed 
fundamental mechanisms concerning business groups’ interactions with the 
institutional environment during the market-oriented institutional transition.  
The empirical part of the dissertation consists of three empirical studies (Chapters 
3–5), with a common focus on performance implications of business groups’ 
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institutional-embeddedness-renewing actions and organizational features and 
institutional conditions that support/hinder this. In each chapter of the empirical work, 
I further operationalize the general conceptual framework of institutional 
embeddedness renewal by blending it with carefully-designed analytical frameworks.  
Chapter 3 
The first chapter adopts the dual-process model to evaluate the impact of 
institutional embeddedness renewal on the performance of business groups during the 
market-oriented institutional transition. I further provide an analytical framework to 
address the effects of institutional embeddedness renewal at the collective level and at 
the organizational level, by defining the collective-level and organizational-level 
measures of new (more-market-oriented) and old (less-market-oriented) institutional 
embeddedness to capture the process of institutional embeddedness renewal. I 
empirically analyze the proposed effecting mechanisms in the context of China, 
employing data on 38 business groups from the Chinese textile industry during the 
period 2000–2008. 
The results of the econometric analysis support an optimistic view that business 
groups can strategically renew their institutional embeddedness during the 
market-oriented institutional transition. Specifically, I find that at both the collective 
level and the organizational level, the institutional embeddedness around the new 
institutions affects the performance of business groups positively. This suggests the 
situation in which business groups enhance their performance by adhering to new 
institutional structures. Besides, the institutional embeddedness around the old 
institutions also brings positive effects. This result suggests the need for business 
groups to maintain their embeddedness in old dominant institutional structures to 
support their institutional-embeddedness-renewing strategies and competition in 
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market. This chapter contributes to the literature by revealing important strategic 
issues of how business groups manage their interactions with the institutional 
environment during the market-oriented institutional transition. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 investigates the likelihood of failure of business groups in the Chinese 
textile industry during the 2000s and institutional contingency of the survival 
mechanisms. In contrast with the previous chapter, this chapter places more focus on 
important organizational features that characterize business groups’ 
capabilities/tendencies to interact with the institutional environment during the 
market-oriented institutional transition. Specifically, this study introduces a working 
taxonomy to classify business groups in China by the political dimension (either by 
state ownership or by political rank). On the basis of this, this study operationalizes 
the empirical research purpose as to compare the distinctions in the failure likelihood 
between highly politically embedded business groups (namely, state-owned business 
groups and national and provincial business groups) and their counterparts (namely, 
collectively owned business groups and sub-provincial business groups). Furthermore, 
the institutional differences across China’s subnational regions (measured by 
supportive policies and marketization) are utilized to capture institutional 
contingencies of the effect of the proposed organizational features. 
Using data on 48 Chinese textile business groups during the period 2000–2008 and 
adopting the Cox proportional hazard model as the estimation method, organizational 
failure likelihoods of these business groups are analyzed. The results from the Cox 
regression analyses show that: (1) business groups with high political embeddedness 
(and simultaneously, low market-orientated autonomy) have high failure likelihoods; 
(2) these highly politically embedded business groups are less likely to fail both in 
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provinces where supportive policies have been implemented comprehensively, and in 
provinces characterized by a high degree of marketization. These results support the 
view that in an incremental market-oriented, government-guided institutional 
transition as in China, the general trend of the population dynamics within business 
groups is market-oriented; business groups with deep political embeddedness can 
prosper in particular environments as the product of interactions with the government 
and the marketization pressure. 
Chapter 5 
In this chapter, using the 2001–2005 data on listed firms from the Chinese textile 
industry, I estimate the diversification effects of all firms in the sample and the 
differences in the diversification effects between group-affiliated firms and their 
independent counterparts. The purposes of the chapter are multiple: first, to verify the 
findings of previous studies on firm diversification and group affiliation in emerging 
economies in a novel empirical setting as in this study; second, to explore possible 
influence of the institutional embeddedness renewal of business groups, given the fact 
that Chinese business groups in the period were experiencing the renewal of their 
governance structures (e.g., incremental listing) that involved their listed affiliates 
deeply. In short, by using this novel empirical setting, I look forward to enrich 
findings from my empirical analysis by incorporating institutional embeddedness 
renewal considerations. 
The results suggest that the dominant influence of institutional environments exists 
and leads to a homogenous trend in the diversification effect; that is, unrelated 
diversification positively affects performance of all firms in the sample. Group 
affiliation has complicated impacts on the diversification–performance relationship of 
the listed firms. Group-affiliated firms are more successful in pursuing unrelated 
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diversification when compared with independent firms. Furthermore, it is found that 
group-affiliated firms perform related diversification worse than their independent 
counterparts. These results on the effects of group affiliation produce insightful 
findings when interpreted with institutional embeddedness renewal considerations: (1) 
the performance advantage from unrelated diversification suggests that business 
groups’ institutional embeddedness renewal may contribute to the persistence of the 
comparative strength of group affiliation; (2) the concurrent low outcomes from 
related diversification however suggests that the resource allocations and 
organizational adjustments associated with the institutional embeddedness renewal 
process—specifically, the incremental listing—disrupt the interrelations inside the 
business group and therefore hurts the fundamental foundation for the realization of 
related diversification’s value-creation tendency. These findings illustrate the 
possibility that institutional embeddedness renewal can be utilized as a general view 
for the study of business strategies and business groups. 
Conclusions 
The final chapter, Chapter 6, summarizes the implications of the proposed 
conceptual framework of institutional embeddedness renewal and empirical work for 
theory, business and public policy in emerging economies where market-oriented 
institutional transitions are undergone. Finally, I discuss the limitations of empirical 
studies in this dissertation and directions for future research on business groups in 
emerging economies. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Business groups in market-oriented institutional transitions 
Business groups are an organizational form that prevails in many emerging economies 
in Asia and other regions (Carney, 2008; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Business groups 
typically consist of legally independent firms that “are bound together by persistent 
formal (e.g., equity) and informal (e.g., family) ties” (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007, p. 
331). The population of business groups includes a variety of subspecies such as 
Business house in India, Chaebol in South Korea, Qiye-jituan in China, General 
Corporation in Vietnam, and Grupos economicos in Latin American countries 
(Abegaz, 2005; Granovetter, 1995). These influential organizations have a significant 
presence in the economic landscape of these economies. For example, in China, 
business groups contributed almost 60% of the country’s industrial output (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China [NBSC], 2000a; Yiu et al., 2005).
1
 
On the other hand, the institutional transition sweeping these economies is 
characterized by their particular emphasis on developing market-enhancing 
institutions.
2
 To a large extent, many of these fundamental changes during the 
                                                 
1
 See Heugens and Zyglidopoulos (2008) for an overview of the economic presence of 
business groups in emerging economies. 
2
 Using the term “institutional transition”, I refer to “fundamental and comprehensive 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
2 
 
market-oriented institutional transition (MOIT), either to formal institutions such as 
corporate governance systems or as new organizational templates and practices being 
created in informal institutional fields, would be less possible without the involvement 
of business groups known as a major incumbent organizational form. However, Just 
recently, strategic management scholars were beginning to notice the tremendous 
influence of business groups on the institutional transition (Carney, 2008; Heugens 
and Zyglidopoulos, 2008; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).  
In particular, scholars have argued about possible situations in which business 
groups can be promoters that lead the way in experimenting and introducing new 
market-enhancing rules and procedures. This might be the case of business groups in 
China, which serve as “an intermediary institution that would facilitate the enterprise 
reform, and, thereby, the economy transition” (Yiu et al., 2005, p. 188), or, Korean 
business groups in the period after the 1997 Asian financial crisis when a set of 
reforms were initiated to enhance market liberalization and corporate governance in 
Korea (Kim et al., 2010), or, Indian business groups that act as a device of 
institutional innovation by realigning their members’ values and norms towards a 
market focus in a more bottom-up way (Ramaswamy et al., 2011). 
These arguments call attention to the theoretical and practical implications of 
systematic institutional movements of business groups, and promisingly, bring about a 
critical theme for the strategic management study of business groups to query whether 
the interactions between business groups and market-oriented institutional transition 
have been sufficiently addressed in the literature. 
                                                                                                                                            
changes introduced to the formal and informal rules of the game that affect organizations as 
players” (Peng, 2003, p. 275) in the emerging economy, to distinguish distinct institutional 
changes in specific institutional structures or organizational fields (e.g., corporate governance 
reform within business groups in one country). 
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1.2 Analyzing performance of business groups in market-oriented 
institutional transitions 
Over the past several decades, there has been a vast volume of studies on business 
groups from management and other disciplines. Many strategic management 
researchers concentrate their research on seeking for business-group-specific 
competiveness relative to other business organizational forms (typically, independent 
firm) in emerging economies (e.g., Chang and Choi, 1988; Chang and Hong, 2000), 
leaving the complex institutional contexts that confront business groups left largely 
unaddressed. To a certain extent, such approach facilitates the danger of an 
overemphasis on the organization side—“pure” organizational features and strategic 
patterns—of the business group–institutional environment interrelationship.
3
 
Against this, the most remarkable development in the literature during the past two 
decades is probably the increasing prevalence of studies adopting institution-based 
perspectives (e.g., Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Chung, 2002; Kedia et al., 2006; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Kim et al., 2010; Lu and Yao, 2006; Ramaswamy et al., 
2011). Among them, a most influential strand might be the institutional-voids school. 
The concept of institutional voids is introduced into the business group literature 
mostly through the efforts by Khanna and his colleagues (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 
2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005, 2007), who seek to 
describe business group as a solution to institutional voids—market imperfection and 
absence of market-supporting institutions—in emerging economies. The 
                                                 
3
 This approach is criticized to be “anchored in a structure–conduct–performance hypothesis 
testing tradition that was developed by scholars to examine the performance of freestanding 
firms in a North American context” (Carney, 2008, p. 610). For example, an influential 
scholar in this strand concludes that business groups are merely a general form of 
conglomerates (large diversified corporations) in developed economies (Chang, 2006). 
Obviously, it is questionable that one can explain how much of the competiveness of business 
groups by such a “pure” organizational structure feature. 
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institutional-voids view hypothesizes that business groups can formalize their 
competence by creating efficient internal markets to fill up institutional voids, which 
will improve the outcome of business strategies that business groups choose to 
conduct. In essence, they argue that the potential value of business strategies is 
fundamentally determined by the institutional environment.
4
 Due to this, the 
institutional voids arguments and a number of previous studies can be classified into a 
broad umbrella of the so-called “institution-based view of business strategy” 
(hereafter, IBVBS; Peng, 2002, 2003; Peng et al., 2005). 
Obviously, empirical search for competitive advantages of business groups has 
produced results complicated than what the IBVBS had assumed. It is observed that 
positive “business group effects” may exist, but highly contingent on institutional 
specifics such as national settings (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Khanna and Yafeh, 
2005; Lins and Servaes, 2002) and time periods of the institutional transition (Choe 
and Roehl, 2007; Lee et al., 2008). Such mainstream perspectives have been widely 
drawn on to demonstrate major phenomena relevant to business groups, always in a 
similarly environmentally deterministic way.
5
 These seemingly endless institutional 
contingencies do provide some “immediate” rationales for analyzing sources of 
business group effects. However, if the influence of business groups on the 
institutional environment remains assumed away, synthesizing these fragmented 
logics in the framework of IBVBS will be in large part theoretically redundant and 
practically meaningless (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). 
Why does the mainstream literature continue to ignore the capability and 
motivation of business groups to influence the institutional environment for 
                                                 
4
 In other words, the institutional contingency of business strategies. 
5
 A typical example might be the reasoning about “temporal decrease” of business groups’ 
advantages (see Appendix to Chapter 1 for the debate in details). 
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intentional changes? Nominally, this negative attitude is caused by an overemphasis 
on the institutional environment–usually referred to as the socioeconomic framework 
at country level (Peng, 2003). They treat the institutional environment as the dominant 
force shaping “standard” strategy patterns, organizational structures, and therefore 
performance of business groups, but leaving business groups merely as bystanders 
outside the game. However, a more fundamental reason is the lack of theoretical 
understanding of “nonmarket strategies” of the organization to influence rules of the 
game (institutions), and a framework to integrally address the executing procedure, 
effecting mechanisms, and influence of these strategies on institutional transition. 
1.3 Scholarly contribution of the study 
The aforementioned arguments motivate the theoretical exploration and empirical 
investigation that consist of this dissertation. In contrast with extant mainstream 
studies, in this dissertation, I emphasize the autonomy and significance of business 
groups in shaping the institutional environment. Business groups might establish their 
competencies either through being “paragons” or as “parasites” (Khanna and Yafeh, 
2007), which can be represented more definitively by the notion of institutional 
strategy (Lawrence, 1999). I place stress on their (possible) purposeful efforts to exert 
influence on institutional structures to embrace market-oriented changes. Specifically, 
I hope to clarify fundamental mechanisms that shape these institutionally-embedded 
agents as faithful promoters of the market-oriented institutional transition and the 
resultant performance effects, to fill the gaps in the literature of business group study. 
As the mainstream literature does not provide a definitive approach or sufficient 
insights into this theme, I turn to pioneer research in the business group literature and 
the institutional theories—i.e., embeddedness (Granovetter, 1995), market-oriented 
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autonomy (Yiu et al., 2005), and business group–institutional environment interaction 
(Lu and Ma, 2008)—to build an integrated theoretical framework with which to 
delineate important mechanisms relevant to institutional strategies that business 
groups execute during market-oriented institutional transitions. The dissertation is 
constructed around a set of interrelated research questions. 
• How to theorize the fundamental mechanisms shaping a possible paragon role of 
business groups in promoting the market-oriented institutional transition? 
Viewing business groups as institutionally embedded agents, I theoretically 
address this as a systematic institutional process, institutional embeddedness 
renewal (IER), by which business groups individually and collectively renew 
their institutional embeddedness by implementing specific market-oriented 
institutional strategies, and also as a product of important interactive 
organizational features. By proposing the process of institutional embeddedness 
renewal and organizational features and institutional conditions that enable/hinder 
this, it is possible to predict the resultant performance implications for business 
groups in a given institutional setting (Chapter 2). 
• Can business groups improve their performance by implementing institutional 
embeddedness renewal? This is a question concerning the effectiveness of 
institutional embeddedness renewal. We can therefore extend previous discussion 
on business groups’ competitiveness in mainstream literature, specifically, by 
examining the relationship between measures of renewed institutional 
embeddedness of business groups and their performance (Chapter 3). 
• How about the failure likelihoods of business groups with different 
capabilities/tendencies to interact with the MOIT (characterized by specific 
organizational features)? This question provides another new approach by which 
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to reveal the formalization of institutional embeddedness renewal (and therefore 
the paragon role) of business groups in a given institutional environment by 
incorporating an organizational ecological view (Chapter 4). 
• Will the institutional embeddedness renewal of business groups influence the 
outcome of their business strategies (e.g., diversification)? By this question, on 
the one hand, I hope to further address strategic issues of institutional 
embeddedness renewal at the organizational level (inside the business group), and 
on the other hand, to highlight my critical attitude against the mainstream 
literature by examining the effect of business strategies interwoven with the 
institutional embeddedness renewal process (Chapter 5).  
These questions outline a framework that I hope can prove fruitful in better 
accounting for the strategic aspect of the interplay between business groups and the 
institutional environment during market-oriented institutional transitions. Studies in 
this dissertation will contribute to build our understanding on business groups in a 
holistic way. A major purpose is to empirically demonstrate causal links between 
explanatory variables (market-oriented institutional strategies, organizational features 
and institutional conditions) and performance of business groups. Given the highly 
contextualized nature of business groups as embedded agents in the institutional 
transition, the empirical determination of these causal links is complex even at the 
best of times (Carney et al., 2009a). I set China as a distinctive institutional context 
within which to address the aforementioned empirical questions by examining 
carefully-designed hypotheses and questions. China is a typical example of 
incremental market-oriented institutional transition, which provides a suitable 
experimental setting for the research theme above, where it is hypothesized that 
business groups “can be active agents in the change process, helping shape 
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institutional pressures in a coevolutionary fashion” (White et al., 2008, p. 227). To 
conduct the econometric analysis, I refer to governance structure renewal (in the 
Chinese context, enterprise reform) as a distinct institutional field of market-oriented 
institutional strategy, as corporate governance is a central issue for emerging 
economies (Roth and Kostova, 2003), even those at late stages of transition to a 
market economy (Kim et al., 2010). In general, the findings from my econometric 
analyses provide sufficient support to the optimistic view that business groups can 
play as active agents for market-oriented institutional transition to coevolve 
themselves with the fundamental institutional changes in an emerging economy as 
China. Moreover, the framework developed in this study can thereby be proven 
fruitful in better accounting for mutually shaping phenomena between the institutional 
transition and central incumbent business organizations, which I hope to be extend 
beyond business groups. 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I propose a 
conceptual framework addressing the fundamental institutional embeddedness 
renewal process, critical organizational features, and (collectively constructed) 
institutional environmental characteristics that jointly shape the strategic aspect of 
how business groups can be shaped as notable agents for market-oriented institutional 
transition. This is further complemented by objectifying important contextual 
factors—distinct institutional strategy forms, characteristics of institutional transition, 
and competition in the industry—to prepare necessary research settings for examining 
the induced causal relationships. 
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The proposed conceptual framework is demonstrated by three empirical 
investigations (Chapters 3–5), specifically, using a real experimental setting of 
Chinese business groups during the period of enterprise reform and stock market 
liberalization and the textile industry as the selected industry background. Focusing 
on the economic effectiveness of institutional-embeddedness-renewing strategies, 
Chapter 3 empirically analyzes the effect of institutional embeddedness renewal on 
the performance of business groups in the context of China. It examines the proposed 
hypotheses employing data on 38 Chinese business groups in the textile industry 
during 2000–2008. The empirical results of the econometric analysis support an 
optimistic view that it is possible for business groups to improve their economic 
performance by renewing their institutional embeddedness during market-oriented 
institutional transitions (i.e., during the 2000s period in China). 
Chapter 4 places more weight on important organizational features and institutional 
conditions underlying the prosperity of business groups during market-oriented 
institutional transitions. Empirically, it examines the relative failure likelihood of 
business groups initiated with high political embeddedness (and simultaneously, low 
market-oriented autonomy) compared with their counterparts, and the institutional 
contingency of such interactive organizational mechanisms, in the context of China. 
The results of Cox regression analyses using data on 48 business groups from the 
Chinese textile industry during 2000–2008 show that the general trend of the 
population dynamics within these business groups is market oriented–business groups 
with high political embeddedness fail more; such a disadvantageous position of these 
highly politically embedded business groups weakens in institutional environments 
with strong government support and high degree of marketization. 
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Chapter 5 illustrates how institutional embeddedness renewal, as a perspective, can 
add critical insights to conventional research on business strategies (such as 
diversification) and the literature of business group study. Specifically, this chapter 
focuses on diversification outcomes of firms and the moderating impacts of group 
affiliation on these in the context of China. Employing the data on 62 listed firms 
(both group-affiliated firms and independent firms) from the Chinese textile industry 
(2001–2005), this study estimates diversification effects of these firms. The results 
indicate that group affiliation does moderate the diversification–performance 
relationship of these firms, but in such a way that is far more complicated than extant 
mainstream research had thought. This study provides enriched explanations by 
integrating the institutional embeddedness renewal as a theoretical lens.  
Chapter 6, the final chapter of this dissertation, brings together the theoretical work 
and findings of the empirical investigation for answering the research questions 
described in Chapter 1. The chapter summarizes the implications of the theoretical 
work and empirical work, and discusses limitations of this research and directions for 
future research on the study of business groups.
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Chapter 2 
Research Framework and Research 
Setting 
In this chapter, I propose an integrated conceptual framework to address fundamental 
mechanisms by which business groups renew their embeddedness in institutional 
structures and the resultant performance effects. I describe rationales for choosing 
China and the textile industry as the institutional and the industry background for 
empirical investigation. 
2.1 The institutional strategy perspective 
Conventionally, institutional theory insists that legitimacy, not “efficiency,” guides 
organizational action (Lawrence, 1999; Scott, 1995). Similarly in the institutional 
change literature, although it is widely accepted that institutional change is the process 
by which agents seek to enhance their legitimacy and power within organizational 
fields (Hoffman, 1999; Kingston and Caballero, 2009), such legitimacy enhancement 
is seldom recognized as the result of intentional (i.e., performance-oriented) behavior 
of organizations, but is instead seen as a structurally contingent phenomenon caused 
by institutional change itself (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006; Lawrence, 1999; Oliver, 
1991). In contrast to this taken-for-granted thesis of mainstream institutional theory, in 
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the strategic management discipline, legitimacy enhancement has been conceived as a 
product of intentional actions of exerting influence on institutional structures by 
which organizations (firms) acquire resources to improve their  competitive 
advantage and overall organizational success (e.g., Lawrence, 1999; Peng, 2003; Peng 
et al., 2005; Phillips et al., 2000). 
Such intentional actions can be represented more definitively by the notion of 
institutional strategy (Lawrence, 1999). Lawrence introduces the concept of 
institutional strategy, defined as “patterns of action that are concerned with managing 
the institutional structures within which firms compete for resources” into the 
strategic management discipline (Lawrence, 1999, p. 162). Lawrence places particular 
emphasis on how organizations (firms) within the institutional structure adopt, 
establish, and/or modify institutional logics to improve their competitive advantages 
intentionally.  
Institutional strategies are first distinguished from business strategies that “remain 
within the competitive context”,
6
 and at the same time, interconnected with business 
strategies via resources (Lawrence, 1999, p. 169). On the one hand, institutional 
strategies can “improve a firm’s competitive position and support its competitive 
strategies” (Lawrence, 1999, p. 169), by increasing legitimacy in the institutional field; 
on the other hand, institutional strategies depend on the resource provided by specific 
business strategies: for example, “membership strategy”—one of the institutional 
strategy forms proposed in his study—is thought to be connected with “leadership in 
                                                 
6
 Regarding the difference between institutional strategy and business strategy, Lawrence 
further interprets: “institutional strategy is not so much concerned with gaining competitive 
advantage based on existing institutional structures as it is concerned with managing those 
structures—preserving or transforming institutional standards and rules in order to establish a 
strategically favorable set of conditions” (Lawrence, 1999, p. 167). Meanwhile, scholars 
might use interchangeable terms: for institutional strategy, such as nonmarket or 
institution-based strategy (Peng 2003; Peng et al., 2005); for business strategy, such as 
market-based strategy (Peng, 2003) or competitive strategy (Lawrence, 1999). 
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the field” because the latter contains a “critical resource” for the membership strategy 
(Lawrence, 1999). 
Lawrence’s arguments imply that institutional strategy can bring benefit through 
legitimacy enhancement and the improved resource condition, but is also 
accompanied by cost caused by the need for necessary resources; an aggregate 
positive effect on organizational performance might be possible but only when the 
beneficial effect overcomes the associated cost. The effect of institutional strategy can, 
in part, be assessed by examining the impact of institutional strategies on the 
performance of the specific business strategies. Such an examination is of course 
empirically difficult in the real business world, as these causal relationships are highly 
contextualized, “depending on the relationship between a firm’s competitive position 
and its institutional context” (Lawrence, 1999, p. 169). 
 In this respect, to apply the institutional strategy perspective to the analysis of 
business groups within the complicated context of market-oriented institutional 
transition (MOIT), we need a comprehensive theoretical extension. This task is 
accomplished by synthesizing this neoinstitutional perspective into main concepts 
relevant to the theme of this dissertation (see Figure 2.1). 
2.2 An integrated conceptual framework 
2.2.1 Institutional embeddedness renewal 
Given the significance of business groups in the transition of emerging economies to 
market economy, the relationship between business groups and institutional 
environments is fundamentally interactive and mutually shaping (Heugens and 
Zyglidopoulos, 2008). In this sense, the concept of “embeddedness” that reveals that 
economic action is essentially embedded in “concrete, ongoing systems of social 
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relations” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 487), provides an elegant theoretical lens to better 
understand business groups and their organization and strategy and the multifarious 
social relations and structures shaped by such interactive changes. However, it is also 
clear that with its roots in sociology, the embeddedness literature “has focused on the 
cultural, cognitive, political, and structural embeddedness of actors and institutions 
within broad social networks or society at large” (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009, 
p. 1177), but has devoted little attention to strategic aspects of the embeddedness and 
the resultant performance consequences. 
In the extant business group literature, a number of studies stand close to such a 
conventional embeddedness approach, in an attempt to relate the advantages of 
business groups to those dyadic or network relations considered important in the 
current institutional frameworks of emerging economies (e.g., Guest and Sutherland, 
2010; Kedia et al., 2006; Keister, 1998, 2001). This is particularly reflected in their 
central concept of institutional relatedness (Kedia et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2005; 
Ramaswamy et al., 2011). Institutional relatedness, defined as “the degree of informal 
embeddedness with the dominant institutions in the environment that confer resources 
and legitimacy on the focal organization” (Peng et al. 2005, p. 623), is essentially a 
form of institutional embeddedness that is generally referred to as interconnections 
between the organization and its institutional structures (Baum and Oliver, 1992). 
In this respect, institutional embeddedness reflects the static relationship between 
organizations and institutional environments, specifically, institutional structures. 
Institutional structures are “sets of rules and standards” (Lawrence, 1999, p. 167), in 
other words, gathering of formal and informal institutions that are“the rules of the 
game in a society” (North, 1990, p. 3; Peng, 2003, p. 275). Besides, market-oriented 
institutional transition refers to fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced 
Chapter 2 
Research Framework and Research Setting 
15 
 
to such institutional structures to a market economy (Peng, 2003). To capture the 
dynamic interactions between business groups and the institutional environment, 
Zhang (2014) introduces the concept of institutional embeddedness renewal (IER). 
IER possesses critical characteristics that institutional strategies should have, and can 
be described as the strategic, dynamic process by which organizations build 
embeddedness into new (more-market-oriented) institutional structures and quit from 
embeddedness in old (less-market-oriented) institutional structures.
7
 
 
Figure 2.1 Main concepts relevant to institutional embeddedness renewal 
In the context of a typical MOIT, the potential of institutional structures in granting 
legitimacy and resource for organizations tends to differ in such a way that new 
more-market-oriented institutional structures should dominate the old 
less-market-oriented ones. Indeed, in the literature of business group study, 
                                                 
7
 From the viewpoint of institutional change (Suhomlinova, 2006), both the IER of business 
groups and MOIT in emerging economies are institutional changes. Therefore, one can understand 
the IER as “MOIT” in business groups to intuitively capture the dynamic interrelationship 
between business groups and the institutional environment in emerging economies. 
Institutional  
structures 
Market-oriented 
institutional transition 
(MOIT) 
Institutional 
embeddedness 
Institutional 
embeddedness 
renewal (IER) 
Institutions 
Static 
Dynamic 
Institutional 
environments 
Organizations  
(Business groups) 
Chapter 2 
Research Framework and Research Setting 
16 
 
researchers have tended to describe “paragons” as those business groups have 
established a coevolutionary relationship with the institutional environment towards a 
market focus (e.g., White et al., 2008; Yiu et al., 2005). Such a coevolution might 
suggest possible situations in which business groups successfully de-embed from old 
institutional structures and adhere to new institutional structures. Therefore, by 
conducting IER during the MOIT, business groups can have the chance to achieve an 
advantageous position in the institutional environment. 
If business groups were able to manage the institutional structures in such a way, 
then there should be some identifiable effects associated with the IER. To investigate 
the effectiveness of IER of business groups during the MOIT, I focus on distinctive 
effecting mechanisms, first, of the process of IER and second, of fundamental 
organizational features that enable such a process. 
2.2.2 The dual process of IER 
I propose a dual process model to demonstrates how organizations (business groups), 
in the MOIT context, can improve their competitive advantage in the market through 
institutional strategic processes both at the organizational level and in the 
inter-organizational field (Figure 2.2). IER motivates and enables organizations—in 
the context of this study, business groups—to manage the institutional structure, 
collectively and individually (Lawrence, 1999; Suchman, 1995). Naturally, the IER 
process should then be executed at two different levels: legitimating new, more 
market-oriented institutional forms and logics within institutional fields collectively; 
creating, modifying or adopting relevant institutions at the organizational level. 
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Figure 2.2 Dual process of institutional embeddedness renewal 
2.2.2.1 At the collective level 
Business groups are dominant organizations in institutional structures of emerging 
economies. In this sense, Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006) arguments as below have 
important implications for incorporating institutional strategy perspective by 
addressing the process of IER for dominant organizations (business groups).  
From a general resource-based viewpoint, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) provide 
an example of the introduction of a new organizational form in professional business 
services, demonstrate how dominant organizations (international accounting firms) 
utilize their knowledge about, and positions in, interconnected old and new 
organization fields to exert influence on institutional structures: resources derived 
from their legitimacy and central position in the old mature organizational field are 
transferred to constitute the new organizational field; on the other hand, 
re-embeddedness into the new organizational field increases the “motivation to 
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change,” which therefore lowers their embeddedness in the old organizational field 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006, p. 27).  
In the context of MOIT, successful IER is a systematic movement of business 
groups across different institutional structures: business groups lower their 
embeddedness in the extant institutional structure that supports less market-oriented 
institutional logics, and commit more to constituting a new structure that is in favor of 
more market-oriented institutional logics. To start with, within institutional structures, 
the purposeful actions that business groups undertake should link to the improvement 
of the legitimacy of market-oriented institutions. Given the boundedness of rationality 
(Simon, 1957) and highly uncertain institutional changes, business groups will seek to 
establish interconnections with other organizations to increase their knowledge about 
institutional change and decrease the cost of search and evaluation of alternative 
institutional logics.  
Relatively, this is mostly likely to occur within the population of business groups 
because of their commonly shared norms, values, and socioeconomic ideology 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Rodrigues and Child, 2003). This 
“within-community interaction” will then lead to collective behaviors of business 
groups in the form of an informal social network (Keister, 1998; Peng, 2003), or the 
founding of formal industry/professional institutions such as the China Group 
Companies Association (CGCA) whose major aim is to help its members—more than 
150 of the largest business groups in China—to “adapt to a market economy” (CGCA, 
2004; Ma, 2002, p. 127). 
This turns the population of business groups into an organizational field, “a 
community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose 
participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors 
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outside the field” (Scott, 1995, p. 56). Within the organizational field, business groups 
may increase institutional pressure around new, more-market-oriented institutions by 
leveraging coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphic mechanisms (Hargrave and 
Van de Ven, 2006; Seo and Creed, 2002). Consequently, utilizing such isomorphic 
mechanisms to establish “collective wisdom” will help to smooth the embeddedness 
renewing process of business groups; the increased pressure among business groups 
will thereby turn the community of business groups into a subfield within the 
institutional structures around the new, more-market-oriented institutions.  
The collective efforts of business groups will then benefit them win the “battle of 
the standard,” the competition with other interest groups (e.g., private firms and 
multinational corporations) surrounding the formalization of organizational practices 
and routines in either technical or social discipline (Rodrigues and Child, 2003). For 
this, business groups, like other central organizations in the organizational field, can 
also use the political resource embedded in these formal and informal institutions to 
negotiate with national or local governments to exert influence on “rules of the game” 
directly (Carney, 2008; Xavier et al., 2013).  
In short, in the case of IER, the population of business groups might be viewed as a 
community that exercises an isomorphic process that can be guided in the direction of 
market focus (Kim et al., 2010), and within which market-enhancing common norms, 
values, and socioeconomic ideologies are more easily shared (Rodrigues and Child, 
2003). Effective IER will improve the collective position of the community in the 
institutional environment, which brings effects for all individuals in the community as 
it activates resources locked in institutional structures for market-supporting purposes, 
reduces the systematic uncertainty in the MOIT, and accelerates the formalization of 
collectively shared beliefs to embrace further market-oriented changes. 
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2.2.2.2 At the organizational level 
Essentially, these institutionally purposeful actions are unfolded around particular 
institutions to be created, modified, or discarded at the interest of the institutional 
strategy actor, and are therefore managed at the organizational level (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). In this sense, at the organizational level, (de)embedding can be 
addressed as a sequential process through which business groups learn about, adopt or 
modify the relevant institutional forms and logics that they see as helping to sustain 
competitive advantage in an increasingly competitive environment (Crossan et al., 
1999; Uhlenbruck, et al., 2003). Once the organizational-level IER process is 
begun—either by adopting market-oriented rules and norms or by innovating new 
practices—then, whatever the result of the execution, the status of business groups’ 
internal resource and organizational arrangements need to be adjusted accordingly. As 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 (bottom-middle rectangle), the business group needs to 
resolve internal constraints such as lack of necessary resource and knowledge (Kedia 
et al., 2006; White et al., 2008), absence of market orientation and autonomy 
(Bhaumik et al., 2012), or organizational inertia hindering the motivation to re-embed 
in new institutions (Guillén, 2002; Kim et al., 2004).  
Theoretically, the success in conducting organizational-level IER actions and 
resolving the internal constraints, will bring organizational-level IER effects reflected 
as the positive association between adopting relevant institutions and business group’s 
performance. Even so, the result of such an empirical investigation is not immediately 
interpretable. This is because that the potential value of the market-oriented 
institutions that the business group chooses to adopt or abandon will depend on the 
characteristics of the institutional transition and the collective position of business 
groups within that (described as “micro-macro interdependence” in Figure 2.2). 
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2.2.2.3 The resultant performance impacts 
Performance implications of IER can be holistically investigated by examining the 
impact of IER on, first, the performance (e.g., profitability) of business groups and 
second, the outcome of distinct business strategies. These examinations have different 
theoretical emphases on revealing the strategic aspect of the IER of business groups. 
The examination of impacts of IER on performance of business groups is useful to 
evaluate the effectiveness of IER, as it essentially verifies the significance of effecting 
mechanisms of IER within the community and at the organizational level. The 
dissertation dedicates a separate chapter to investigate the extent to which business 
groups in the given institutional setting have successfully conducted a systematic IER 
or stuck into the opposite situation, overembeddedness in old, less-market-oriented 
institutional structures (Zhang, 2014 [Chapter 3]). 
In contrast, examining impacts of IER on the outcome of distinct business 
strategies contributes more to understanding the strategic difficulties in conducting 
IER. First and institutionally, similar to the institutions adopted by business groups as 
illustrated by the “micro-macro interdependence” in Figure 2.2, the potential value of 
business strategies is also certainly conditioned on characteristics of the institutional 
environment and the collective position of business groups within this.
8
 Second and 
organizationally, for business strategies, particularly those organizationally dependent 
ones, one critical task that the business group needs to handle is the cost caused by 
resource allocation and organizational adjustments associated with the IER. A separate 
chapter is devoted to revealing such strategic difficulties of IER by focusing on 
diversification as the distinct business strategy (Zhang, 2011 [Chapter 5]). 
                                                 
8
 The collective position of business groups is the product of their IER strategies. In this sense, 
examining the performance outcomes of business strategies provides—to some extent, 
indirectly—evidence to verify the effectiveness of IER of business groups. 
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2.2.3 Fundamental organizational features facilitating or impeding IER 
In previous subsections, IER has been described as a continuous process heading for 
the desired, more-market-centered end-state (Roth and Kostova, 2003; Suhomlinova, 
2006); such a renewal process is naturally unfolded both within institutional fields and 
at the organizational level (Figure 2.2). However, on the other hand, the proposed 
model does place more focus on a “process” aspect and on the relative position of 
business groups in institutional structures during the MOIT. To complement this, I 
suggest investigating important organizational features that characterize business 
groups’ capabilities and potentials to conduct IER actions. In the literature, several 
researchers have mentioned such organizational features that facilitate or impede 
business groups’ involvement in embracing market-oriented institutional changes (e.g., 
Bhaumik et al., 2012; Lu and Ma, 2008; Yiu et al., 2005).  
2.2.3.1 Political embeddedness 
Political embeddedness—either reflected as relational ties connecting business groups 
with dominant political powers or positions of business groups in political fields—has 
been considered as an important interactive organizational feature explaining the lack 
of capabilities/tendencies to be institutional entrepreneurs (Carney, 2008; Peng et al., 
2005).  
Theoretically, the embeddedness of business groups in mature institutional 
structures may put these powerful incumbent organizations in an embarrassing 
situation of “how and why actors shaped by (i.e., embedded within) institutional 
structures become motivated and enable to promote change in these structures” 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006, p. 27), which constitutes the so-called “paradox of 
embedded agency” in institutional theory (Seo and Creed, 2002; Uzzi, 1997). On the 
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one hand, as a time- and resource-consuming issue, IER is considered to favor 
dominant organizations because they usually possess substantial competitive 
advantage and legitimacy due to their central positions within current industry and 
institutional structures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Lawrence, 1999), On the other 
hand, dominant organizations would be more likely to lack motivation to enact 
changes. Such contradictory reasoning seems to have been reproduced to typify the 
situation of politically embedded business groups.  
Should they predictably end up with the paradox of embedded agency due to the 
path dependency? Can they settle the resource constraints and maintain the motivation 
to enact market-oriented institutional actions? Given the state-administrated 
characteristic of many emerging economies (e.g., China) and significant presence of 
politically embedded business groups in these economies, a holistic empirical 
investigation is needed. 
2.2.3.2 Market-oriented autonomy 
Business group researchers have recognized the fact that business groups in many 
emerging economies are initially endowed with certain autonomy to exert influence 
on institutional structure for market-oriented changes and persist this for a reasonable 
period of time (Kim et al., 2010; Ramaswamy et al., 2011; Yiu et al., 2005). This is 
practically evident if considering business groups’ active roles in the history of 
socioeconomic reforms in these emerging economies as noted earlier. In the context of 
Chinese business groups, Yiu et al. (2005) argue that the market-oriented autonomy is 
a relatively commonality of business groups that emerge as the substitutions for 
institutional imperfections in emerging economies. Hence, in a subsequent research 
by them, they further argue that Chinese business groups “can be active agents in the 
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change process, helping shape institutional pressures in a coevolutionary fashion” 
(White et al., 2008, p. 227). 
 
Figure 2.3 Fundamental organizational features typifying IER 
2.2.3.3 Impacts on business group failure 
Impressively, previous studies seem to have noticed possible causal linkage between 
the fundamental organizational features characterizing business groups’ interaction 
with the institutional environment and the resultant performance consequence. For 
example, for (heavily) politically embedded business groups, a IER process would be 
strategically difficult due to their persistent embeddedness in political regulatory 
framework and government relations (e.g., Carney et al., 2009b); for business groups 
with high market-oriented autonomy, their motivations and capabilities in embracing 
market-oriented changes to institutional structures considered to be an advantage (e.g., 
White et al., 2008).  
From my point of view, an extensive investigation of the relationship between the 
status of these fundamental organizational features and the subsequent failure 
consequences is theoretically meaningful. Somewhat obviously, this can provide 
evidence for addressing the existence of systematic institutional embeddedness 
renewal within the population of business groups (see Figure 2.3). Mechanisms 
proposed in Figure 2.3 are demonstrated by an econometric comparison of 
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organizational failure likelihoods between two cohorts of Chinese business groups 
initiated with different organizational features (Zhang and Wang, 2014 [Chapter 4]). 
2.2.4 Contextual factors needed to be considered 
Empirical examination of the proposed mechanisms is a challenging issue. Given the 
high complexity of the institutional transition in emerging economies, the IER is 
rarely able to produce beneficial effects that can be depicted in a simple way. A 
complete analytical design need consider the strategic, institutional and industrial 
contexts for enacting and executing IER strategies. Specifically, empirical 
investigations in this study have considered three crucial contextual factors, form of 
involved institutions, characteristics of the institutional transition, and industry 
background. 
2.2.4.1 Form of involved institutions 
Institution is the core that assembles concepts of the IER framework (see Figure 2.1). 
Lack of a focus on representative institutional forms will make a holistic examination 
of the collective-level and organizational-level institutional strategic mechanisms 
empirically unrealistic. This is particularly important for the investigation on the 
impact of processing IER on performance of business groups (Chapter 3). Specifically, 
Chapter 3 focuses on governance structures (e.g., enterprise forms and ownership 
concentration), a subset of formal and informal institutions related to corporate 
governance. Corporate governance is crucial to the transition to a market economy. It 
constructs an institutional framework both at the macro level as “external 
institutional/governance system,” and at the organizational level, “guiding firms’ 
activities” (Roth and Kostova, 2003, pp. 314–315). In the business group literature, 
business groups are found to have been active in continuously adopting new corporate 
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governance rules and norms to improve individual practice, promoting these 
market-oriented institutional logics within the institutional structure in transition 
economies such as that of China (Ma et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2007), but also in those 
emerging economies with more developed markets (Kim et al., 2010). 
2.2.4.2 Characteristics of the institutional transition 
Business groups’ aptitude for market-enhancing institutions and their capability to 
enact institutional strategy are largely shaped by their participation in institutional 
changes in history. An incremental, more bottom-up MOIT might predict a probable 
institutional foundation for a preference towards market-oriented institutional logics 
(i.e., property rights) and entrepreneurship favoring IERs, which will persist for quite 
a long period (Roth and Kostova, 2003; Uhlenbruck et al., 2003). The stage of the 
MOIT needs to be considered too. While institutional entrepreneurship tends to persist 
across stages of the MOIT, resource endowments in the institutional structure will not. 
Generally, resource constraints would not be likely to become a serious problem in 
earlier periods of MOIT when sourcing resources by filling “institutional voids” is 
still relatively easy (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). This, however, might become 
relatively difficult at later stages of MOIT (Kedia et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2005). 
2.2.4.3 Industry background 
Successful execution of institutional embeddedness renewing strategies will lead to 
enhancement of legitimacy and power in organizational fields, which can be 
converted into resources that contribute to improving the competitive position of 
business groups in the market (Lawrence, 1999). However, from an institutional 
structure of production perspective (Coase, 1992), the mechanisms of converting the 
institutional resource may vary with the specific industry competition context. At this 
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point, empirical investigations in this dissertation follow the convention in 
institutional studies (e.g., Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005; Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006; Lawrence, 1999), and focus on a specific industry sector to avoid such an 
ambiguity and keep the model straightforward. Empirical analysis with a large 
cross-industries sample should be encouraged, but seems not to be rewarding at the 
present stage because the application of the institutional strategy perspective is still in 
its infancy in the literature. 
To demonstrate the rationality of the proposed theoretical framework and analytical 
issues, I select China’s MOIT and its textile industry as the distinctive institutional 
and industry contexts within which to develop testable hypotheses and questions. 
2.3 Business groups in China’s MOIT 
I have three reasons for choosing China as the institutional context for the empirical 
investigation. First, China is known as a model illustration of incremental 
market-oriented institutional transition. Second, researchers commonly hold an 
optimistic attitude towards a systematic coevolution of Chinese business groups with 
the institutional framework in a market-enhancing direction (Carney et al., 2009a; Yiu 
et al., 2005; White et al., 2008). Third, it provides distinctive institutional background, 
such as enterprise reform and market liberalization which are utilized for our 
examination of the impact of IER on business group’s performance and outcomes of 
their business strategies (Chapters 3 and 5).  
2.3.1 Chinese business groups during the past decades 
A typical business group is a gathering of legally independent firms that are coupled 
together by formal and informal ties (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). In China, business 
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groups had not been initiated as such “typical” business groups. Instead, they evolve 
to realize this as an ultimate goal: that is, to convert themselves into “modern” group 
corporations. Focusing on such governance structures renewal of Chinese business 
groups, the following subsections provide an overview of Chinese business groups in 
the past decades. To simplify the description, I divide the process into three periods, 
the 1980s, 1990s, and the period after 2000. 
2.3.1.1 The 1980s 
The history of Chinese business groups can be traced back to the end of the 1970s 
when their predecessors, the so-called “enterprise economic alliance (in Chinese, 
qiye-jingji-lianheti)”, appeared to realize transaction cost-based 
advantages—increasing product capability, ensuring materials supply and an efficient 
approach to the consumer because the former planning economy had obstructed all of 
these—in large quantities (CGCA, 2004; Keister, 1998, 2001). Such a bottom-up 
organizational innovation fitted in easily with the Chinese government, which had 
been amazed by the vital role of Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol in promoting 
economic growth (Ma and Lu, 2005; White et al., 2008). The resultant consensus is 
reflected in a set of policies in the mid-1980s, which entitled not only the formal name 
of “business group (qiye-jituan),” but also gave legitimacy to these alliances in the 
economy (Keister, 1998, 2001; Ma and Lu, 2005).  
An enterprise economic alliance is hardly a coupled organizational form with a 
distinctive governance structure. Business groups at this stage are described as “sacks 
of potatoes”: gatherings of the so-called general factory (zongchang), and factory 
(gongchang) that are not companies in the modern sense and loosely coupled by 
non-property-right-based ties (e.g., transactional relationship). Consequently, 
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throughout the 1980s, Chinese business groups were seeking to realize their autonomy 
by supporting their members’ attempts to separate from government and acquire legal 
person status. 
2.3.1.2 The 1990s 
The 1993 Company Law raised the curtain on hypercompetition between business 
groups and these rival business organizational forms around their legitimacy and 
positions in both institutional and market spheres. This increased the motivation of 
business groups to facilitate the governance structure renewal process. A major task is 
to convert themselves from sacks of potatoes into group corporations (jituan-gongsi) 
that operate in the framework of property rights-based corporate governance 
institutions.  
Chinese business groups adopted a gradual corporatization process, essentially by a 
continuous three-step process as described by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (NBSC): first, establishing parent–subsidiary vertical relationship in the group; 
second, converting the parent company, the core of the group, into a modern 
enterprise (adopting modern enterprise forms such as limited company and joint stock 
company) to conform to the requirement of the Company Law; then, ensuring that 
property relations between the parent company and the dominant owners (mostly, 
governments) and between the parent company and other member companies 
(business group affiliates) are more transparent. 
Figure 2.4 delineates this incremental process clearly: among those business 
groups included in the NBSC list, in 1997 the ratios of those that had established a 
parent–subsidiary group system, had a parent company in a modern enterprise form, 
and were with clear property relations was 80.9%, 52.8%, and 30.4%, but by 1999 
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these had changed to 85.1%, 70.1%, and 61.3%, respectively. On the one hand, we 
can therefore say that by the end of the 1990s, the goal of converting business groups 
into group corporations has been partly achieved. However, on the other hand, this 
process has not yet completed as it is still needed to upgrade the governance structures 
to more-market-oriented versions that “emphasizes the new corporations’ 
independence, profit-orientation, clearer property rights and good corporate 
governance” (Zhang, 2004, p. 2038). 
Source:  NBSC (2001b–2009b). 
Figure 2.4 The corporatization process and growth of Chinese business groups 
2.3.1.3 The 2000s 
The current period, after 2000, is seen as a mid-to-late stage in China’s enterprise 
reform (Lau et al., 2007). China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001 marks this new period with intense market competition among business groups 
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and rival organizations (e.g., state-owned enterprises [SOEs] and multinational 
corporations [MNCs]). As shown in Figure 2.4, the conventional governance structure 
renewal strategies—such as the three steps of corporatization—are still progressing, 
but at a relatively slow pace towards convergence. As argued by Uhlenbruck et al. 
(2003), the corporate transformation in transition economies could not be realized 
fully without converting those market-based rules and routines into organizational 
practices, and embedding them into the mindset of organizations and individuals. In 
this sense, governance structure renewal is becoming increasingly resource and 
time-consuming: the more market-oriented and complicated the institutional structure 
becomes, the more the IER strategy needs to be interrelated with, and dependent on 
the resource-creation of business strategies. 
The increasing penetration of market-enhancing institutions in China increases the 
legitimacy of new governance structures that business groups have to choose (Meyer 
and Lu, 2005). One method is being public company listed in stock markets. This is a 
process by which business groups convert themselves into group companies ruled by 
more strict market-enhancing institutions. Moreover, this extended business groups’ 
governance structure renewal into another important field of the MOIT in 
China–establishment and liberalization of stock market: since the reopening of 
Chinese stock markets in the early 1990s, business groups have been the major 
players (Ma et al., 2006).  
2.3.2 Collective aspect of IER process of Chinese business groups: an example 
The aforementioned governance structure renewal process of Chinese business groups 
should not, however, be conceived as thoughtless draws by isolated individual 
business groups from given organizational templates available in an indulgent 
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environment. This is essentially institutional and collective. This can be illustrated by 
looking into how business groups collectively involved in establishing legitimacy of 
the “business group version” of these corporate governance forms, especially by 
organizing industrial and professional associations to promote market-oriented change. 
One typical example is the CGCA, one of the most influential associations of business 
groups in China. Since its establishment in 1987, the association has been consistently 
serving distinctive purposes, from urging association members to “adapt to a market 
economy” in 1990s (Ma, 2002) to “comprehensively promoting the strategic 
development of large Chinese corporations and groups of companies” currently 
(CGCA, 2010). Its distinctive board structure includes executive directors who are 
mainly top executives from those largest business groups in various industries while 
on the other hand, the honorary directors are (former) senior officials from the State 
Council, National Development and Reform Commission, and Ministry of Commerce. 
Given this, the CGCA seems to lack neither incentive nor political resources to 
engender institutional pressures to promote changes in governance structures. 
In 2002, the CGCA began a project on business group governance structure. The 
major purpose is, as revealed in the report published later, to provide “practical 
solutions for business groups and advice on policy-making” (CGCA, 2004, pp. 3–4). 
According to this publication, the CGCA proposed a pragmatic perspective on 
important issues of governance structure reform (e.g., parent–subsidiary structure and 
partial listing): market-oriented governance reform should be supported, however it 
needs to be carried out in an incremental way as business groups were “still bearing 
the cost of performing social functions” (CGCA, 2004, p. 8). 
The CGCA and their members were engaged in continuous negotiations, or even in 
conflict with other agencies that preferred more radical changes. This is the case in 
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encounters with the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) around 
governance issues during the process of partial listing. An example is chairman 
duality: since end of the 1990s, the CSRC has attempted to prohibit the chairman of 
the listed firm to concurrently serve as the legal representative (practically, chairman 
or president) in the shareholder companies (i.e., business groups), and issued several 
administrative notices to highlight this issue. The CGCA opposed these notices, and 
declared that they “noted this problem during investigation,” and emphasized the 
possibility that “chairman duality does not hurt listed firms, but contributes to 
improving relations between the parent and listed firms”; and more aggressively, 
queried the legitimacy of these notices as “improper,” declared that it was a “worthy 
discussion, that needs to be improved in practice”—a euphemism for refusal in 
Chinese (CGCA, 2004, p. 26). I have no further information on the issue of chairman 
duality. However, we do know the ultimate status: the relevant notice was abolished in 
2007 while chairman duality, as well as chief executive officer duality, has become 
prevalent in listed Chinese firms (Peng et al., 2007). Moreover, in respect of business 
group-favoring policies—such as investment and financing rights, priorities to 
establish finance companies and entitled research and technology centers—which 
were often picked up in previous studies and considered “endowed government 
resources” (e.g., Guest and Sutherland, 2010; Yiu et al., 2005), the CGCA 
acknowledged that these are, at least partially, trophies of business groups’ collective 
efforts (see CGCA, 2010). 
2.4 Important settings for the empirical investigation 
2.4.1 Subnational regional institutional differences 
In the IER framework, the within-community isomorphism has been treated as a 
fundamental mechanism to shape an active role of business groups during 
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market-oriented institutional transitions. However, how best to represent the 
interactive aspects of the community of business groups is not immediately obvious. 
The Chinese socioeconomy is conceived as an M-form “regional organization” (Qian 
et al., 1999). Dynamics at subnational regional level constitute a significant portion of, 
and add to the bottom-up tendency of, China’s market-oriented institutional transition 
(Shi et al., 2012). To form an organizational field, there need to be critical issues “that 
become important to the interests and objectives of a specific collective of 
organizations” (Hoffman, 1999, p. 352). Correspondingly, for governance structure 
change, the subnational region (specifically, province) can be viewed as the specific 
organizational field in which business groups, rival organizations (e.g., SOEs) and 
governments interact to share institutional logics. Put another way, utilizing the 
significant variance of interactive characteristics in regions in China, we can quantify 
these interactive characteristics (e.g., marketization degree and corporatization of 
business groups) and examine the resultant organizational outcomes (e.g., economic 
performance and organizational survival). This is distinguishable from prior research 
that has relied heavily on chasing temporal changes or exogenous shocks, which has 
obvious drawbacks particularly when such punctuations are absent (Kim et al., 2010). 
2.4.2 Industry background 
The textile industry
9
 is chosen as the competitive environment within which to 
examine the predicted mechanisms regarding IER of Chinese business groups.  
                                                 
9
 Following previous studies on textile industries (e.g., Brandt et al., 2008; Colpan, 2008) and 
Chinese official definitions (China Economic Information Network [CEI], 2004), empirical 
studies in the dissertation have adopted two practical definitions. A narrow-spectrum 
definition of textile industry focus on manufacturing, including 2-digit CSIC sectors such as 
Textiles (CSIC 17), Apparel, footwear, and caps (CSIC 18), Leather, fur, feather, and related 
products (CSIC 19), and chemical fibers (CSIC 28). A broad definition covers both textile 
manufacturing and upstream and downstream sectors (e.g., Textile wholesaling and Chemical 
product manufacturing). 
Chapter 2 
Research Framework and Research Setting 
35 
 
 
Source: The China Statistics Yearbook (NBSC, 2001a–2009a) and the Large Corporations of China 
(NBSC, 2001b–2009b). 
Notes: “Total sales of textile BGs” is the aggregation of sales of business groups in the textile 
manufacturing sector (CSIC 17, 18, 19, and 28); “Presence of BGs in the textile industry” was 
calculated by dividing “Total sales of textile BGs” by “Total sales of the textile industry” which is the 
aggregation of main business sales of designated enterprises (complied with the NBSC’s requirements) 
in the textile manufacturing sector. 
Figure 2.5 Business groups in the Chinese textile industry, 2000–2008 
The Chinese textile industry during China’s MOIT can be referred to as 
representing a reasonable industry setting.  
• The Chinese textile industry is a major sector of China’s industries, representing 
almost a tenth of the gross value of industrial output in 2005 (Brandt et al., 2008, 
p. 588), showing continuous growth over the past decade (see Figure 2.5). The 
continuous growth of the textile industry decreases the systematic uncertainty of 
exploring and shifting between institutional templates (Uhlenbruck et al., 2003), 
therefore increasing the heterogeneity of effecting institutional strategic 
mechanisms during the MOIT.  
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• The trend in the textile industry is found to be consistent with the overall trend of 
business groups’ evolution in the economy. Generally, a moderately incremental 
trend of adoption of new institutional forms is presented in the 2000s. For 
example, regarding the process of converting business groups into listed group 
companies, such an incremental market-oriented trend is clear. In 2001, among 
124 large business groups in the four two-digit CSIC industries in the textile 
manufacturing sector (CSIC 17, 18, 19, and 28) as reported by the NBSC (NBSC, 
2002a), 39 had issued shares on domestic stock exchanges, contributing total 
sales of 91.1 billion RMB, which accounts for approximately 46% of the 
aggregate revenues of all business groups in the industry. In 2004, the ratio of 
sales of partly listed business groups in the total sales of all textiles business 
groups was increased to 52% (NBSC, 2005a).  
• I also believe that one major interest underlying this study, as many others in the 
literature, is whether and how business groups born in “old” socioeconomic 
structures can realize institutional renewal (of their internal governance system) 
and how this impacts on their competitive advantage in the increasingly 
market-based competitive and technologically evolving landscape of markets. 
The textile industry represents characteristics preferable to those of industries 
with fewer players or more regulation (e.g., automobile, energy, and petroleum), 
or more technology-driven newly emerging industries (e.g., pharmaceutical, 
software, and high-end equipment). 
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Chapter 3 
Institutional Embeddedness Renewal of 
Business Groups and Performance 
Implications10 
This chapter focuses on performance effects of institutional embeddedness renewal 
(IER) of business groups during the market-oriented institutional transition (MOIT). 
Specifically, I apply the IER process model to the Chinese context and empirically 
analyze the proposed hypotheses using data of business groups from the Chinese 
textile industry during the 2000s. 
3.1 Analyzing the effectiveness of IER 
3.1.1 IER as a systematic institutional embeddedness phenomenon 
The previous chapter proposes a process model that describes the IER of business 
groups as a dual process at both the collective and the organizational level. It is argued 
that if business groups can success in increasing legitimacy of the chosen institutions 
within organizational fields and resolving the internal constraints at the organizational 
level, IER will bring multiple effects that are reflected in two forms: first, as the 
                                                 
10
 Zhang, Qiang (2014), “Institutional embeddedness renewal or overembeddedness: the case 
of business groups in China”, Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Administration, Vol. 6 No. 2, 
pp. 148-167. 
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collective advantage of business groups as a community in the institutional framework; 
and at the organizational level, as an effect on business groups’ performance by 
adopting relevant institutions coinciding with the trend of the institutional transition.  
At the core of these arguments lies the matter of how to understand business 
groups’ renewal of the institutional contents of their embeddedness to enhance their 
legitimacy and competitive position in a continuously changing institutional 
environment. In essence, IER reflects a systematic movement of the population of 
business groups in the direction of a market focus.
11
 Theoretically, in a given distinct 
institutional environment in which the MOIT is significant and business groups are 
prospering, the IER should be distinguishable from the opposing situation of 
overembeddedness (Hagedoorn and Frankort, 2008), in which business groups are 
trapped and rely on their involvement with the old, less-market-oriented institutions. 
Nevertheless, scholars have found that it is difficult to arbitrate between these 
opposing situations (Carney et al., 2011; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007), due to lack of a 
sound theoretical foundation and analytical framework.  
The institutional strategy perspective provides an elegant theoretical foundation 
from which to address the distinctions between IER and overembeddedness. In either 
of these cases, a central issue is to leverage distinct isomorphic mechanisms 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to raise institutional pressure in the business group 
community. The isomorphic pressure arouses collective behaviors within the 
community during the MOIT will be initiating and coevolving with a collective 
institutional identity (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006; Polletta and Jasper, 2001). The 
collectively established institutional identity—either market-enhancing or 
                                                 
11
 I use the term “systematic” to emphasize that researchers need to examine the effects both 
within the community and at the organizational level. 
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market-undermining—manifested in preferences toward particular institutional forms 
and logics, will persist for quite a long period even independently of the pace of 
institutional transition (Roth and Kostova, 2003; Uhlenbruck et al., 2003). In this 
respect, the isomorphic pressure thus stimulated is therefore self-enhancing, turning 
the business group community into a territory around the chosen institutions and 
accounting for greater commitment to the furthering of the (de)embedding process. If 
deliberately effected, this within-community mechanism will be helpful to improve 
the collective position and competiveness of business groups in the institutional 
environment. Similarly, at the organizational level, business groups may achieve 
performance outcomes by learning about, adopting or modifying the relevant 
institutional forms and logics that they see as dominant force in their community and 
the institutional environment (Crossan et al., 1999; Uhlenbruck, et al., 2003). 
However, it is obvious that such actions of business groups are not always 
market-enhancing (as the case of IER); they can also be market-undermining or even 
hindering the MOIT (thereby the case of overembeddedness). 
Therefore, despite sharing theoretical foundations, IER and overembeddedness are 
split over the driving force and specific effecting mechanisms underlying business 
groups’ (de)embedding actions. Essentially, arguments supporting the former 
phenomenon tend to emphasize the significance of business groups’ motivation and 
capability to keep embedding in the new, more-market-oriented institutions (White et 
al., 2008; Yiu et al., 2005); in contrast, the overembeddedness arguments tend to focus 
on institutional constraints impeding de-embedding from the old, less-market-oriented 
institutions (Peng et al., 2005). These distinctions will be naturally reflected as 
different relationships between the dual process and performance of business groups. 
In this sense, given a specific institutional setting, the effectiveness of IER of  
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business groups can be holistically examined by comparing the explanatory power of 
the competing arguments of IER and overembeddedness.  
3.1.2 The analytical framework 
The process of IER can be captured by the renewed embeddedness in both the new 
(more-market-oriented) and the old (less-market-oriented) institutional structures. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of IER (distinctions between IER and overembeddedness) 
can be investigated by examining the relationships between the institutional 
embeddedness and the performance, as following: 
 
How to holistically capture the institutional embeddedness of business groups is 
critical for the current study. In this chapter, I focus on governance structure renewal 
of Chinese business groups and employ the data of business groups in the Chinese 
textile industry during the 2000s. To empirically demonstrate the effecting 
mechanisms of IER of business groups under the institutional environment, I propose 
an analytical framework that provides a method to utilize the information on: (1) 
institutions around which institutional structures are constructed; (2) business groups’ 
adoption of these institutions (see Figure 3.1). 
3.1.2.1 Institutional embeddedness of the community and business group 
Given a distinct institutional setting, the institutional embeddedness can be 
represented by the penetration ratios of the institutions within the business group 
community at the collective level, and at the organizational level, by the extent to 
which a business group has adopted the institutions.  
Embeddedness of the 
business group in 
new/old institutional 
structures 
Performance of the 
business group 
Embeddedness of the 
community in 
new/old institutional 
structures 
= f , 
. 
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Figure 3.1 The analytical framework of Chapter 3 
In essence, this is an approach that focuses on institutions adopted by business 
groups to capture their collective and individual embeddedness within the institutional 
environment. It is distinguishable from a relational approach that identifies relations 
or agents considered to be critical and use them as proxies for the institutional 
environment (Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2005).  
Specifically, the penetration ratio of an institution can be calculated as: 
Penetration of an institution = Number of business groups adopting this institution in 
the community / Total number of business groups in 
the community. 
 Community is empirically defined as the population of business groups in the 
subnational region (province) of China, because in terms of the development of both 
formal and informal institutions, China is characterized by significant subnational 
variation among its provinces (Chan et al., 2010; Seo et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2012). 
Embeddedness of the community in 
new/old institutional structures 
• Penetration ratio of the institutions 
within the community 
• Governance structures as 
representative institutions 
• BGs in the subnational region as 
community Performance 
(Profitability) 
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• Governance structures as 
representative institutions 
 
Collective-level effects 
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3.1.2.2 Representative institutions and a working taxonomy 
This chapter focuses on governance structures of Chinese business groups. 
Governance structures such as ownership concentration, external control, and 
enterprise forms are institutions that define the structural features of corporate 
governance which is an essential part of MOIT in emerging economies. In the context 
of MOIT, business groups are linked with particular institutions (i.e., of corporate 
governance) that vary in the newness (degree of market orientation). Therefore, a 
taxonomy of “new (more-market-oriented)/old (less-market-oriented)” institutions is 
needed. Specifically, this chapter identifies a set of business group governance 
structure forms whose market orientation degree is measured discretely or 
continuously. The following institutional background section is devoted to interpret 
the historical rationales of these measures. 
3.2 Institutional background 
There are well-documented arguments on Chinese business groups’ strategic 
behaviors renewing their governance structures to involve them in the enterprise 
reform (Lu and Yao, 2006; Ma et al., 2006), and insightful discussions of forms, 
mechanisms and contexts of these market-conforming institutional strategies (Lin and 
Su, 2008; Meyer and Lu, 2005; Zhang, 2004). The previous chapter has provided an 
overview of how Chinese business groups continuously upgraded their internal 
governance system to involve themselves deeply in the field of enterprise reform over 
the past decades. This section further clarifies this to delineate important governance 
structure symbols that characterize distinct institutional embeddedness renewing 
processes of Chinese business groups. 
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3.2.1 Modern/conventional enterprise forms 
The enterprise reform that aimed at introducing “modern corporate 
institutions”—property rights-based corporate governance institutions—is at the heart 
of the economic reform of China (Lau et al., 2007; Peng et al., 2007). Upon entering 
the 1990s, enterprise reform in China became more significantly focused on 
establishing a national “modern enterprise system” as distinct from the initial focus in 
the 1980s. Under such circumstances, corporatization emerged and became officially 
recognized (NBSC, 2001b, p. 14) as a dominant approach that enabled business 
groups to build a “modern parent–subsidiary governance structure in which the parent 
company
12
 is formalized and control subsidiary companies by property rights-based 
ties” (CGCA, 2004, p. 42). The Chinese business groups adopted a gradual 
corporatization process.  
The process initially placed more emphasis on formalizing the parent company into 
a “modern enterprise” to comply with, mainly, the National Company Law that was 
first enacted in 1993. Following the official classification (NBSC, 2009b), the parent 
company is treated as a modern enterprise when it falls into one of the following 
categories: joint-stock company (JSC), limited liability company (LLC), solely 
state-funded LLC (guoyou-duzi-gongsi), and four other minor categories
13
. These are 
distinguished from a traditional enterprise categorized as traditional non-SOE 
(typically, collectively held company) or traditional SOE (NBSC, 2009b). This 
movement systematically led to incrementally market-oriented changes in the 
                                                 
12
 In the Chinese context, the “parent company” refers to an entity in a business group that 
controls other legally independent entities in the business group as its affiliates (CGCA, 2004; 
Keister, 1998, 2001), not an ultimate holder (an entity outside the business group). 
13
 For example, in 2004, the four categories—namely, sino-foreign joint venture, joint 
venture with partners from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan (HMT), joint-stock company with 
foreign investment, and joint-stock company with investment from HMT—only account for 
1.7% of all the 2764 business groups. 
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distribution of different governance forms within the population of business groups: 
among those business groups included in the NBSC list, in 2000 the proportion of 
those that had a parent company in a modern enterprise form (JSC or LLC) was 
42.4%, and by 2008 this had changed to 60.6% (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Penetration ratios of major parent company enterprise forms in Chinese business 
groups, 2000–2008 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total number of business groups 2655 2710 2627 2692 2764 2845 2856 2926 2971 
1. Parent company in modern enterprise forms 
Limited liability company (%) 25.9 28.6 31.5 36.1 38.6 42.2 44.4 45.5 46.7 
Joint stock company (%) 16.5 14.0 14.3 14.5 14.3 13.8 13.4 13.6 13.9 
Solely state-funded LLC (%) 28.5 29.6 30.0 27.8 25.8 24.3 23.6 22.6 21.7 
2. Parent company in traditional enterprise forms 
Traditional non-SOE (%) 9.5 7.9 6.7 5.4 5.7 5.8 4.2 4.3 4.0 
Traditional SOE (%) 17.3 18.6 16.5 14.8 13.9 11.7 10.8 10.3 10.1 
Notes: Data derived from NBSC (2009b); the percentages were calculated by dividing the number of 
business groups whose parent company was in the enterprise form by the total number of business 
groups. 
3.2.2 The incremental listing of Chinese business groups 
The continuous progress of the MOIT in the country arouses increasing pressure on 
business groups for market-oriented changes. The 2000s (the sample period of the 
econometric analysis in this chapter) were characterized by an ideal institutional 
landscape to demonstrate confrontation between arguments concerning business 
groups as institutionally embedded agents. The pervasive resource-emphasizing 
preference among business groups on an overdeliberate renewal process, was 
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increasingly queried given the accompanying problems with governing Chinese listed 
companies (Hu et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2008). Simultaneously, the significant 
improvement in the institutional framework in the decade, provided sufficient 
incentives and conditions for the government and other major agents to exert more 
pressure on the stagnant corporate governance system for change. To cope with this, 
the corporatization requires more deliberately designed institutional instruments, 
which might be more institutionally complex and resource consuming.  
“Incremental listing” emerged as an important IER strategy that links business 
groups with newly introduced stock market institutions since the early 1990s (Cheung 
et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2006). Intuitively, incremental listing is a process by which 
business groups initially list only some of their assets and then sequentially “inject” 
the remaining assets into the listed entity over a period of time (Naughton, 2006). This 
is, essentially, an incremental approach that open business groups to market-focused 
outside investors while maintaining substantial control over the listed affiliates.
14
 The 
ultimate goal of the incremental listing journey is “comprehensive listing”, which is 
increasingly legitimized as a common standard for large business groups when 
entering the 2000s (Deng and Gao, 2010; State Council, 2006). The process of 
incremental listing comprises a sequence of enterprise forms across which the degree 
of market orientation is increasing: non-listed business group (initial state), 
partially-listed business group (in-between state), and wholly-listed business group 
(ultimate state). To utilize aforementioned characteristics of incremental listing, this 
study chooses business groups which were partially listed before the 2000s (the 
                                                 
14
 Of course, this can also be addressed as a process associated with continuous resource 
reallocation and organizational adjustments within the business group (particularly, between 
its listed and unlisted sub-entities). Implication of these issues has been fully clarified in 
Chapter 5. 
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analysis period) as the sample to conduct an econometric analysis. In comparison, 
partially-listed business groups were involved in the new round of reform (therefore 
higher stages of the MOIT) in China more significantly, for example, in terms of the 
split-share structure reform launched in the mid-2000s.
15
 This setting also helps to 
employ governance structures of listed affiliates of business groups. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
In the following subsections, I propose a series of hypotheses to compare the 
explanatory power of IER and overembeddedness arguments for Chinese business 
groups in this decade. I first address different performance effects at the collective 
level predicted by the competing arguments.  
3.3.1 Within-community mechanisms around new governance structures 
Arguments supporting the IER hypothesis emphasize that the emergence of business 
groups in emerging economies cultivated not only collectively shared market-oriented 
identity and autonomy but also many important capabilities to carry this out (Carney, 
2008; Kim et al., 2010). The historical coevolution of Chinese business groups and 
the institutional framework reveals pieces of evidence on these optimistic arguments. 
Historically, the market orientation of Chinese business groups is not simply 
“assigned” by the government but rather is determined by the accumulative efforts in 
place since the beginning of economic reform when the enterprise economic alliances 
emerged to fill institutional voids produced by the former planning economy (CGCA, 
                                                 
15
 The split-share structure reform is a part of stock market liberalization in China to resolve 
several problems confronting Chinese listed firms, to: (1) reduce controlling shareholder 
dominance, and (2) modify the split structure of tradable and nontradable shares in listed 
firms (Bell and Feng, 2009; Jiang et al., 2008). Obviously, business groups have been 
engaged in these as a great number of listed firms in China are business group affiliates (Ma 
et al., 2006). 
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2004; Keister, 1998, 2001). For example, Yiu and her colleagues argue that “once the 
business groups are formed, they have autonomy in pursuing different strategies to 
acquire resources and develop market capabilities in order to enhance their strategic 
competitiveness” (Yiu et al., 2005, p. 187). 
The self-enhancing isomorphic mechanism aroused by endogenous autonomy 
makes business groups more tightly connected with the new more-market-oriented 
institutions, promoting the collective occupation of business groups in shaping a 
market-oriented institutional framework which defines critical sources of competitive 
advantages in the market. Therefore, viewing the embeddedness of the business group 
community in the new institutions—specifically, the penetration of the new 
governance structures (e.g., parent company in modern enterprise forms) in the 
region—as a proxy for the isomorphic pressure, this could be reflected as a positive 
association between the dominance of market-oriented governance structure forms 
and performance. In the context of China, the systematic movement in the population 
of business groups to a market-oriented modern enterprise system in the 2000s as 
revealed in Table 3.1 might inform the presence of this effecting mechanism. 
Therefore, the IER hypothesis will propose a systematic governance structure 
renewal: 
Hypothesis 1a For Chinese business groups, the penetration ratios of new 
governance structures within business groups in the province where they are 
located, are positively associated with performance. 
In contrast, the overembeddedness hypothesis tends to support a pessimistic 
perspective that objects a market-oriented within-community institutional strategic 
view. Most overembeddedness arguments also assume the dominance of a 
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market-oriented institutional transition, whereby a dual-track institutional system in 
which those old institutions interrelated with the business groups remain effective to a 
certain extent in certain fields while the new institutions are increasingly introduced in 
fields where business groups are less influential and promoted by non-business group 
entrepreneurial players (Kim et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2005).
16
  
Such a systematic failure is considered as the result of a set of institutional 
constraints such as structural inertia (Guillén, 2002), environmental uncertainty (Kim 
et al., 2004), and competitive pressure caused by rival players who possess less 
historical baggage (Kedia et al., 2006). As business groups rarely promote the new 
institutions, the penetration of the new governance structure forms (e.g., parent 
company in modern enterprise forms) within business groups is a proxy for the 
exogenous marketization pressure, which tends to affect the performance negatively. 
Therefore, an overembeddedness hypothesis would predict: 
Hypothesis 1b For Chinese business groups, the penetration ratios of new 
governance structures within business groups in the province where they are 
located, are negatively associated with performance. 
3.3.2 Within-community mechanisms around old governance structures 
Mainstream research emphasizes the possibility that business groups might have gone 
too far away from a balance point, falling into the cage of overembeddedness (Carney, 
2008). When such institutional constraints as previously discussed are significant, 
withdrawing from the old mature institutional structures might cause a reduction of 
resources that can be derived from the institutional environment, and raise the risk of 
                                                 
16
 However, as will be discussed in the following subsection, they have overemphasized the 
dominance of institutional environmental forces that hinder business groups from 
involvement in market-oriented institutional changes. 
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infuriating dominant agents (e.g., local governments) who might object to the 
delegitimization for its own sake (Meyer and Lu, 2005). If such cost is considered 
insuperable, business groups will be motivated to stay with these institutions even 
when they become obsolete. Such an overembeddedness burden is therefore reflected 
in the self-enhancing isomorphic mechanism around the old dominant institutions.  
Regarding Chinese business groups, we have previously discussed 
resource-emphasizing preferences that they share. This can be further illustrated by 
looking into how Chinese business groups are collectively involved in establishing the 
“business group version” of corporate governance forms. I illustrate this with the case 
of the China Group Companies Association (CGCA), one of the most influential 
associations of business groups in China. The CGCA proposed a pragmatic, 
sometimes conservative, perspective on important issues of governance structure 
reform (CGCA, 2004). This involves the CGCA and their members to be in conflict 
with other agents, such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission which 
preferred more radical changes around governance issues such as chairman duality 
(CGCA, 2004). Winning these battles has placed business groups at an advantage in 
competing for resources embedded in mature institutional structures (Guest and 
Sutherland, 2010; Yiu et al., 2005). Nevertheless, it does have the potential to 
exacerbate business groups’ embeddedness in these old, less-market-oriented 
institutions (CGCA, 2010). 
By contrast, it can be argued that institutional embeddedness renewal is more 
realistic. Embedding in the old institutions can be treated as a method of mobilizing 
institutional resources (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). To support their engagement 
in embracing new market-oriented institutions, business groups have to 
simultaneously remain embedded in prevailing institutions formalized in the past but 
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that are now less market-enhancing in nature. Therefore, IER hypothesis does not 
negate a persisting and supportive, although usually constrained, effect of the old 
dominant institutions to fuel embedding into new institutions. Prior studies of Chinese 
business groups, although seldom focusing on the mechanisms within the business 
group community, do generate insightful implications in respect of this institutional 
strategic issue. For example, White et al. (2008) delineates the historical context in 
which the Chinese business group was shaped as an effective system managing both 
business strategies (therefore shaped around the new institutions) and government 
relational ties (therefore shaped around the old institutions). Moreover, the gradual 
decline of the old traditional parent company governance forms as shown in Table 3.1 
seems also to argue against a sudden disappearance of beneficial potentials of these 
institutions. 
Therefore, although the IER hypothesis and the overembeddedness hypothesis 
differ in how the embeddedness in old institutions should be dealt with, both of them 
tend to imply a positive effect of the embeddedness of the business group community 
in old institutions—the penetration of the old governance structure forms (parent 
company in traditional enterprise forms in the context of this study)—in a subnational 
province context.  
Hypothesis 2 For Chinese business groups, the penetration ratios of old 
governance structures within business groups in the province where they are 
located, are positively associated with performance. 
3.3.3 The organizational-level process 
The extent to which a systematic embeddedness phenomenon dominates business 
groups during incremental MOITs can be further addressed by examining the 
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effecting mechanisms of organizational-level strategies to enhance market orientation 
of the adopted institutional forms. Specifically, I address Chinese business groups’ 
organizational-level renewal of governance structures to a comprehensively new 
version (fully listed business group with low ownership concentration and high 
tradability of shares in its listed affiliates) which implies increased embeddedness in 
new institutional structures and decreased embeddedness in new institutional 
structures at the organizational level, by examining competing hypotheses. 
Theoretically, the beneficial potential of the adopted governance structures is 
essentially conditioned on the collectively interactive institutional context—that is, 
whether the institutional content of these forms has been synchronized within the 
business group community as in the institutional environment. Establishing or 
dissolving the legitimacy of a governance structure is typically a friction-convergence 
process (Kim et al., 2010; Peng, 2003). The beneficial potential of the governance 
structure would be difficult to realize in friction periods characterized by the lack of 
an institutional foundation that legitimizes the governance structure, but would be 
more likely to become significant in convergence periods when the legitimacy of the 
relevant supportive institutions has been established to a certain extent. 
The IER hypothesis emphasizes the persistence of the autonomy collectively 
shared within the entire population of business groups, which enables coevolution 
between business groups and the institutional environment in facilitating 
market-enhancing changes (White et al., 2008). Under such circumstances, the 
legitimatization of the governance structure while progressing to a new 
market-oriented version tends to converge quickly, lending substantial institutional 
support to the business group that attempts to sustain its competitive advantage in the 
increasingly competitive market. Naturally, some of the adopted governance 
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structures need to be coupled with the old dominant institutions to fuel re-embedding 
actions. However, in situations where the institutional embeddedness renewal 
mechanisms dominate, balancing such obsolete embeddedness will be strategically 
achievable and therefore will not reverse the beneficial potential of these adopted 
institutional forms even when their institutional contents are being refreshed.  
In the context of China, institutional strategic actions which business groups have 
taken in the fields of recent enterprise reform and stock market 
liberalization—specifically, the incremental listing at the business group level and 
split-share structure renewal for their listed affiliates—have a consistent 
market-oriented focus. As previously argued, the beginning of convergences in the 
governance structure reform of Chinese listed companies had become identifiable in 
the mid-2000s (Jiang et al., 2008). These governance structure renewal actions have 
the potential to shift business groups from an old governance structure (partially listed 
business group with high ownership concentration and low tradability of shares in its 
listed affiliates). Therefore, the IER hypothesis will propose: 
Hypothesis 3a For Chinese business groups, the impact of upgrading 
governance structures to a new market-oriented version on performance is 
positive. 
In contrast, the overembeddedness hypothesis tends to imply an overstretched 
convergence period for these old dominant governance structures due to the 
self-enhancing tendency of overembeddedness as argued earlier. During a typical 
overembeddedness process, the old version of the adopted governance structures 
might permanently rest on a convergence position; however, replacing these 
institutional forms with more-market-oriented versions will be accompanied by severe 
institutional frictions and organizational learning/adjusting costs. In the context of the 
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governance structure reform in China, several studies have argued that the mature 
governance structure forms might have too heavy historical baggage—specifically, 
collectively shared preferences on deriving institutional resource and tight control 
over listed affiliates (Hu et al., 2010; Lu and Yao, 2006)—to easily escape. If such an 
organizational-level cost of overembeddedness is significant, it would be too arbitrary 
to assert that the upgraded governance structure forms will be associated with positive 
performance effects. Instead, the dominant overembeddedness mechanisms will 
propose: 
Hypothesis 3b For Chinese business groups, the impact of upgrading 
governance structures to a new market-oriented version on performance is 
negative. 
3.4 Methodologies 
A holistic examination of the proposed within-community and local-level institutional 
strategic mechanisms requires measuring the overall performance of business groups, 
but this is a difficult task in the Chinese context (Lu and Yao, 2006; Ma et al., 2006). I 
accomplish this by considering the profitability of the listed affiliate of the business 
group as an efficient proxy for several reasons. First, this reconciliation reflects the 
distinctive relationship between Chinese business groups and their listed affiliates; 
that is, the listed affiliates are the core of business groups actively involved in the 
corporatization and market liberalization reform, as the comprehensive listing was 
legitimized as an ultimate goal of these (partially) listed business groups (Lu and Yao, 
2006; State Council, 2006). Thereby, measuring performance at the listed affiliate 
level is a significant synchronized proxy of outcomes of embeddedness-renewing 
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strategies of business groups. Second, apart from some of the larger business groups, 
such as those labeled “national champions” (Guest and Sutherland, 2010), most 
Chinese business groups owned only a single listed subsidiary firm. For example, 
only two of the business groups included in this study had two listed affiliates. 
Estimating profitability by that of the listed affiliate is therefore empirically 
convincing. Third, it also helps to delineate the organizational-level IER process by 
including corporate governance strategies at the listed affiliate level because such 
information at the business group level is difficult to find. 
3.4.1 Data and sample 
The data were collected from various sources. Provincial data on the distribution of 
distinct governance structure forms within business groups were derived from Large 
Corporations of China (NBSC, 2001b–2009b). Utilizing this source widely employed 
in previous studies (e.g., Guest and Sutherland, 2010; Ma et al., 2006), I also derived 
data on individual business groups (e.g., sales, assets, and industry). Data on the 
accounting information of group-affiliated listed companies is from the RESSET 
database and checked against alternative sources.  
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 38 matching pairs of business 
groups and their listed affiliates from 2000 to 2008
17
. To be included in the sample, a 
listed company needed to satisfy five critical principles: (1) having aggregate sales of 
textile segments that accounted for most of its sales for at least one year, (2) having 
nonnegative equity values and sufficient accounting information, (3) being the largest 
listed affiliate of a business group that was not fully listed before the sample period, 
                                                 
17
 This study relies on Large Corporations of China (NBSC, 2001b–2009b) to characterize 
the within-community and local-level mechanisms of business groups. This yearbook ceased 
publication in 2010. The period 2000–2008 is the longest time span that we can achieve. 
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(4) being the largest listed affiliate of the same business group throughout the sample 
period, and (5) having the business group identified as engaged in textile 
manufacturing classified by the Chinese Standard Industry Codes (CSIC) as 17, 18, 
19, and 28, or in textile wholesaling and retailing (CSIC 63 and 65) and 
simultaneously containing a significant component of textile manufacturing in its 
business (CEI, 2004; Colpan, 2008).  
3.4.2 Performance measure 
Performance is measured as the return on sales at the affiliated firm level (FMROS), 
calculated as the ratio of operating income to sales. It provides an accounting-based 
measure of operating efficiency and profitability, and has been used in many previous 
studies of business groups and listed firms (e.g., Colpan, 2008; Li et al., 2009).  
3.4.3 Within-community mechanisms 
The community-level institutional embeddedness was represented by penetration 
ratios of distinct parent company governance structure forms. The penetration ratios 
of modern enterprise forms is represented by two variables (PRLLC and PRJSC), and 
the penetration ratios of traditional enterprise forms is represented by the other two 
variables (PRTNSOE and PRTSOE)
18
. The four continuous variables (PRLLC, PRJSC, 
PRTNSOE, and PRTSOE) were calculated as the number of business groups whose 
parent company was in a relevant form (limited liability company, joint stock 
company, non-corporatized non-SOE company, and non-corporatized SOE, 
respectively) divided by the number of business groups in the province.
19
 
                                                 
18
 I did not employ “solely state-founded LLC” because it is a halfway form only applicable 
to large SOEs, lacking distinguishing characters to be addressed as modern or traditional 
(Huang, 2011). 
19
 Tables A3.2–3.5 provide an overview on the distribution of these governance structure 
forms of Chinese business groups across subnational regions (provinces) in China. 
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3.4.4 The organizational-level process 
Three variables were introduced to characterize the organizational-level process of the 
governance structure renewal. The first variable is business group listing ratio 
(BGLIST), calculated by using the total assets of the business group to divide the 
assets of its listed affiliates. Furthermore, I introduced two variables at the affiliate 
level, namely, firm share tradable share ratio (FMTS), measured as the proportion of 
fully tradable shares in total share and firm ownership concentration (FMOC), 
measured as the proportion of shares owned by the top 1 shareholder. 
3.4.5 Control variables 
To control for the effect of institutional strategies in the industrial field, I introduced 
intraindustry business group concentration (BGIC), calculated as the top-three sales 
concentration ratio of the CSIC2 industry to which the business group belongs, using 
information on all business groups included in the NBSC lists (NBSC, 2001b–2009b). 
To control for the impact of internal resource condition both at the business group and 
affiliate level, I included BGGW (the annual change in the business group’s sales), 
BGSZ (the natural logarithm of business group assets in RMB), and affiliate-level 
FMLEV (the debt-to-asset ratio).  
3.4.6 Regression model 
The regression model is specified as follows: 
 Pit = ai + λt + α1Xit + α2Controlit + uit, (1) 
where i indicates the business groups (i = 1,…,38), t indicates time (2000–2008), Pit is 
the profitability of the listed affiliate (FMROSit), Xit represents institutional 
embeddedness variables (PRLLCit, PRJSCit, PRTNSOEit, PRTSOEit, BGLISTit, FMTSit 
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and FMOCit), Controlit indicates the control variables (BGICit, BGGWit, BGSZit, and 
FMLEVit), and uit is the error term. 
3.5 Empirical results 
Table 3.2 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix for the sample. 
The regression results are presented in Table 3.3. Taking into consideration the 
relatively high correlations between several of the explanatory variables, these 
variables are first included separately in Models 1, 2, 3, and 4, followed by the full 
specification with all explanatory variables included (Model 5). The regression 
models are estimated using fixed-effects regression methods to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the sample. The choice of the fixed effects versus the random effects 
estimators is confirmed by the application of Hausman test as the assumption of 
random-effects models—the random effects and the regressors are not 
correlated—was violated (p < 0.01) (Hausman, 1978). Year dummies were included in 
all specifications to control for period effects. 
The IER hypothesis and overembeddedness hypothesis predict distinct 
relationships between the collective-level institutional embeddedness and 
performance. The collective-level institutional embeddedness is represented by the 
penetration ratios of new governance structure forms (PRLLC, PRJSC) and of the old 
governance structure forms (PRTNSOE, PRTSOE). In respect of the 
within-community mechanisms around new governance structure forms, both the 
effect of PRLLC and the effect of PRJSC (p < 0.01) are positive (Models 1, 2, and 5). 
These results are consistent with the prediction of the IER hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a), 
and do not support the overembeddedness hypothesis (Hypothesis 1b) which proposes 
a negative effect of penetration ratios of new governance structure forms. Regarding
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations 
Variables Description Mean SD 1． 2． 3． 4． 5． 6． 7． 8． 9． 10． 11． 
1. FMROS Firm return on sales 0.068 0.110 1           
2. PRLLC Penetration ratio of Limited liability company 0.416 0.161 0.150 1          
3.PRJSC Penetration ratio of Joint stock company 0.148 0.062 –0.014 –0.101 1         
4. PRTNSOE Penetration ratio of Traditional non-SOE 0.063 0.041 0.325 0.366 –0.111 1        
5. PRTSOE Penetration ratio of Traditional SOE 0.086 0.100 –0.057 –0.611 –0.150 –0.176 1       
6. BGLIST Group listing ratio 0.567 0.222 –0.099 –0.008 0.001 –0.229 –0.086 1      
7. FMTS Firm tradable share ratio 0.455 0.147 –0.109 0.342 –0.069 –0.136 –0.202 –0.069 1     
8. FMOC Firm ownership concentration 0.450 0.151 0.004 –0.432 –0.043 –0.187 0.173 0.125 –0.608 1    
9. BGIC Intraindustry BG concentration 0.299 0.095 –0.169 0.116 –0.002 –0.121 –0.089 –0.026 0.222 –0.154 1   
10. BGGW Group sales growth 0.157 0.263 0.293 0.077 –0.002 0.188 –0.053 –0.217 –0.056 –0.033 0.011 1  
11. BGSZ Group size (natural logarithm of assets in RMB) 21.987 0.789 0.165 0.241 0.035 0.031 –0.130 –0.285 0.226 –0.031 0.025 0.232 1 
12. FMLEV Firm leverage 0.393 0.147 –0.242 0.198 0.086 –0.140 –0.117 0.263 0.214 –0.079 0.031 –0.025 0.315 
Note: N=271.
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Table 3.3 Results of regression analyses 
 Dependent variable: Firm return on sales (FMROS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant –1.121** –0.897* –1.248** –1.069** –1.575*** 
 (0.476) (0.473) (0.541) (0.522) (0.551) 
Collective-level effects      
PRLLC 0.076 0.095   0.187 
 (0.120) (0.119)   (0.131) 
PRJSC 0.597*** 0.572***   0.587*** 
 (0.205) (0.203)   (0.200) 
PRTNSOE   0.275 0.381 0.423 
   (0.317) (0.319) (0.335) 
PRTSOE   0.479*** 0.436*** 0.527*** 
   (0.163) (0.160) (0.170) 
Organizational-level effects      
BGLIST 0.179*** 0.153** 0.146** 0.122* 0.152** 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) 
FMTS 0.024  0.050  0.136 
 (0.077)  (0.078)  (0.083) 
FMOC  0.193*  0.205* 0.259** 
  (0.102)  (0.105) (0.112) 
Control variables      
BGIC –0.418*** –0.412*** –0.371*** –0.367*** –0.382*** 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088) (0.086) 
BGGW 0.037 0.038* 0.040* 0.040* 0.045** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
BGSZ 0.051** 0.038* 0.061*** 0.051** 0.060** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
FMLEV –0.260*** –0.248*** –0.300*** –0.290*** –0.285*** 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.070) (0.070) (0.068) 
      
Observations 271 271 271 271 271 
Hausman stat. 42.16*** 56.80*** 35.27*** 51.57*** 504.88*** 
R2 (within) 0.308 0.318 0.308 0.319 0.354 
Notes: Coefficients from fixed-effects regressions; year dummies included in all specifications; 
standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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the old governance structure forms, the signs of the estimated coefficients for the old 
governance structure forms—specifically, PRTNSOE and PRTSOE (p < 0.01)—are 
all positive (Models 3, 4, and 5). Therefore we found supporting evidence for 
Hypothesis 2. 
The organizational-level process associated with the systematic institutional 
embeddedness phenomenon is addressed by two competing extreme hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b) on the effects of upgrading the adopted 
governance structure forms to a comprehensive new version. The positive effect of 
BGLIST (p < 0.1) in all five models and FMTS in Models 1, 3, and 5 are consistent 
with Hypothesis 3a (the IER hypothesis) but not Hypothesis 3b (the 
overembeddedness hypothesis); the positive effect of FMOC (p < 0.1) in Models 2, 4, 
and 5 is inconsistent with Hypothesis 3a but consistent with Hypothesis 3b. These 
results therefore negate the exclusivity of either of these extreme institutional 
embeddedness hypotheses in explaining the organizational-level institutional 
embeddedness phenomena. 
The estimated coefficients on the control variables lend additional implications to 
my analytical framework. The significantly negative effect of intraindustry business 
group concentration (BGIC) tends to support the efficiency structure view, as argued 
in Guillén (2002), that there was significant market competition between Chinese 
business groups during the market-oriented institutional transition. The effect of group 
sales growth (BGGW) is consistently positive, providing evidence that the 
organizational cost for balancing embeddedness in old social obligations during a 
successful embeddedness renewing process can be suppressed. The results for the 
remaining two control variables are also consistent with the conventional 
resource-based view that considers business groups as collections of resources.  
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This study focuses on systematic institutional embeddedness renewal movements 
within business groups. However, the distinct IER actions that a business group takes 
might to some extent vary, contingent on its initial embeddedness (Roth and Kostova, 
2003). I therefore relaxed the constraints on sample selection by including seven 
business groups fully listed before the sample period to check the robustness of our 
results when considering differences in initial embeddedness conditions. I conducted 
the same regressions as in Table 3.3. The results for all hypotheses are qualitatively 
consistent with those reported in Table 3.3 (see Table A3.6 in Appendices). 
3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter, I examined the effectiveness of institutional embeddedness renewal 
(IER) of business groups during the market-oriented institutional transition (MOIT). I 
applied the dual-process model proposed in Chapter 2 that describes systematic 
institutional embeddedness phenomena of business groups as a continuous process of 
increasing collective isomorphic pressure to establish the legitimacy of selected 
institutions within institutional fields, and simultaneous sequential learning/adjusting 
at the organizational level promoting the pervasiveness of relevant institutions. 
Correspondingly, the effect of IER is also dual level, consisting of collective-level 
effect and organizational-level effect. I further argued that the process of the IER can 
be captured by the embeddedness both in the new (more-market-oriented) institutional 
structures and in the old (less-market-oriented) institutional structures.  
I proposed an analytical framework to evaluate the dual-level IER effects by 
examining the relationship between the institutional embeddedness (at both the 
collective level and the organizational level) and the performance of the business 
group. Specifically, the collective-level institutional embeddedness is captured by the 
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penetration ratios of new and old institutions in the business group community, and 
the organizational-level institutional embeddedness is captured by the adoption of the 
new and old institutions by the business group. 
To demonstrate the proposed IER process mechanisms, I proposed a set of 
competing hypotheses, namely, the IER hypothesis and the overembeddedness 
hypothesis which predict different performance consequences. The proposed 
hypotheses are tested by examining the performance effects observed during 
governance structure renewal of Chinese business groups. I identified important 
governance structures formalized to build a modern business group governance 
system that involved Chinese business groups in the enterprise reform and stock 
market liberalization to develop measures of institutional embeddedness for 
econometric analysis. I selected the Chinese textile industry to evaluate 
econometrically the performance effects during these institutional strategic processes 
evident in the sample business groups in this particular industry in the 2000s. 
The main findings from the econometric analysis as follows should be highlighted. 
The results regarding isomorphic mechanisms within the community of business 
groups are more consistent with the prediction of the IER hypothesis. Hypotheses 1a 
and 1b depict differences between the two competing institutional embeddedness 
phenomena. The results indicate that the penetration ratios of both limited liability 
company (PRLLC) and joint stock company (PRJSC) that characterize 
within-community pressure around the new institutions have yielded positive 
performance effect. To say the least, although such a positive effect is not statistically 
significant in the case of PRLLC, it does not lend support to the overembeddedness 
hypothesis that predicts a negative effect of penetration ratios of new institutions 
within the business group community. On the other hand, regarding the examination 
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on Hypothesis 2, there is a positive effect observed around the old institutions as 
represented by the penetration ratios of traditional non-SOE (PRTNSOE) and 
traditional SOE (PRTSOE). This should be interpreted as evidence that business 
groups still need to maintain embeddedness in old dominant institutional structures to 
derive resources to fuel their embedding into new institutional structures and 
competitiveness in market.  
These results jointly provide collective-level evidence that business groups 
engaging in the MOIT as described in this study were experiencing an effective IER. 
Specifically, this process is more likely to be incremental. Under such circumstance, 
embeddedness in those institutions which are less market-oriented but still dominant 
(in the context of this study, such as the traditional SOE enterprise form) will remain 
important as demonstrated by the aforementioned results. 
To a large extent, such an optimistic conclusion is reproduced in the examination 
regarding the organizational-level process (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). Two of the 
strategies promoting the market orientation of adopted governance structure 
forms—specifically, incremental listing (BGLIST) and increasing firm share 
tradability (FMTS)—produce positive effects (although only statistically significant in 
the case of BGLIST). In contrast, the effect of firm ownership concentration (FMOC) 
is significantly positive. This result coincides with findings of previous studies on 
Chinese business groups. Employing 628 listed firms affiliated with Chinese business 
groups in 2001, Lu and Yao (2006) also reported a significant positive effect of 
ownership concentration. High ownership concentration of the listed firm 
characterizes a deep embeddedness of the business group with which it is affiliated in 
old, dominant institutional structures. A positive effect of firm ownership 
concentration therefore provides organizational-level evidence on a relatively 
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persistent value of the embeddedness in old institutional structures for business 
groups.    
Besides, several other explanatory variables (PRLLC, PRTNSOE, and FMTS) have 
not produced significant coefficients. Isolating IER effects in a real empirical setting 
as in China tends to be complicated by many contextual factors. In the previous 
section, we have discussed that the potential influence of the distinct periods 
(convergence period versus friction period) on the examination of the value of an 
institutional form adopted by business groups. This provides a partial explanation of 
the insignificance of these explanatory variables. For example, regarding the 
insignificant effect of share tradability (FMTS), the results of this study is consistent 
with previous studies on Chinese listed firms (e.g., Jiang et al., 2008). I agree with the 
interpretation by Jiang et al. (2008); that is, the institutional foundation of the new 
governance structure (high share tradability) was still weak as the split-share structure 
reform in China has not been launched until the mid-2000s.
20
  
To conclude, we can say that from an IER process viewpoint, these research 
findings provide a positive answer to the research question, “can business groups 
improve their performance by implementing institutional embeddedness renewal?” 
(Chapter 1, p. 6). Business groups picked up in the analysis of this study were 
renewing their embeddedness effectively during the market-oriented institutional 
transition. The effect of the embeddedness in new institutional structures (measured 
by either the penetration ratios or by the adoption of the new institutions) is positive, 
while a concurrent positive effect observed around the old institutions implies the 
necessity of deliberately maintaining embeddedness in those old, dominant 
                                                 
20
 To account for such contextual complexity of MOIT, a possible solution is to include 
variables of MOIT characteristics to elaborate the contingency of the performance effects of 
IER strategies (the following Chapter 4 considers for this issue). 
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institutions. Such effecting mechanisms of IER are expected to dominate the business 
groups in China, given the reliability of the institutional and industry setting of this 
study in depicting the transition of the institutional framework of China, and the 
consistence of my empirical findings with previous studies using more large, 
multi-industry samples (e.g., Jiang et al., 2008; Lu and Yao, 2006). 
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Chapter 4 
An Analysis of Failure of Politically 
Embedded Business Groups in China21 
This chapter examines failure likelihoods of business groups initiated with different 
political and market-oriented features and the institutional contingency of these 
effecting mechanisms during China’s state-led market-oriented institutional transition, 
employing data for 48 textile business groups during the period 2000–2008. 
4.1 Introduction 
Given the significance of business groups in emerging economies (Heugens and 
Zyglidopoulos, 2008), “the relationship between business groups and institutional 
environments is fundamentally interactive and mutually shaping” (Zhang, 2014, p. 
148). For this reason, the role that business groups play—collectively, as “paragons” 
or “parasites”—in the institutional transition of emerging economies to market 
economies, has become highly topical in the literature on business groups (Carney, 
2008; Carney et al., 2011; Heugens and Zyglidopoulos, 2008; Khanna and Yafeh, 
2007). Nevertheless, in business group studies to date, this remains an issue that is 
                                                 
21
 Zhang, Qiang and Wang, Yan (2014), “Political embeddedness, market-oriented 
autonomy, and failure of business groups during China’s state-led institutional transition”, 
International Journal of Economics and Business Research (accepted paper). 
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widely referred to but seldom examined explicitly.  
Any analysis of the role of business groups requires examination of the general 
trends and mechanisms of the interactions between business groups and the 
institutional environment. From an organizational ecology viewpoint (Rodrigues and 
Child, 2003; Volberda and Lewin, 2003), an intuitive and straight way to ascertain 
such a collective role of business groups in a given emerging economy is to consider 
the population dynamics of these business groups. If they collectively play a paragon 
role in market-oriented institutional transition (MOIT), then business groups with 
features that indicate active involvement in market-oriented institutional changes 
would prosper more than their counterparts without such salient features, and vice 
versa. Mainstream studies have shown great concern for identifying organizational 
features that are important for business groups in MOITs (e.g., Kim et al., 2004; 
White et al., 2008; Yiu et al., 2005). However, there remains an almost total lack of 
empirical investigation of the relevance of these features to the population dynamics 
of business groups during the MOIT. 
This study aims to fill these gaps in the literature. Specifically, this study examines 
the likelihood of failure of business groups initiated with different political and 
market-oriented features, and further investigate institutional conditions that increase 
or reduce the risk of failure faced by these featured business groups, in the context of 
China. China is taken as a distinctive institutional setting for several reasons. The 
fundamental institutional changes sweeping many emerging economies are 
characterized by their particular emphasis on developing market-enhancing 
institutions, and simultaneously, dominance of the state in guiding these fundamental 
changes (Andersson and Poon, 2001; Carney, 2008). China is a model illustration of 
such state-led MOIT (Fan, 1994; Lau et al., 2000). The theoretical arguments and 
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empirical investigation in this study therefore have wide applicability. Furthermore, 
China is a large emerging economy in which the institutional differences across its 
subnational regions (typically, provinces) are significant and easy to identify (Li and 
Park, 2006; Shi et al., 2012). This is very helpful in the examination of the 
institutional contingencies of the effect of political and market-oriented features 
because the rules for interactions between business groups and institutional 
environments tend to differ across these regions (Lu and Ma, 2008). 
Employing data from 48 business groups from the Chinese textile industry, this 
study examines two research questions concerning the fundamental organizational and 
institutional mechanisms related to organizational failure of business groups in China. 
First, is the general trend of the entire population of business groups moving towards 
greater market orientation? This can be answered by comparing the failure likelihoods 
of business groups with different political and market-oriented features. Second, how 
will the links between these organizational features and failure likelihoods vary 
between different institutional environments? To answer this question, this study 
focuses on the political and market-focused characteristics of Chinese subnational 
regions to capture institutional contingencies. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
literature and delineates the background to address the important organizational 
features and environmental characteristics of surviving business groups during 
government-guided institutional transitions. The following sections propose a set of 
hypotheses in the context of China and conduct econometric analysis using data from 
business groups in the Chinese textile industry. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of the findings. 
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4.2 Theoretical underpinnings and background 
Empirical research on the roles of business groups in the institutional transition of 
emerging economies remains inadequate (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Zhang, 2014). 
Nevertheless, in the business group literature there has been a persistent concern about 
organizational features considered important for their prosperity or failure. These 
include the capability to implement business strategies (Kim et al., 2004; Lu and Yao, 
2006; Ramaswamy et al., 2011), connections with governments (Ma et al., 2006; Yiu 
et al., 2005), and political rank (Guest and Sutherland, 2010; Lu and Ma, 2008). Let 
us begin with a brief review of these important interactive organizational features to 
develop a holistic research framework for the survival consequences of business 
groups with such features in the context of state-led MOITs such as that in China. 
4.2.1 Fundamental organizational features 
Yiu and her colleagues propose that business groups are essentially bundles of two 
types of sources: politically “endowed resources” from governments and 
“acquired/developed resources” that are the product of intentional, market-oriented 
actions of business groups (Yiu et al., 2005). From an institutional embeddedness 
perspective (Granovetter, 1995), Yiu et al. (2005) identify some fundamental 
organizational features that are important in the coevolution of business groups with 
state-led MOITs: political embeddedness (embeddedness in political institutional 
structures) and market-oriented autonomy, which typifies the organizational 
foundation of endogenously developed resources. 
Political embeddedness. In the context of state-led capitalism, the government is “the 
most important character” with which the roles of business groups and other 
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incumbent organizations are interactively constructed (Carney, 2008, p. 604). 
Embeddedness in specific relationships and political structures in which the 
government possesses regulatory power brings values. Highly politically embedded 
business groups might be granted financial resources necessary for competition, 
identities to affect industrial policies, and opportunities to participate in state-led 
industrialization projects or act as tools to promote market-oriented changes in major 
institutional fields such as enterprise reform (Guest and Sutherland, 2010; Rodrigues 
and Child, 2003; Yiu et al., 2005). On the other hand, political embeddedness also 
incurs political costs and constraints that reduce motivation for market-oriented 
changes (Ma et al., 2006; White et al., 2008). In this respect, the effect of political 
embeddedness is highly contextual and best captured by both relational features such 
as state ownership ties (Lu and Yao, 2006; Ma et al., 2006) and structural 
characteristics such as political rank (Guest and Sutherland, 2010; Lu and Ma, 2008). 
Market-orientated autonomy. A successful government-guided and incremental MOIT 
accompanies a persistent market liberalization pressure that facilitates changes in the 
mindset of key players (e.g., business groups and governments in this study) in 
conceiving market-oriented changes. In the context of Chinese business groups, it is 
argued that “once the business groups are formed, they have autonomy in pursuing 
different strategies to acquire resources and develop market capabilities in order to 
enhance their strategic competitiveness” (Yiu et al., 2005, p. 187). From an 
organizational learning perspective, such market-oriented autonomy is theoretically 
illustrative (Crossan et al., 1999). This is largely the product of business groups’ 
continuous learning about historical market-oriented tendencies in institutional 
transitions. Emerging as agents to resolve “institutional voids” and reform tools for 
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the emerging economy (Ma et al., 2006; Yiu et al., 2005), business groups become 
aware of the damage caused by remaining with old institutions, which motivates them 
to engage further in market-oriented institutional changes. Such self-enhancing 
autonomy helps business groups to move into more market-oriented institutional 
structures that improve their competitive advantage (Zhang, 2014 [Chapter 3]), and 
helps them perhaps to obtain political trust, because market-focused, institutional 
entrepreneurial features are increasingly appreciated by governments seeking agents 
of economic reform (Sun et al., 2010; Wu and Chen, 2011). 
4.2.2 Institutional contingencies in a subnational regional context 
An examination of the links between business groups’ organizational failure and 
political embeddedness, and simultaneously, market-oriented autonomy, will be 
helpful for answering the first research question; that is, whether and to what extent 
the general trend within business groups is evolving towards a market focus. However, 
it is also obvious that the performance of business groups “may well be related to the 
particular institutional environment in which they evolve” (Guest and Sutherland, 
2010, p. 619). Specifically, the prosperity of business groups is also influenced by the 
structural characteristics of the institutional environment along both political and 
economic dimensions (Lu and Ma, 2008; Peng, 2003). In this sense, analysis of failure 
of business groups must take into consideration interactive contexts not only at the 
organizational level but also from the institutional environment side as institutional 
contingencies. However, to date, these institutional environment complexities still 
have not attracted enough attention in the business group literature, with few 
exceptions (e.g., Lu and Ma, 2008; Zhang, 2014 [Chapter 3]). In line with these 
studies, this study focuses on two important structural properties of the institutional 
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environment in emerging economy, first, business-group-related regulations and 
second, development of market institutions. 
Business-group-supporting policies. Business groups can acquire political resources 
from interaction with the government, which are fundamentally determined by the 
institutions (e.g., policies) governing these interactions. In the history of many 
emerging economies, the government has been involved deeply in the formalization 
of business groups (Carney, 2008). The government—for example, in the context of 
China—has implemented a wide range of policies that facilitate the engagement of 
business groups not only in national market-enhancing industrialization strategies but 
also in industrial fields where government protection is lowered (Meyer and Lu, 2005; 
Yiu et al., 2005). 
Marketization. This is defined as “the degree of market-based mechanism 
development and other institutions in order to achieve more efficient market 
functioning” in emerging economies (Shi et al., 2012, p. 1225). Marketization not 
only indicates the level of development of market-supporting “institutional 
arrangements and governance systems” (Roth and Kostova, 2003, p. 315) but also 
determines market-oriented isomorphic pressure shared among national and local 
governments, business groups, and other major agents. 
To describe these institutional environmental characteristics, this study specifically 
focuses on institutional differences at the subnational level, because a significant 
proportion of fundamental marketization dynamics—particularly in those emerging 
economies undergoing large-scale, complex institutional changes—is constituted 
within such a subnational regional context (Chan et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2012). This is 
particularly applicable to China’s institutional transition in which business groups, 
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along with rival organizational forms and governments, interact to shape 
market-oriented institutional logics (Meyer and Lu, 2005).  
4.2.3 Business groups in China 
The emergence of business groups in China is the product of both organizational 
entrepreneurial autonomy and government promotion (Keister, 1998; Ma and Lu, 
2005). In the past decades, on average, Chinese business groups have successfully 
coevolved with the institutional transition in major institutional fields (e.g., enterprise 
reform) by being involved in the corporatization campaign to convert themselves into 
“modern enterprises” in the 1990s (Meyer and Lu, 2005) and recently in commitments 
to transform themselves into large group corporations in a modern sense (CGCA, 
2010). On the other hand, Chinese business groups are also characterized by their 
significant political embeddedness. Business groups formalized in the early days of 
economic reform were, almost entirely, state owned or collectively owned by 
non-private entities (Ma and Lu, 2005). State-owned and collectively owned business 
groups still have a dominant presence within the entire population of business groups 
(Carney et al., 2009a). Besides, some studies emphasize the political rank by which 
business groups position themselves in the country’s hierarchical regulatory 
framework (Guest and Sutherland, 2010; Lu and Ma, 2008; Sutherland, 2009). These 
structural arguments coincide with the official taxonomy by the NBSC that classifies 
business groups by the level of approval authorities, as national business groups (by 
the State Council), provincial business groups (by provincial governments), or 
sub-provincial business groups (by sub-provincial governments). 
Empirically, as an important operationalization, this study focuses on incumbent 
business groups formalized in the early periods of China’s reform (1980s and 1990s). 
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This study categorizes these business groups by their initial political interactive 
characteristics: by initial ownership into state-owned business groups (SOBGs) and 
collectively owned business groups (COBGs), and by political rank, into national and 
provincial business groups (NPBGs) and sub-provincial business groups (SPBGs). 
Among them, SOBGs and NPBGs are treated as highly politically embedded business 
groups. Regarding the political aspect of the categorization, highly politically 
embedded business groups (SOBGs, NPBGs) tend to have greater incentives to carry 
about political “institutional baggage” (Roth and Kostova, 2003). In contrast, COBGs 
or SPBGs have fewer incentives to maintain government interrelationships in the form 
of collective ownership or embeddedness in low-level political regulative structures, 
because the value of such political capital tends to be affected by the market 
liberalization process more significantly (Lu and Ma, 2008; Peng, 2003).  
On the other hand, there is significant difference in the degree of market 
orientation between these cohorts. High, formal political embeddedness is considered 
to be an impeding factor that hinders incumbents in China’s business groups and large 
enterprise sector from developing market-oriented capabilities and incentives (Ma et 
al., 2006; Zhang, 2004). Highly politically embedded business groups tend to have a 
low degree of market orientation. According to the NBSC (2009b), among 419 
non-corporatized, less market-oriented business groups, 72.8% are found to be state 
owned; such a low degree of market orientation has also been found in national 
business groups with the highest political rank (Guest and Sutherland, 2010).  
By this, the empirical investigation is operationalized as comparing survival 
consequences between business groups initiated with high political embeddedness and 
low market-oriented autonomy (SOBGs, NPBGs), and business groups with initial 
low political embeddedness and high market-oriented autonomy (COBGs, SPBGs). 
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4.3 Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis presents a possible scenario regarding the difference in failure 
rates of highly politically embedded business groups (SOBGs, NPBGs) and lowly 
politically embedded ones (COBGs, SPBGs). 
4.3.1 The general trend within business groups 
The success of China’s institutional transition over the past few decades is mostly the 
result of the selection of an incremental approach (Fan, 1994), which emphasizes the 
initiative of business organizations and their full engagement in economic reform 
(Lau et al., 2000; Ma and Lu, 2005). Such a successfully conducted transition to a 
market economy implies an irrevocable spread of market-enhancing institutions and 
continuous reduction of direct government intervention (Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 
2005). This causes more pressure on business groups embedded more strongly in old 
institutional structures (Zhang, 2014). In the context of this study, this means those 
with high political embeddedness (SOBGs, NPBGs). 
A dominant marketization process also causes changes in the logic bases of the 
government in conceiving qualified “reform instruments”. In recent decades, the 
Chinese government has undertaken different strategies to promote reforms in 
different sectors of business groups. Although the government continues to use large, 
government-connected business groups as instruments for national projects such as 
the “go abroad” strategy (Sutherland, 2009), the selection criteria have been 
increasingly market focused. The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) undertook profit-emphasizing capital and budget management 
programs with large business groups (Naughton, 2006), and performance assessment 
systems were used to encourage national trial business groups to conduct 
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market-focused behaviors. These have resulted in increasing difficulty for highly 
politically embedded business groups in deriving resources from government 
relations.  
It is true that highly politically embedded business groups might have cultivated 
autonomy to a certain degree as required by the government in implementing 
industrialization strategies. However, because of the relative overembeddedness in old, 
less-market-oriented institutions (CGCA, 2004), they will find that their capabilities 
developed in government-led industrialization fields might not produce sufficient 
competiveness in dramatically enlarging market spheres where new enterprise 
structures with less historical burdening (e.g., private company) are more legitimate. 
The aforementioned arguments might suggest that as a general trend, Chinese 
business groups relying more on their political embeddedness would  have less 
chance to prosper as paragons that “act in an entrepreneurial, market oriented manner” 
(White et al., 2008, p. 229). 
Hypothesis 1 Highly politically embedded business groups have a higher 
likelihood of organizational failure than lowly politically embedded 
business groups. 
4.3.2 Subnational contingencies 
This subsection focuses on institutional differences at the subnational regional level to 
address institutional contingent aspects of the interactive organizational mechanisms 
comprehensively. Correspondingly, this study proposes hypotheses on the relative 
failure likelihoods of highly politically embedded Chinese business groups in 
subnational regions characterized by different degrees of business-group-promoting 
policy implementation and marketization pressure. 
Chapter 4 
An Analysis of Failure of Politically Embedded Business Groups in China 
77 
 
4.3.2.1 Business-group-supporting policies 
Business group studies are consistent in the understanding of the existence of political 
interactive contexts. It is widely acknowledged the coercive power of governments, 
and their inherent incentives to guide market-oriented institutional changes. In a 
successful government-guided, market-oriented institutional transition context, 
connection with the government, either through formal ties such as state ownership or 
by establishing informal ties via broker agents (Sun et al., 2010), is crucially 
important for domestic incumbents such as business groups. 
Lu and Ma (2008) conduct an empirical study on the contingent value of business 
group affiliation in influencing the performance of international joint ventures (IJVs) 
of Chinese domestic companies. They focus on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
restriction policies as an important characteristic of the institutional environment at 
the provincial level and argue that in provinces where FDI is politically restricted, 
IJVs of group-affiliated companies perform better than their counterparts. From my 
point of view, similar to FDI regulation policies discussed in Lu and Ma (2008), 
business-group-supporting policies can be regarded as a politically interactive 
characteristic that defines the positions of business groups within industrial fields. In 
recent decades, the Chinese government has pursued a series of preferential policies 
for business groups, covering a wide spectrum of market-based activities such as 
financial activities and technology development (NBSC, 2009b). These crucial 
policies are continuously creating significant value for most business groups in China 
(Guest and Sutherland, 2010). 
Because of the centralization characteristic and strong top-down mandates of 
China’s political system (Caulfield, 2006; Qian et al., 1999), these policies are usually 
enacted by the national government and implemented by provincial and municipal 
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governments with few amendments. Therefore, variation in degrees of 
implementation of these preferential policies in the subnational regions (at the 
provincial level) can be used to illustrate the relatively consistent interactive political 
mechanisms. That is, if government support is crucial for the prosperity of highly 
politically embedded business groups, this effect will dominate in some distinct 
subnational regions: 
Hypothesis 2 In regions where supportive policies have been implemented 
comprehensively, compared with lowly politically embedded business 
groups, highly politically embedded business groups are less likely to fail. 
4.3.2.2 Marketization 
Inspired by the prosperity of business groups in emerging Asian economies, Carney 
(2008) proposes a “state-led industrialization hypothesis”, arguing that those business 
groups initiated with close relationships with the state can still prosper through their 
political embeddedness and “further strengthen and consolidate their position” during 
the market liberalization process (Carney, 2008, p. 601). The industrialization 
hypothesis is theoretically meaningful for interpreting the probable dominance of 
politically embedded business groups. 
In the context of successful market-oriented, government-guided institutional 
transitions, the significance of the industrialization hypothesis relies on the extent to 
which the government prefers to use these business groups as instruments for 
market-enhancing reforms. Being such reform agents, business groups can formalize 
capabilities to compete in important industries selected by the government and 
probably can simultaneously develop market orientation to some extent as required by 
the government. Nevertheless, in such situations, market-oriented autonomy would 
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not take top priority. In the typical case of government-led institutional transition as 
described in the industrialization hypothesis, the progress of market liberalization is 
comprehensively managed. Competitive pressure from players outside 
industrialization fields will of course exist, however, at a modest degree that cannot 
provide highly politically embedded business groups with sufficient incentives to 
react to such market-focused pressure.  
China is well known for its successful practice of incremental, endogenously 
driven development in recent decades (Lau et al., 2000). Under such circumstances, it 
is theoretically doubtful that when active involvement of central business 
organizations such as highly politically embedded business groups is lacking, an 
endogenous, nationwide marketization process can be gradually realized without 
significant involvement by exogenous forces. The interaction between highly 
politically embedded Chinese business groups and the government might reassemble 
the dual-track characteristics of China’s economic reform (Fan, 1994), to be mutually 
enhancing towards a market focus.  
If such dual-track mechanisms are significant enough and work well with 
politically-supporting mechanisms, there should be a negative association between the 
marketization degree of the institutional environment and failure rates of highly 
politically embedded business groups in the subnational context. For highly politically 
embedded business groups, the gradual reform provides not only government support 
but also the necessary institutional and macroeconomic foundations for adopting new 
market-oriented rules, norms and values that prevail in the economy. This makes them 
the dominant players in competitive environments such as the regions where 
marketization degree is high. In contrast, business groups with less political 
embeddedness in these regions will find that they are stuck in a disadvantageous 
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situation: to overcome resource constraints caused by a lack of government 
connection, they need to commit more to market-focused strategies with which they 
face significant institutional difficulties that their political interactive characteristics, 
however, cannot immediately resolve (Meyer and Lu, 2005). 
Hypothesis 3 Compared with lowly politically embedded business groups, 
highly politically embedded business groups are less likely to fail in regions 
characterized by a high degree of marketization. 
4.4 Methodologies 
4.4.1 Research setting and sample issues 
4.4.1.1 Industry setting 
Specifically, this study chooses the textile industry to examine the scenarios predicted 
by the proposed hypotheses. The textile industry is a major sector of China’s 
“conventional industries”, occupying a significant presence in the total industrial 
output (Brandt et al., 2008). This is a typical industrial sphere open to comprehensive 
global market competition (Yeung and Mok, 2004; Zhang, 2011 [Chapter 5]), in 
which abnormal government intervention tends to be suppressed (CEI, 2004). During 
the 2000s, the industry grew steadily while business groups kept relatively stable 
positions in the industry (Figure 2.5). These characteristics provide a well-balanced 
setting for addressing concurrent political and market-based interactive mechanisms. 
4.4.1.2 Sample and data 
Obtaining business-group-level information is always a challenging issue for studies 
on business groups in China. To overcome this difficulty, this study focuses on 
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business groups with affiliates listed on domestic stock exchanges. In China, listed 
companies need to disclose publicly a wide range of information as required by the 
regulator, while business groups have no such disclosure obligation. This study was 
able to derive detailed information on business groups’ interactive features (ownership, 
political rank) from the public documents of their listed affiliates (e.g., annual reports, 
prospectuses, and announcements) and supplemented this with necessary information 
from electronic sources such as the RESSET database. More importantly, this 
operationalization provides an effective method of characterizing the organizational 
failure of Chinese business groups. 
Other information regarding the organizational features of business groups (e.g., 
assets, location, and industry) was collected from various editions of the Large 
Corporations of China (NBSC, 2001b–2009b), which were also used to calculate 
subnational (provincial level) indexes of business-group-supporting policies. Data 
regarding provincial marketization are from the National Economic Research 
Institution (NERI). 
The initial sample consisted of all business groups identified by the NBSC as 
engaged in textile manufacturing (CSIC 17, 18, 19, and 28) and those engaged in 
wholesaling and retailing (CSIC 63 and 65) of textiles and maintaining certain textile 
manufacturing businesses following selection criteria in previous studies (CEI, 2004; 
Colpan, 2008; Zhang, 2014 [Chapter 3]), during the period 2000–2008. These 
business groups were then screened according to two critical principles: (1) the 
business group had its core affiliate (the largest listed affiliate) listed on domestic 
stock exchanges before 2005,
22
 and (2) the core affiliate was also a textile company 
                                                 
22
 Six business groups with their core affiliate listed after 2000 (specifically, during 
2001–2004) were included. The necessary historical information for identifying their initial 
organizational status (in 2000) and failure status (losing control over the core affiliate or not) 
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(with its main business being textiles for at least one year). The final sample 
comprises 48 Chinese textile business groups (see Table A4.1). 
4.4.2 Modeling organizational failure of business groups 
In this study, organizational failure of a business group is defined as a focal event in 
which the business group lost control over its largest listed affiliate (core affiliate). 
Regarding “losing control”, this study adopts a property-rights-based approach. It 
means that the business group was no more the largest shareholder of the core affiliate 
(either directly or indirectly).
23
 This assessment is reliable because such crucial 
changes are required to be disclosed publicly. This is also unambiguous, as most 
business groups in the sample owned only one listed affiliate during the sample period. 
Compared with alternative measures such as bankruptcy and firm exit (Fama and 
French, 2004; Garg and Delios, 2007), this measure coincides better with the research 
themes in the current study. First, it reflects fundamental political and institutional 
contexts in China. Incremental listing—listing their “core” affiliates then continuously 
injecting the remaining components into the core—is an essential part of the 
corporatization program of Chinese business groups (CGCA, 2004; Zhang, 2004). 
Losing control over the major affiliate implies an interrupted process of 
market-oriented evolution and even deprivation of business group identity. Second, it 
sufficiently captures the failure from a market-focused dimension of business failure 
as in Honjo (2000). In a study on Chinese business groups with listed affiliates in the 
2000s (Zhang, 2014 [Chapter 3]), it is reported that in average these business groups 
have 56.7% of their assets allocated in their listed affiliates. Hence, losing such core 
                                                                                                                                            
during the sample period can be gathered from the prospectuses. Excluding these observations 
does not change the analytical results qualitatively as reported in Table 4.2. 
23
 Table A4.2 and Figure A4.1 illustrate how such information can be gathered from listed 
affiliates (particularly, the core affiliate) of business groups and other public sources. 
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affiliates is business failure in nature. Besides, I examined the negative consequences 
of organizational failure events and found that losing the core is accompanied (or 
followed) by conventional market-based events, such as bankruptcy, which, however, 
only capture a small portion of failed cases in the sample. 
To utilize the longitudinal event data for an event history analysis, the survival 
status is recorded by business group failure, which was coded zero (surviving) or one 
(failed). Business groups were assumed to be at risk of failure in each year during the 
sample period 2000–2008 (treated as right-censored) or from 2000 to its year of 
failure. Correspondingly, business group duration was calculated to measure the 
duration of survival (from 2000 to its year of failure or to 2008).  
Following the related empirical literature (Garg and Delios, 2007; Lu and Ma, 
2008), this study utilizes a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the effects of 
the organizational and regional interactive features on business groups’ failure 
likelihoods. The Cox proportional hazard model can be specified as: 
h(t) = h0(t)exp(Xβ), (1) 
where h(t) is the rate at which business groups fail at time t given that they have 
survived in t–1, h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, and Xβ are the covariates and 
parameters to be estimated. 
The Cox proportional hazard model has the advantage over parametric models (e.g., 
log-normal and Weibull) that the particular form of the baseline hazard function is left 
unspecified. This is particularly appropriate for the current study, in which the main 
interest is on estimating the effect of the interactive characteristics that determine 
business group failure but not on the specification of the baseline hazard function.
24
 
                                                 
24
 Theoretically, the analytical framework of this study also coincides with the proportional 
hazard assumption well. In essence, this study argues about the persistence of initial political 
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4.4.3 Explanatory variables 
4.4.3.1 Organizational features 
Political embeddedness (simultaneously, market-oriented autonomy) is represented by 
a dummy variable, high political embeddedness (HPE). The variable is measured by 
two alternative indicators. First, SOBG takes a value of one when the business group 
was initially state owned or of zero when the business group was initially collectively 
owned. Second, NPBG is coded as one when the business group falls into the relevant 
categories (national business groups, provincial business groups) or as zero for 
sub-provincial business groups. In general, political embeddedness of business groups 
in the sample exhibits a significant continuity. The political rank, as one kind of 
political title, rarely changes once designated; regarding ownership status, since 2000 
(the benchmark year for identifying initial status), only 13 groups (27.1%) have 
changed their ownership status (because of privatization). 
4.4.3.2 Regional characteristics 
Supportive polices. The NBSC annually reported provincial statistics on the 
implementation of the main business-group-supporting policies: (1) comprehensive 
investment autonomy, (2) overseas financing rights, (3) provision of security to 
foreign entities, (4) independent import and export rights, (5) consolidated tax 
payment, (6) rights to contract overseas projects, (7) rights to approve foreign 
business affairs, (8) rights to establish technology and R&D centers, and (9) rights to 
establish financial companies (NBSC, 2001b–2009b). For each province, the degree 
of policy implementation for each policy (the percentage of business groups that 
                                                                                                                                            
and autonomous interactive characteristics, which results into persistent (therefore, to some 
extent “proportional”) distinctions in hazard ratios of business groups in the two different 
cohorts. 
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adopted this policy) is calculated. Supportive polices is simply the mean of these nine 
percentages, which measure the overall degree of supportive policy implementation in 
the province (see Table A4.3 for an illustration). 
Marketization. Researchers have proposed several indexes of the development of 
institutional environments in subnational regions in China, focusing on elements such 
as privatization of SOEs, market liberalization and improvement of the legal system 
(Li and Park, 2006; Seo et al., 2010). A more holistic index was developed by the 
NERI, which reports annual scores reflecting the degree of relative marketization of 
each province using a multilevel and multicategory assessment system (Fan et al., 
2011).
25
 Therefore, following earlier studies (e.g., Shi et al., 2012), this study uses the 
provincial marketization index by the NERI to capture the overall improvement in 
building market-oriented institutions in Chinese provinces (see Table A4.4). 
Additionally, the effect of size, calculated as the natural logarithm of the average of 
the business group’s total assets from 2000 to 2004 (in RMB), was also controlled for. 
Size is widely accepted as a general proxy of resources accumulated in the 
organization (Yiu et al., 2005), and in politically interactive fields, as an important 
characteristic of business groups in interacting with the government and its agencies 
(Meyer and Lu, 2005). 
 
 
                                                 
25
 The provincial-level index of NERI is a score calculated as the sum of the weighted scores 
of 23 fundamental elements (e.g., reducing government intervention on enterprises, easing 
non-tax burden of enterprises, and reducing the size of government). These elements are 
classified into five categories: relationship between government and market, development of 
non-state-owned economic sectors, development of commodity markets, development of 
factor markets, and development of market intermediaries and legal-institutional 
environments. Some of these elements are further divided into several sub-elements. 
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4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 The model 
Among 48 business groups in the sample, 11 (22.9%) were found to be failed business 
groups. The average duration of survival for business groups in the sample is 8.6 
years (Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1 Cumulative counts of organizational failures in the sample, 2000–2008 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations 
Variables Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. SOBG 0.672 0.470 1    
2. NPBG 0.341 0.474 0.503 1   
3. Supportive policies 53.651 5.571 –0.112 –0.357 1  
4. Marketization 7.578 1.952 –0.260 –0.185 –0.112 1 
5. Size 21.901 0.661 –0.131 0.066 0.089 0.063 
Note: N=411. 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix of covariates 
used in this study. The regional characteristic variables (supportive policies and 
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marketization) were demeaned before interacting them with HPE. Table 4.2 displays 
the results of the regression analysis, in which HPE was represented by alternative 
measures (SOBG for Models 1 and 2, NPBG for Models 3 and 4). All models are 
statistically significant. Based on the global Schoenfeld test (Grambsch and Therneau, 
1994), the assumption of proportional hazards holds for all four models. 
4.5.2 Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 is supported. Regarding the relative dominance of political and 
market-focused interactive mechanisms in affecting the failure of business groups, 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a market-focused scenario in which highly politically embedded 
business groups have higher failure rates. The coefficients of HPE in all models are 
consistently positive and statistically significant. This implies that whatever measure 
of government ownership characteristic (SOBG) or political rank (NPBG) is used, the 
failure likelihoods of highly politically embedded business groups are higher than 
their counterparts. Meanwhile, the results regarding size might provide additional 
evidence: the positive coefficients of size (significant in Models 1 and 2) imply a high 
failure risk confronting large business groups. 
4.5.3 Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 is supported. Hypothesis 2 argues for a consistently significant role of 
the political interactive characteristic of institutional environments in determining the 
failure of business groups. It is expect that in regions where supportive policies were 
implemented comprehensively, highly politically embedded business groups will 
confront less risk of failure. The interaction terms between HPE and supportive 
policies are found to be consistently negative in Models 2 and 4, and statistically 
significant in Model 2. These results lend support to Hypothesis 2. 
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Table 4.2 Results of Cox regression analyses 
 HPE measured as SOBG  HPE measured as NPBG 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
High political embeddedness (HPE) 1.711 * 4.999 ***  1.237 ** 2.224 ** 
(0.985)  (1.050)   (0.628)  (0.976)  
High political embeddedness × 
Supportive policies 
  –0.462 ***    –0.174  
  (0.132)     (0.113)  
High political embeddedness × 
Marketization 
  –0.998 **    –0.757 ** 
  (0.490)     (0.323)  
Supportive policies   0.398 ***    0.134  
   (0.106)     (0.094)  
Marketization   0.816 **    0.386 * 
  (0.402)     (0.221)  
Size 0.446 ** 0.560 **  0.290  0.582  
(0.219)  (0.249)   (0.242)  (0.360)  
          
Wald Chi-square 12.82 *** 36.33 ***  9.81 *** 12.22 * 
Log-likelihood –38.90  –37.09   –39.00  –37.25  
Notes: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
4.5.4 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 is supported. The hypothesis focuses on the extent to which highly 
politically embedded business groups can utilize the support of political 
embeddedness to engage autonomously in the process of marketization. In Models 2 
and 4, the coefficients on the interaction term between HPE and marketization are all 
significantly negative. These results indicate that relative to their counterparts, highly 
politically embedded business groups have lower failure likelihoods in regions 
characterized by a higher degree of marketization, as proposed by Hypothesis 3. 
Together with Hypothesis 2, these results jointly suggest that even business groups 
with high political embeddedness can also be an autonomous agent for marketization, 
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when provided necessary pressure from the institutional environment and the 
government. 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter introduced a new approach to addressing the role of business groups in 
market-oriented institutional transition, a key theme in the recent literature on 
business groups in emerging economies (Carney, 2008; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) and 
of this dissertation. The approach is theoretically insightful and straightforward: the 
role that business groups collectively play in a given institutional environment may be 
captured by comparing failure likelihoods of business groups with distinct interactive 
features. Therefore, in contrast with Chapter 3 that focuses on performance effects 
associated with the process of IER, this chapter places more emphasis on 
organizational features enabling/hindering such process. 
Specifically, this study studied the failure consequences of business groups 
initiated with different political and market-based interactive organizational 
endowments, and the institutional contingency of these interactive organizational 
mechanisms in the context of China. Drawing insights from previous studies, two 
fundamental organizational features that characterize the capabilities and tendencies 
of business groups to engage in MOIT, namely political embeddedness and 
market-oriented autonomy, were considered. This was then applied to the context of 
China, where business groups are classified into two broad categories: highly 
politically embedded business groups and lowly politically embedded business groups. 
Utilizing this taxonomy and the subnational regional institutional differences in China, 
and employing data from business groups in the Chinese textile industry, this study 
conducted an econometric analysis of differences in failure rates of these business 
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groups and the institutional contingencies of these survival mechanisms. 
The empirical investigation began with an examination of the relative dominance 
of the fundamental organizational features in determining the failure rates of business 
groups in a successful government-guided institutional transition as in China. The 
possible survival scenario is predicted in Hypothesis 1. It is found that business 
groups with high political embeddedness (and simultaneously low market-oriented 
autonomy) confront higher failure risk. This finding is consistent with an optimistic 
assertion in the literature on Chinese business groups that during the institutional 
transition in China, the general trend in the evolution of the entire population of 
business groups is market oriented. For example, White et al. (2008) argue that in 
coping with the increasing pressure of marketization, Chinese business groups can 
cultivate their market orientation. Ma et al. (2006) find that business group affiliation 
positively moderates the negative relationship between state ownership and the 
performance of Chinese listed companies. They therefore argue that Chinese business 
groups seem to have cultivated their market-orientated incentives and capabilities to a 
certain degree by filling the so-called “state-ownership voids”. Analysis in this study 
provides supportive evidence for ascertaining such a market-oriented tendency as a 
general commonality within Chinese business groups. 
Hypothesis 2 argues for a relatively pronounced value of political interactive 
contexts in determining the failure of Chinese business groups. It is found that in the 
Chinese subnational regional context for the hypothesis that in provinces where 
business-group-supporting policies were implemented more comprehensively, 
business groups initiated with heavy political embeddedness would be less likely to 
fail. This finding coincides with the reality in China and arguments of previous studies. 
During China’s incremental institutional transition, the government’s persistent 
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enthusiasm for active involvement in—sometimes, direct control over—market 
liberalization processes remains obvious (Smyth, 2000). Such a historical context 
endowed some business groups with an initially dense political embeddedness that 
accounts for a significant portion of the legitimacy and capabilities that they possess. 
Several empirical studies argue about advantages enjoyed by these business groups. 
Lu and Ma (2008) argue that nation-level business groups under the administration of 
the State Council can derive political capital from their close relationship with the 
national government and can utilize this to fuel their affiliates. They find that 
international joint ventures (IJVs) under the umbrella of national business groups 
perform better than IJVs affiliated with independent companies. In a similar vein, 
Guest and Sutherland (2010) focus on 100 or so national trial business groups. They 
examined the performance effect of the overall prominent position of these “national 
champions” in the country’s regulative framework (e.g., a variety of 
business-group-supporting policies) at the affiliated company level, and they find 
supportive empirical evidence. Analysis in this study extends the arguments of these 
studies, by revealing the existence of political interactive contexts and connecting this 
with the population dynamics of business groups. 
Hypothesis 3 asks whether there are circumstances under which highly politically 
embedded business groups can coevolve with the marketization process. It is found 
that business groups with high levels of political embeddedness prosper in Chinese 
provinces characterized by a high degree of marketization. One interpretation is that 
these highly politically embedded business groups have formalized distinctive 
motivations and capabilities as a response to market-focused pressure from both the 
marketization and the government. This finding has important implications for the 
promotion of transformation among politically embedded business groups. In recent 
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decades, governments of major emerging economies have upgraded their 
industrialization strategies, from a simple import substitution strategy in early periods 
of reform (Carney, 2008) to facilitating overseas investments by domestic enterprises 
(Garg and Delios, 2007; Sutherland, 2009). In industrial sectors, enterprises with 
greater entrepreneurial, market-oriented autonomy are politically favored (Wu and 
Chen, 2011); business groups involved in the industrialization process are provided 
with motivation to commit more to develop technologically complex, market-focused 
capabilities. The accumulated knowledge and resources can, in turn, be used to 
expand their territory into more market-centered, less state-managed industrial 
spheres. Under this circumstance, the “friendly” interrelationship with the government 
can work well as the converter of political resources for such entrepreneurial trials. 
From the perspective of lowly politically embedded business groups, the 
complexity of the organizational and institutional mechanisms that underpin the 
survival or failure of business groups during MOITs can be further demonstrated. 
Although the general trend within sample business groups is towards market 
orientation, specifically reflected in the relative advantage of lowly politically 
embedded business groups over their counterparts (Hypothesis 1), it is clear that this 
advantage is highly contextually constrained, and is available only in institutional 
environments with relatively low levels of marketization (Hypothesis 3). It is argued 
that with the process of MOIT, such institutional environments will naturally decline 
(Peng, 2003). Therefore, in the worst-case scenario, the general market-oriented trend 
within these business groups may be disrupted or reversed. This is a negative scenario 
that business group researchers and institutional scholars would not wish to see. 
In conclusion, this study provides a promising contribution to our understanding of 
fundamental organizational and institutional mechanisms that shape the distinctive 
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roles, population dynamics, and failure of business groups during MOITs. The results 
of the Cox regression analyses show the complexity of the proposed organizational 
and institutional mechanisms. It is possible for market-oriented autonomy to dominate 
political embeddedness in determining the overall prosperity of business groups. 
However, the effect of organizational mechanisms is highly contingent on the specific 
institutional conditions that confront a business group.  
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Chapter 5 
Diversification, Group affiliation, and 
Performance of Listed Firms in China26 
Employing data on listed firms in the Chinese textile industry during the period 
2001–2005, this chapter analyzes the performance effects of diversification strategies 
and the impact of group affiliation on these effects. I clarify the empirical results by 
incorporating institutional embeddedness renewal (IER) considerations. 
5.1 Introduction 
The impact of diversification strategy on firm performance has been a prominent 
theme in strategic management and other fields such as enterprise economics and 
corporate finance (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Palepu, 1985; Ramaswamy et al., 2011; 
Rumelt, 1974; Silverman, 1999). In recent years, there has been a fairly steady stream 
of research on diversification outcomes in emerging economy contexts, which take as 
promise that the value-creation potential of diversification is determined by 
characteristics of the institutional environment (Chakrabarti et al., 2007; Peng et al., 
2005; Wan, 2005), and moderated by connections with central business organizations 
                                                 
26
 An earlier version of the chapter: Zhang, Qiang (2011), “Diversification and performance 
of group-affiliated firms during institutional transitions: the case of the Chinese textile 
industry”, American Journal of Economics and Business Administration, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 
234-246. 
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such as business group (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Lu and Yao, 2006; Ramaswamy et 
al., 2011; Sing et al., 2007). 
This study offers complementary insights from a novel sample of listed firms 
drawn from the Chinese textile industry in the 2000s. The aim of this study is 
threefold. First, it investigates the extent to which firms can conduct diversification 
strategies successfully in such an institutional setting characterized by notable 
market-oriented changes. To a certain extent, the great majority of studies on 
diversification effects in emerging economies are from an institution-based view of 
business strategy (IBVBS), emphasizing the dominance of the institutional 
environment in determining the relative value of business strategies (Kedia et al., 
2006; Lee et al., 2008; Peng et al., 2005; Wan, 2005). In emerging economies 
undergoing market-oriented institutional transition (MOIT), “intermediate 
institutions—such as financial and market intermediaries—are inefficient or absent” 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2007, p. 101); in other words, there tends to be institutional voids 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000). The existence of institutional voids implies that in the 
context of emerging economy, diversified firms might perform better than specialized 
firms by internalizing such functions that substitute for the imperfect external product, 
capital and labor markets. Unfortunately, the empirical studies have yielded mixed 
results (Chakrabarti et al., 2007; Lin and Su, 2008; Singh et al., 2007). Such an 
inconsistency suggests that the relationship between diversification and firm 
performance may be also influenced by the way that the firm interconnects with the 
institutional environment, i.e., by affiliation to a business group (Ramaswamy et al., 
2011; Zhang, 2014). 
Second, I examine how group affiliation moderates the relationship between 
diversification and performance of these firms. Given the significance of business 
Chapter 5 
Diversification, Group affiliation, and Performance of Listed Firms in China 
96 
 
groups in emerging economies, there has been an increasing concern about the 
relationship between group-affiliated firms’ diversification strategies and their 
economic performance (e.g., Chakrabarti et al., 2007; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Kim 
et al., 2004; Lins and Servaes, 2002; Singh et al., 2007). In many emerging economies, 
group affiliation has often been found to be profitable (Carney, 2008; Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007). Group affiliation may benefit firms by providing access to resources 
pooled within the business group (Chang and Choi, 1988; Khanna and Palepu, 2000) 
and embedded in institutional environments (Granovetter, 1995). Therefore, if a 
group-affiliated firm can access the substantial group resources and use them to fuel 
its diversification strategy, a higher-performance effect of diversification should be 
possible. However, extant empirical research on firm diversification in emerging 
Asian economies has produced inconsistent results (Chakrabarti et al., 2007; 
Ramaswamy et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2007). Furthermore, although Chinese business 
groups have attracted increasing research attention in recent decades, researchers have 
just begun to study the diversification of firms affiliated with these business groups 
(Lu and Yao, 2006). My investigation will enrich our understanding of the 
diversification and business groups in the context of China. 
Third, on the basis of the various arguments in previous institution-based studies of 
business groups and diversification, I add institutional embeddedness renewal (IER) 
to ascertain performance consequences of diversification by group-affiliated firms. 
From an institutional embeddedness perspective, there might be differences in the 
performance outcomes of diversification by the group-affiliated firms and by 
independent firms during the MOIT. Fundamentally, the value of diversification 
strategies is determined by the institutional environment (or dynamically, the MOIT) 
and how the firm is linked with this. Business groups are prominent players that have 
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to conduct IER to cope with market-oriented changes within institutional structures. 
Hence, as one part of the business group, group-affiliated firms might be granted both 
resource and cost associated with the IER. In this respect, the impact of group 
affiliation on the performance outcomes of diversification strategies by the firm 
during the MOIT will not be simply even, but inevitably contextualized.  
Such institutionally contextualized tendency does raise specific requirements for 
more delicate analytical settings. This study accomplishes this by using 2001–2005 
data on listed firms from the textile industry of China for the empirical analysis. The 
country environment and industry background offer a unique institutional setting to 
take into considerations possible influences of the IER of business groups (Zhang, 
2014). Particularly, the unique relationship between Chinese business groups and their 
listed affiliates is thought to be suitable for delineating the complexity of 
diversification strategies of group-affiliated firms. One reason is that the listed 
affiliates are involved deeply in the process of incremental listing, which is known as 
an essential part of IER of Chinese business groups during the 2000s.
27
 
In Section 5.2, I provide the theoretical foundations and institutional background 
for this study. Section 5.3 deals with the methodological issues. Section 5.4 presents 
the results of econometric analysis. Section 5.5 provides a brief concluding remark. 
5.2 Literature review and background 
5.2.1 Diversification strategy and economic benefits 
Diversification strategy is the entry of a firm into new lines of activity (Ramanujam 
and Varadarajan, 1989). In this sense, a diversified firm is defined as a firm that 
                                                 
27
 Needless to say, selecting listed firms as the sample for analysis is a common approach for 
empirical studies of business group effects (see Guest and Sutherland, 2010). 
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operates in different businesses (industries) simultaneously (Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). 
Sources of performance outcome of diversification strategy has attracted substantial 
interest during the past decades (e.g., Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Lang and Stulz, 1994; 
Palepu, 1985; Rumelt, 1974; Silverman, 1999).  
Hill and Hoskisson (1987), one early work in the line of these studies, propose two 
fundamental economic benefits that diversified firms can achieve through specific 
diversification strategy. Synergistic economies, often referred to as “economies of 
scope” (Rumelt, 1974), “can be realized by firms that have diversified into a related 
set of businesses” (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987, p. 332). Financial economies are 
“associated with firms that have diversified into unrelated areas” (Hill and Hoskisson, 
1987, p. 332). By pursuing unrelated diversification, firms can “achieve a more nearly 
optimal capital allocation of resources, and ‘police’ the divisions more effectively than 
the external capital market could if each division were an independent enterprise” 
(Hill and Hoskisson, 1987, p. 333). 
5.2.2 Entropy diversification measures 
To verify the economic benefits as proposed in Hill and Hoskisson (1987), we need 
specific diversification measures to conduct empirical examinations. Palepu (1985) 
surveyed diversification effect studies in the 1970s and 80s, argues that one reason 
these studies have not depicted significant diversification effect is that their measures 
could not identify the distinction between unrelated and related diversification. 
Responding to this, Palepu (1985) introduced the entropy diversification measures, 
which have become a standard method for diversification studies today (e.g., Fukui 
and Ushijima, 2007; Lee et al., 2008; Lu and Yao, 2006; Ramaswamy et al., 2011; 
Singh et al., 2007).  
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The entropy measure of diversification takes the general form: 
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where j indicates an industry in which the firm has business (j = 1,...,J), sj is the firm’s 
sales in industry j (sj > 0), and TS is the firm’s total sales. 
The entropy measure is attractive most because the total entropy DIVit can be 
divided into two separate components (unrelated diversification UDIVit and related 
diversification RDIVit). Let us consider the case in which a firm has pursued 
diversification into G industry groups. The sales in the industry group g is then 
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where j = 1,…,Jg (Jg is the number of industries in the industry group g), and sj is the 
firm’s sales in industry j (sj > 0). 
The degree of unrelated diversification of firm i in period t, UDIVit is the entropy 
exist across these isolated industry groups, which can be calculated as: 
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where g = 1,…,G (G is the number of industry groups in which the firm has business), 
Sg indicates the firm’s sales in the industry group g, TS indicates the firm’s total sales. 
The degree of related diversification of firm i in period t, RDIVit, is computed by: 
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is the entropy within industry group g, j indicates an 
industry in the industry group g (j = 1,…,Jg), sj is the firm’s sales in industry j (sj > 0). 
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5.2.3 Diversification effects in emerging economies and moderating roles of group 
affiliation 
5.2.3.1 Diversification effects in emerging economies 
A dominant theoretic strand in the institution-based studies of diversification is that 
the benefits of diversification arise, at least partly, from the diversified firms’ internal 
markets that are considered to be efficiently established while external market 
conditions are still imperfect and institutional foundations remain inadequate (see 
arguments in Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). In essence, as the extent of such internal 
market building are shaped by the fundamental changes of institutional environments 
(in other words, the institutional transition), the influence of the institutional 
environment will dominate across group affiliated firms and independent firms. 
A successfully undergone MOIT tends to decrease the relative value of the internal 
markets of diversified firms (Peng et al., 2005). Building internal markets that are 
soundly efficient than the external markets is a difficult task in late stages of the 
MOIT (Kedia et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2008). Therefore, it would not 
strange that empirical studies on firm diversification effects in emerging economies 
have produced mixed results (e.g., Chakrabarti et al., 2007; Lin and Su, 2008; Singh 
et al., 2007). Employing a sample of 816 listed firms from 74 two-digit industries in 
China during the period 2000–2002, Lin and Su (2008) reported a significant positive 
effect of diversification on firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q), and the result is 
robust to the use of alternative diversification measures such as the number of 
segments, Herfindahl index or dummy measures. They argue that the positive 
relationship between diversification and firm value implies that diversified firms may 
benefit relatively easily from their internal capital markets in China, “where it is 
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costly or impossible to raise external capital” (Lin and Su, 2008, p. 408). In contrast, 
Chakrabarti et al. (2007) studied 3117 firms in six East Asian economies during the 
period 1988–2003. They found positive impact of diversification on ROA only in the 
least developed environments–Indonesia. Moreover, Sing et al. (2007) studied 846 
Indian firms during the post-reform era of India (1998–2000) and reported negative 
impacts of diversification on firm ROA and ROE.  
Several empirical issues can be helpful to identify sources of such inconsistency. 
First, these studies actually employ only unrelated diversification measures; more 
insightful findings might be achieved if related diversification measures is included as 
argued in early diversification studies (e.g., Palepu, 1985). Second, the choice of 
suitable performance measure is critical if considering the long-term tendency of 
unrelated diversification in creating value.  
5.2.3.2 Moderating roles of group affiliation 
In the literature of business group study, there is an increasing concern about the 
relationship between diversification strategies and economic performance in emerging 
economies (e.g., Chakrabarti et al., 2007; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Kim et al., 2004; 
Lins and Servaes, 2002; Singh et al., 2007).  
However, it seems that these studies are continuing the tradition from mainstream 
studies on diversification effects in emerging economies. Placing focus on financial 
economies of diversification, they argue for the possibility that group affiliation can 
benefit firm’s diversification. They argue that in emerging economies, group 
affiliation is found to be profitable under certain circumstance (Carney, 2008; Khanna 
and Yafeh, 2007); if so, it will be possible that group affiliation may benefit firms by 
providing access to substantial resources pooled in the business group and hidden in 
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the institutional environment. 
Researchers have expected to see that if group-affiliated firms can access such 
group resources and use them to fuel its diversification strategy, a higher-performance 
effect of diversification compared with independent firms should be possible. 
Unfortunately, the empirical studies have yielded mixed results (e.g., Chakrabarti et 
al., 2007; Ramaswamy et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2007). Ramaswamy et al. (2011) 
studied 185 Indian listed firms, and found that group affiliation positively moderates 
the negative effect of diversification on firm ROA. Singh et al. (2007) reported same 
positive impact of group affiliation on firm ROA for Indian firms in the period 
1998–2000. In contrast, although using ROA as performance measure, Chakrabarti et 
al. (2007) only found evidence supporting that group-affiliated firms perform 
diversification better in two of six East Asian economies, Singapore and Thailand. 
5.2.3.3 Taking into consideration the IER of business groups 
From our point of view, the inconsistency within previous studies on the role of group 
affiliation on diversification effect suggests that the relationship between a 
group-affiliated firm’s diversification and performance may reproduce the complexity 
of business group–institutional environment interactions. Previous studies on 
diversification and business group have paid little attention to purposeful IER actions 
of business groups that is the focus of the dissertation. Given the prominence and 
(possible) active role of business groups in emerging economies, incorporating the 
IER process considerations can contribute to extending the theoretical foundations of 
research on diversification strategy in emerging economies. 
The institutional embeddedness of business groups is the result of their intentional 
IER actions to manage their interconnections with the institutional environment 
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(specifically, institutional structures). Therefore, the extent to which business groups 
have effectively conducted the IER will has inevitable influences on the 
diversification strategies of the firms affiliated with them.  
This can be viewed at both the collective level and the organizational level of the 
IER. First, at the collective level, the successfully renewed embeddedness of the 
business group community into dominant market-oriented institutional structures 
improves the collective position of business groups within the institutional 
environment. This will increase the aggregate level of resource within the business 
group that can be utilized to support the diversification of the affiliated firms.  
On the other hand, the IER requests deliberately designed and conducted resource 
allocation and organizational adjustments at the organizational level, which will of 
course affect the diversification–performance link of affiliated firms if the affiliated 
firms are involved in this. Unrelated diversification and related diversification tend to 
be influenced through different mechanisms: for unrelated diversification, the 
resultant changes in the financial economies will be more meaningful; for related 
diversification, the influence of intra-business-group resource allocation and 
organizational adjustments may account for much because of its organizational 
dependence (Rawley, 2010). 
Furthermore, business groups in different emerging economies tend to differ in the 
extent to which they have successfully conducted IER and the presence in the 
economy. Therefore, one should not simply expect that there are consistent 
diversification effects for firms (or group-affiliated firms) in different emerging 
economies. In this sense, it is not strange that the empirical studies on firm 
diversification effects in emerging economies have produced mixed evidence. 
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5.2.4 Research background 
5.2.4.1 China’s MOIT 
I turn to the Chinese context where systematic existence of IER within business 
groups has been widely observed (Zhang, 2014 [Chapter 3]). Specifically, this study 
employs data on domestic listed firms from China’s textile industry for the period 
2001–2005 to provide enriched insights for the study of diversification and business 
groups in emerging economies.  
China offers a suitable country specificity to conduct a holistic study. China is 
known for its successful implementation of an incremental institutional transition 
during the last three decades. Such a gradual transition characteristic conforms to the 
common presumption underneath institution-based studies of diversification and 
business in emerging economies. They argue that as a general trend, the institutional 
transition in the emerging economy should be shifted in a market direction (Peng, 
2003; Peng et al., 2005). 
5.2.4.2 The incremental listing of Chinese business groups 
After almost two decades of continuous institutional transformation since the end of 
the 1970s, China has established a preliminary market-oriented enterprise system that 
makes business organizations compete more on the basis of market mechanisms 
(Aivazian et al., 2005). During the 1990s, Chinese business groups have implemented 
successful governance structure renewal with major focus on converting themselves 
into group companies. When entering into the 2000s, the changes in institutional 
environments impose increasing pressure on Chinese business groups for 
more-market-oriented changes. Compared with the newly established independent 
firms and those former state-owned enterprises that may have undergone governance 
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structure renewal already, business groups have to make more effort to upgrade their 
governance structures at least to the average level of the industry. Such a 
disadvantageous condition is, as argued in Meyer and Lu (2005), partly because of the 
relatively large scale and complex organizational contexts of Chinese business groups 
as loose hierarchical systems embedded with individual affiliates that vary in 
institutional tendencies and resource endowments. 
Incremental listing is a critical governance structure renewal strategy for Chinese 
business groups in the 2000s, to accelerate an evolution towards the ultimate 
aim—being “a general form of diversified corporation” (Chang, 2006, p. 414). As the 
“core” to implement this IER movement, the listed affiliates are more likely to benefit 
from the IER effects than the unlisted affiliates of business groups. The incremental 
listing is a gradual process that often begins with the listing of a core affiliate (usually 
one that has been corporatized fully, thereby being institutionally advanced), followed 
by a sequences of “transfer-and-integrate” procedures across the indefinite boundary 
between the listed and unlisted parts of the business group during a considerably long 
period (CGCA, 2004; Naughton, 2006). By transferring and integrating its “most 
evolved” institutional forms and “best” resources into listed affiliates, the business 
group may expect to create a virtuous cycle: successful implementation of the 
transfer-and-integrate procedure leads to both continuous spillover of advanced 
institutions from listed affiliates to others and an increase in the business group’s 
resource stock, which in turn stimulate new rounds of transfer-and-integrate. However, 
such a series of complicated resource allocation and organizational adjustments 
causes costs. 
Given the aforementioned characteristics of China and Chinese business groups, 
selecting listed firms (both group-affiliated and independent) as the sample for 
Chapter 5 
Diversification, Group affiliation, and Performance of Listed Firms in China 
106 
 
analysis is suitable. Although employing listed firms for analysis is a common 
approach in the literature of diversification and business group study (Guest and 
Sutherland, 2010), our focus on the listed affiliates of Chinese business groups will 
produce plentiful interpretations for exploring the moderating effects of group 
affiliation on diversification outcomes. 
5.3 Methodologies 
5.3.1 Sample and data 
The sample initially includes 94 textile firms listed on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2005. After eliminating firms that 
went public or were delisted during the period or have missing values, the final 
sample is a balanced panel dataset containing 62 firms and 310 firm-years. There are 
46 group-affiliated firms (74%) in the sample; this percentage is comparable with 
previous studies of Chinese business groups; for example, Ma et al. (2006) reported a 
percentage of 67%. 
Regarding the industry background, the Chinese textile industry became the largest 
textile industry in the world in 1994 and is considered a highly unregulated industry in 
the Chinese economy (CEI, 2004). This industry setting, especially the market 
competition in the industry, is meaningful as our primary interest is the impact of 
group affiliation on firms’ business strategy outcomes during the MOIT. 
Accounting and financial data of listed firms are collected from the China 
Financial and Economic Research (CCFR) database and the RESSET database. 
Segment data (business description, sales, cost, etc.) are compiled from financial 
statements directly; I use the two-digit Chinese Standard Industry Classification 
(CSIC) to code all segments, and I compute diversification variables with segment 
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sales data. I use the yearbooks published annually by the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China (NBSC), Large Corporations of China (NBSC, 2001b–2006b), to obtain 
information on business groups such as registration name, address, and turnover. 
Group affiliation is then identified by matching a listed firm’s block shareholders with 
the business group by the name and other essential data that are reported in the CCFR 
database (and financial statements) and NBSC yearbooks. 
5.3.2 Diversification measures 
This study employs the entropy index of diversification (Palepu, 1985). Data 
availability is a critical issue. A common approach in the diversification literature to 
capture the relatedness between segments (and industry groups) is to consider all 
three-digit or four-digit industries in one two-digit industry as an industry group (for 
example, industries CSIC 171, 172 and 173 belong to the industry group CSIC 17). In 
China, this is a tall order as there is not a refined database for segment information at 
three- or four-digit SIC level (like COMPUSTAT). To calculate diversification 
measures, researchers have to manually collect the segment data and match each 
segment with an industry classification code (e.g., Lin and Su, 2008; Ma et al., 2006). 
In many cases, the segment information disclosed by the listed firms is so coarse that 
researchers can only afford to assign business segments with two-digit CSIC codes (as 
in this study). This increases the difficulty in describing industry groups.
28
 
The current study settles this issue by focusing on the broad scope of the textile 
industry. The textile industry is defined as an industry group consisting of six 
two-digit CSIC industries: Textiles (CSIC 17), Apparel, footwear and caps (CSIC 18), 
                                                 
28
 Using one-digit CSIC industries as the industry group and two-digit CSIC industries as the 
industries of the industry group is possible, but means little for studies in the field of strategic 
management. 
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Leather, fur, feather and related products (CSIC 19), Chemical fibers (CSIC 28), 
Wholesaling (CSIC 63) and Chemical material and product manufacturing (CSIC 
26).
29
 According to this definition, the textile industry is the only multi-industry 
industry group that we can identify.  
The degree of unrelated diversification of firm i in period t, UDIVit is exactly as 
described in Equation (3): 
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As the entropy equals zero for any single-industry industry groups, Equation (4) 
indicated in Subsection 5.2.2 can be rewritten as follows: 
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where k represents two-digit CSIC industries in the textile industry group in which the 
firm does business (k = 1,…,K), S
tex
 is the firm’s total sales in the textile industry 
group, and
tex
ks is the firm’s sales in industry k. 
This assumes that in average, firms in the sample were more likely to pursue 
related diversification inside the textile. Given the general trend of the sample firms 
being relatively specialized in the textile industry (as shown in descriptive statistics on 
unrelated diversification in Table 5.1), such a simplification is reasonable. 
5.3.3 Dependent and control variables 
I use Tobin’s Q and ROA as dependent variables following previous studies (e.g., 
Fukui and Ushijima, 2007; Khanna and Palepu, 2000). 
                                                 
29
 This broad-spectrum definition reflects considerations of relatedness in the diversification 
of textile firms (Colpan, 2008) and the corporate coherence literature (Lien and Klein, 2009; 
Teece et al., 1994). I also applied a narrow-spectrum definition with focus on textile 
manufacturing (CSIC17, 18, 19, and 28) (CEI, 2004) and conducted a robustness examination 
(see Table A5.2 in Appendices). 
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Tobin’s Q is a widely used measure of firm value in the finance discipline. As in 
previous studies of business groups (e.g., Khanna and Palepu, 2000), a simplified 
version of Q can be calculated as: 
Tobin’s Q = (Market value of equity + Book value of total debt) / Book value of total 
assets. 
It is well known that in the Chinese stock market, a significant proportion of the 
shares were non-publicly tradable shares before 2007 when China completed the 
“share structure resolution reform” to allow nontradable shares to be publicly tradable 
(Peng et al., 2011). As it is difficult to estimate the prices of these non-publicly 
tradable shares, I use the price of publicly tradable shares (Huang and Song, 2006). 
ROA is employed to measure the short-term profitability of the firm: 
ROA = (Net Income + Interest × (1 – Tax rate)) / Total assets. 
Following Khanna and Palepu (2000), I take into consideration the tax-shield 
effects of debt structure and interest paid. As argued in Huang and Song (2006), 
Chinese companies are subject to different income tax rates based on the district 
where they operate, the period when they were established, and the composition of 
ownership. Accordingly, I calculate an average tax rate for each firm. 
Several widely employed control variables are included. First, the leverage ratio 
(LEV) is computed as debts divided by total assets, to assess the extent to which listed 
firms may rely less on their internal capital markets when access to external financial 
resources is possible (Lins and Servaes, 2002). Second, the nature logarithm of total 
sales in RMB (SIZE) is used to control for the size effect (Lee et al., 2008). Finally, 
the sales growth rate (GROWTH) is controlled for (Fukui and Ushijima, 2007). 
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5.3.4 Regression models 
Regression models are specified in a hierarchical way. At first, to examine the effect 
of diversification on firm performance, I introduce the following regression model: 
 Pit = ai + λt + α1UDIVit + α2RDIVit + α3Controlit + uit, (7) 
where i indicates the listed firms (i = 1,…,62), t indicates time (2001–2005), Pit is 
firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA), UDIVit and RDIVit indicates unrelated 
diversification and related diversification, Controlit indicates the control variables, and 
uit is the error term. 
Furthermore, to examine the differences in the diversification effects across 
group-affiliated firms and independent firms, I propose the second regression model: 
 Pit = ai + λt + α1UDIVit + α2RDIVit + α3UDIVit × GPit + α4RDIVit × GPit 
+ α5Controlit + uit, 
(8) 
where UDIVit × GPit is the interaction term between UDIVit and GPit , RDIVit × GPit is 
the interaction term between RDIVit and GPit (GPit is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 for group-affiliated firms and 0 for independent firms). I employ fixed effect 
models as the estimation method; the dummy variable GP is time invariant, the effect 
of GP will be fully absorbed by the firm-specific effects in the fixed-effects models 
and is therefore unidentifiable. 
5.3.5 Estimation techniques 
Utilizing the panel data structure of the sample, I use standard panel regression 
techniques as the estimation method and include dummies for years to account in all 
the regressions for unobservable firm-specific and time-specific effects. To avoid the 
possible reverse causality between diversification and firm performance, I lag all 
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diversification variables one period.  
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics 
  Full sample 
(N=310) 
 Group-affilated 
firms (N=230) 
 Independent 
firms (N=80) 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Tobin’s Q 
(Market value of equity + total debt) 
/ Total assets 
1.888 1.015  1.769 0.850  2.230 1.333 
ROA Return on assets 0.014 0.076  0.017 0.077  0.006 0.074 
UDIV Unrelated diversification 0.238 0.290  0.242 0.294  0.228 0.278 
RDIV Related diversification 0.327 0.327  0.356 0.343  0.243 0.259 
LEV Debt to total assets 0.517 0.190  0.512 0.196  0.532 0.169 
SIZE Natural log of total sales (in RMB) 20.523 0.973  20.722 0.882  19.951 1.000 
GROWTH Growth rate in sales 0.145 0.313  0.168 0.328  0.079 0.256 
5.4 Empirical analysis 
Table 5.1 presents the means and standard deviations of all continuous variables for 
both the full sample and for group-affiliated firms and independent firms separately. 
First, consider the statistics for the full sample. The mean of Tobin’s Q is 1.888, which 
is higher than those reported in studies of listed firms in developed economies (e.g., 
Fukui and Ushijima, 2007) but acceptable when taking into consideration the 
characteristics of the Chinese stock market as a representative emerging market 
(Huang and Song, 2006). The average levels of unrelated and related diversification 
(entropy measures) are relatively low, 0.238 and 0.327 respectively; generally, the 
textile firms in the sample are still in the early stages of business expansion. I then 
compare the means between group-affiliated firms and independent firms to explore 
differences in firm performances and strategy patterns. Compared with independent 
firms, group-affiliated firms perform worse on the stock market (Tobin’s Q), whereas 
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they achieve better profitability (ROA). Furthermore, they are more diversified (both 
UDIV and RDIV), with less debt in their capital structures (LEV), are larger in size 
(SIZE) and are growing faster (GROWTH).  
Table 5.2 Pearson correlations 
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Tobin’s Q 1      
2. ROA –0.036 1     
3. UDIV –0.083 –0.067 1    
4. RDIV –0.117 0.063 –0.086 1   
5. LEV –0.188 –0.321 0.246 0.110 1  
6. SIZE –0.497 0.222 0.012 0.387 0.005 1 
7. GROWTH –0.033 0.275 –0.023 0.130 0.026 0.239 
Note: Full sample (N=310). 
Table 5.2 reports the correlation coefficients for the full sample. One interesting 
point is that the correlation is −0.036 between Tobin’s Q and ROA. Such a negative 
correlation has also been reported in recent studies of Chinese listed firms (e.g., Yuan 
et al., 2008). This may imply the existence of an overall inconsistency between the 
long-period and short-period goals/strategies for the listed firms in the sample. 
The regression results are presented in Table 5.3. Models 1 and 2 estimate the 
effects of unrelated and related diversification on firm value (Tobin’s Q) and 
profitability (ROA). In models 3 and 4, the interaction terms between group affiliation 
dummy variable GP and the diversification variables are added to compare the 
diversification effects between group-affiliated firms and their independent 
counterparts.  
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Table 5.3 Results of regression analyses using entropy diversification measures 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Tobin’s Q ROA  Tobin’s Q ROA 
UDIV 0.576 ** –0.047 *  0.156  –0.038  
(0.229)  (0.026)   (0.335)  (0.039)  
RDIV –0.023  –0.010   1.153 ** 0.097 * 
(0.226)  (0.026)   (0.472)  (0.055)  
UDIV × GP      0.741 * –0.009  
      (0.405)  (0.047)  
RDIV × GP      –1.505 *** –0.135 ** 
     (0.526)  (0.061)  
LEV –0.267  –0.127 ***  –0.214  –0.126 *** 
(0.339)  (0.039)   (0.331)  (0.039)  
SIZE –0.094  0.025   –0.068  0.029 * 
(0.136)  (0.016)   (0.133)  (0.016)  
GROWTH 0.023  0.024 *  0.021  0.023 * 
(0.109)  (0.012)   (0.106)  (0.012)  
          
R2 (within) 0.638  0.167   0.657  0.184  
Notes: Coefficients from fixed-effects regressions; year dummies included in all specifications; 
standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Results of control variables are comparable with previous studies of listed firms in 
developed economies and some studies on Chinese firms. In Models 2 and 4, the 
coefficient for the leverage ratio variable LEV is significantly negative and consistent 
with previous studies (e.g., Ma et al., 2006); in Models 1 and 3, although insignificant, 
the coefficient for LEV is still negative as reported in Fukui and Ushijima (2007). All 
these results imply that the high leverage ratio tends to constrain the overall outcome 
of the strategies that the firm can perform. The effect of sales growth (GROWTH) is 
positive but not significant in Models 1 and 3; the coefficients for the variable SIZE 
are insignificant except in Model 4. 
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5.4.1 Effects of diversification strategies 
5.4.1.1 Unrelated diversification 
Previous studies propose that unrelated diversification will be related positively to 
firm performance in emerging economies. As shown in Model 1, the coefficient of 
unrelated diversification is positive and significant, suggesting that unrelated 
diversification has a positive effect on long-term firm performance (Tobin’s Q). 
Meanwhile, the effect of unrelated diversification on profitability (ROA) is 
significantly negative (Model 2).  
It might be noted that although we have expected a positive effect of unrelated 
diversification on firm performance, the assumed positive causal relationship may 
change to be insignificant or even negative when we use short-term performance 
measures (such as profitability) because of the long-period tendency of unrelated 
diversification in value creation (Kim et al., 2004). The result in Model 2 may reveal 
this tendency consistent with Lu and Yao (2006) who also found negative impact of 
unrelated diversification on ROA of Chinese listed firms. 
Taking all these results together, in the sample period of the MOIT in China, the 
dominant characteristic of institutional environments is still the existence of 
institutional imperfection, which legitimates diversified firms’ internal capital markets 
to facilitate their performance. 
5.4.1.2 Related diversification 
The coefficients of related diversification are negative and insignificant in Models 1 
and 2. It is hard to interpret this result from the view of mainstream research. First, 
related diversification theory suggests that there should be a positive correlation 
between related diversification and firm performance if the synergistic economics are 
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realizable (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). Furthermore, it is believable that firms can 
improve performance easier by related diversification than by unrelated 
diversification (Bettis, 1981; Palepu, 1985); however, firms in the sample have 
conducted unrelated diversification relatively successfully (as revealed by the positive 
effect of UDIV). From the viewpoint of empirical investigation, we should first look 
into whether this result is caused by differences between group-affiliated and 
independent firms. 
5.4.2 Moderating impacts of group affiliation on diversification effect 
Models 3 and 4 present the results of regressions estimating the impacts of group 
affiliation on the relationship between diversification and performance. Institutional 
embeddedness renewal (IER) provides an insightful lens to interpret the empirical 
result as it reveal where the group resource arises from. 
5.4.2.1 Unrelated diversification 
The coefficient of the interaction term between unrelated diversification and group 
affiliation in Model 3 is positive but marginally significant at the 10% significance 
level, suggesting that group-affiliated firms in the sample still possess an advantage in 
pursuing unrelated diversification over their independent counterparts. This finding is 
particularly consistent with two recent empirical studies on firm diversification effects 
in India (Ramaswamy et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2007). Both of them find that group 
affiliation positively moderate the relationship between unrelated diversification and 
performance of firms in such a major emerging economy. 
In emerging economies, the value of group affiliation is essentially conditioned on 
the extent to which business groups have effectively conducted the IER. Successful 
IER grants business groups a collective prominent position within the institutional 
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environment that ensures the resource can be utilized by their affiliated firms, i.e., to 
perform diversification strategies better than their counterparts (independent firms). 
The situation in China during the 2000s is like this. Our studies in previous chapters, 
together with recent arguments and empirical evidence (White et al., 2008; Yiu et al., 
2005), indicate a successful systematic IER of Chinese business groups during the 
period. The higher performance of unrelated diversification by group-affiliated listed 
firms is explainable if we consider it as the implication of IER for listed affiliates of 
business groups. Therefore, an optimistic explanation may be that business groups in 
the period have successfully conducted IER, and the resultant effects make their listed 
affiliates’ internal markets superior. 
5.4.2.2 Related diversification 
The coefficients of the interaction term between related diversification and group 
affiliation are all negative and significant in the two models (both Tobin’s Q and 
ROA). Group affiliation affects the relationship between related diversification and 
firm performance significantly in such a way that the related diversification 
performance of group-affiliated firms worsens. Furthermore, these results show that 
the estimated effect of RDIV on performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA) is 1.153 and 
0.097 for independent firms (GP = 0), and –0.352 and –0.038 for group-affiliated 
firms (GP = 1). The positive effects of related diversification by independent firms 
coincide well with what the conventionally related diversification theory has 
predicted. 
Recent development in related diversification theory argues that to realize such an 
efficiency-based value creation tendency, the firm needs to meet organizational 
requirements such as high coordination and interrelation to share resources and 
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transfer skills across divisions (Kim et al., 2004; Rawley, 2010). In other words, 
related diversification is a significantly organization-dependent issue. For Chinese 
group-affiliated listed firms in the 2000s, their related diversification tends to be 
interwoven deeply with resource allocation and organizational adjustments associated 
with the IER—in the context of incremental listing—the transfer-and-integrate 
procedures.  
After moving their high-quality assets (or organizationally speaking, units) into 
listed affiliates, the business group is faced with the problem of integrating the 
transferred units with those that are already there. Impacts of such transfer–integrate 
procedures can be addressed technologically and organizationally. If we regard these 
transferred units as modular units with standard technological interfaces (e.g., 
input–output between vertical integrated units), such transfer–integrate procedures can 
be understood as cycles to rearrange those broken technology interlinks. 
Organizationally, such transfer–integrate procedures need to repair the disturbed 
organizational interrelations. Such technological interlinks and organizational 
interrelations are relevant to the sustainable advantages of business group and consist 
of the foundation of related diversification benefit exertion; however, these are 
difficult to recover in a short period.  
Consequently, given the occupation of transferred units in the listed affiliates’ 
related business scope,
30
 there tends to be durable damage to the value-creation 
tendency of relatedness caused by the complexity of repairing these technological 
interlinks and organizational interrelations.
31
 In contrast, on average, to independent 
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 This can be evidenced by an associated phenomenon, that is, the frequent and complicated 
related party transactions (RPTs) between the Chinese listed affiliate and their connected 
parties during the past decades (Fisman and Wang, 2010; Peng et al., 2011). 
31
 Unrelated diversification would bear relatively little cost from such a transfer-and-integrate 
mechanism. Unrelated diversification involves more in intra-business-group allocation of 
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firms that pursue a related diversification strategy, the constraints from such a 
transfer–integrate mechanism will be weak (i.e., when connected with former 
state-owned enterprises) or even nonexistent (i.e., when established as independent 
firms). Drawing these arguments together, the performance effect that group-affiliated 
listed firms can achieve from related diversification is systematically inferior to what 
their independent counterparts can achieve as shown in Models 3 and 4. 
5.4.3 Robustness examinations 
Finally, I conducted robustness checks, first, by employing different diversification 
measures. Studies on corporate diversification have also used Herfindahl-based 
diversification measures (e.g., Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Lang and Stulz, 1994). 
These measures are rooted in the Herfindahl index that has been commonly used by 
industrial organization economists to measure industry concentration. Following Lu 
and Beamish (2004), the Herfindahl-based measures of unrelated diversification is:  
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For the sample in this study, the Herfindahl-based diversification measures are 
found to be highly correlated with the entropy diversification measures. I ran all 
regressions in Table 5.3 using Herfindahl-based measures and reported the results in 
Table A5.1 in Appendices. The results regarding all explanatory variables are highly 
consistent with those reported in Table 5.3.  
                                                                                                                                            
capital, equipment or other resources which is rarely technological connected and less 
interwoven with organizational interrelations. 
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I further checked the robustness of the findings by applying a narrow-spectrum 
definition of textile industry (as a manufacturing sector comprising of CSIC 17, 18, 19, 
and 28) and ran the regressions as in Table 5.3. To a large extent, the results regarding 
all explanatory variables are qualitatively consistent with those reported in Table 5.3 
(see Table A5.2 in Appendices). Specifically, the coefficient of UDIV in Model 1 is 
significantly negative. In models 3 and 4, the signs of coefficients of UDIV × GP 
remain as those in Table 5.3 although statistically insignificant, which is consistent 
with the results reported in Table 5.3. RDIV × GP is consistently negative but the 
statistical significance weakened. The resource-based view of corporate 
diversification suggests that a central issue of defining related business portfolio 
(equally, industry group) is whether these business (industries) share certain resource 
or capabilities. The narrow-spectrum definition of textile industry excludes two 
two-digit CSIC industries—Wholesaling (CSIC 63) and Chemical material and 
product manufacturing (CSIC 26). In the real world of business, textile firms tend to 
entry into these industries to utilize their knowledge and capabilities about the whole 
value chain about the textile industry (CEI, 2004; Colpan, 2008). The 
narrow-spectrum definition might underestimate the extent to which the textile firm 
undertakes related diversification.
32
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I focus on diversification effects of firms and the moderating impacts 
of group affiliation on these effects in emerging economies. I set the institutional 
background to be the 2000s of China, and employed the 2001–2005 data on listed 
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 Table A5.3 reports the distribution of firm business segments across the six two-digit CSIC 
textile industries. During the sample period, 43.55% and 9.68% of the 62 firms had operated 
businesses in CSIC 63 and CSIC 26. 
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firms from the Chinese textile industry to conduct empirical analysis. The unique 
relationship between Chinese business groups and their listed affiliates and textile as a 
sound industry background are utilized to explore the dominant influence of 
institutional environments and the moderating role of business groups in determining 
the outcomes from their affiliated firms’ diversification.  
The empirical results suggest that in the context of the 2000s in China: (1) the 
institutional environments are still characterized by institutional voids which 
legitimize the relative value of diversified listed firms’ internal capital markets (UDIV 
in Model 1); (2) it may still be possible for the affiliated listed firm to achieve 
performance advantages from unrelated diversification, therefore implying a potential 
contribution of IER of business groups to the comparative strength of business group 
affiliation (UDIV × GP in Model 3); (3) however, the simultaneous existence of poor 
outcomes from related diversification implies that the IER of business groups may 
lead to disruptions to the internal technological and organizational interrelations, 
which are known as the fundamental foundations for the realization of related 
diversification’s value-creation tendency (RDIV × GP in Models 3 and 4). 
To conclude, the main objectives of this study have been accomplished. That is, 
using data on listed firms from the textile industry in China, I ascertained the validity 
of the various arguments in diversification theories and previous studies of 
diversification (both of independent and of group-affiliated firms), and illustrated how 
the IER of business groups is meaningful for explaining the complex 
diversification–firm performance relationship in such a novel institutional setting, 
governance structure renewal of Chinese business groups (specifically, incremental 
listing) in the 2000s. My findings highlight the importance of integrating an IER view 
with mainstream strategy issues for the study of diversification and business groups.
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
Business groups are central organizations in many emerging economies undergoing 
market-oriented institutional transitions (MOITs). In the literature of business group 
study, there has been increasing concern about the roles of business groups in MOITs, 
as “paragons or parasites” (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007, p. 331). The role of business 
groups in the MOIT is essentially shaped by the interplay between business groups 
and the institutional environment. To provide insightful answer to the question asked 
by Khanna and Yafeh (2007), a comprehensive study on the fundamental mechanisms 
underlining business groups’ interactions with the institutional environment during the 
MOIT and the resultant performance implications is required. 
It seems that the mainstream literature has still not prepared to respond to this 
request in an effective way. To a large extent, previous studies have only just begun to 
include business groups’ interactions with the institutional environment in their 
explanations of distinct business group effects such as the impact of affiliation with a 
business group on firm performance (for a useful survey, see Carney et al., 2011). The 
dissertation has been designed to fill these gaps. The dissertation proposed a set of 
research questions that constitute the aforementioned research theme. In Chapter 2, I 
developed a conceptual framework of institutional embeddedness renewal that 
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theorizes business groups’ interactions with the institutional environment and the 
resultant performance implications in the context of MOIT. In Chapters 3–5, China in 
the 2000s and the textile industry were utilized as the specific institutional and 
industry background to carry out a set of empirical analyses to answer the proposed 
research questions. 
6.1 Implications for theory and practice 
6.1.1 Implications for theory 
6.1.1.1 The IER framework 
Drawing on insights from institutional strategy theory (Lawrence, 1999) and other 
disciplines such as institution-based view of business strategy (Peng, 2003), 
organizational learning (Crossan et al., 1999) and organizational ecology (Volberda 
and Lewin, 2003), this dissertation extends the conventional institutional 
embeddedness framework (Granovetter, 1995) into the case of business groups in 
complicated MOIT contexts. 
I developed the conception of institutional embeddedness renewal to depict the 
strategic aspects of business groups’ interactions with the institutional environment. 
On the basis of this, I introduced a dual process model by which to study the 
performance effects of IER at both the collective level and the organizational level, 
and the possibly cost associated with the IER process. These efforts provide necessary 
theoretical foundation for investigating the performance implications of implementing 
IER during the MOIT (as illustrated by the empirical analyses in Chapters 3 and 5). 
On the basis of this, focusing on the difference in the capabilities/tendencies to 
strategically manage their interplay with the institutional environment across business 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
123 
 
groups, I identified two important organizational features (political embeddedness and 
market-oriented autonomy) to characterize this. I argued that business groups with 
different degree of these features will have different likelihoods of failure and such 
survival mechanisms tend to be institutionally contingent (as empirically 
demonstrated in Chapter 4).  
The aforementioned theoretical development has important implications for 
research on business groups in emerging economies undergoing transition to a market 
economy. With its focus on the fundamental interaction between business groups and 
the institutional environment, the research framework proposed in this dissertation can 
be applied to other institutional settings where MOIT is occurring and plays a similar 
role. Because the development of institutions varies between these situations and the 
content differs, these studies can add further insights to the research on institutional 
embeddedness phenomena of business groups. 
6.1.1.2 Empirical work 
The empirical investigation in Chapters 3–5 further adds to these implications for 
research on business groups. Focusing on institutional transition in China, specifically, 
the enterprise reform and market liberalization during the 2000s and using the textile 
industry as the industry background, the explanatory power of the proposed research 
framework were verified by studying business groups in such a typical MOIT.  
In Chapter 3, I applied the proposed dual process model to analyze the impact of 
IER on the performance of business groups. I further introduced an analytical 
framework in which the process of IER is captured by the embeddedness of the 
business group community and the business group in both new (more-market-oriented) 
and old (less-market-oriented) institutional structures; the collective-level institutional 
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embeddedness is measured by the penetration ratios of new/old institutions within the 
community and the organizational-level institutional embeddedness is measured by 
business group’s adoption of new/old institutions. I focused on the governance 
structure renewal of Chinese business groups during the 2000s and utilized 
governance structures as the institutions to create institutional embeddedness 
measures. I proposed a set of hypotheses that predict possible relationships between 
the institutional embeddedness and performance of business groups. Employing data 
on 38 business groups with listed affiliates from the Chinese textile industry during 
the period 2000–2008, I econometrically tested the proposed hypotheses. I found that, 
at both the collective level and the organizational level, the embeddedness in new 
institutional structures brings positive effects. The result suggests that business groups 
can enhance their performance by moving into new institutional structures. Besides, 
the embeddedness in old institutional structures also bring positive effects. This result 
implies that during the MOIT, the interconnections with those old, but still dominant 
institutions (such as traditional SOE governance structures in the context of this study) 
are still necessary for supporting the IER and competition of business groups. These 
findings enrich our understanding on strategic issues concerning how business groups 
manage their interactions with the institutional environment towards a market focus. 
Chapter 4 examined failure likelihoods of Chinese textile business groups during 
the 2000s and institutional contingency of the survival mechanisms. In contrast with 
the analysis on IER process in Chapter 3, chapter 4 places more focus on 
organizational features that characterize business groups’ capabilities/tendencies to 
interact with the institutional environment during the MOIT. On the basis of a review 
of the development of Chinese business groups in the past decades, I provided a 
working taxonomy to categorize them by initial ownership as state-owned business 
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groups and collectively-owned business groups, and by political rank as national and 
provincial business groups and sub-provincial business groups. Among them, 
state-owned business groups and national and provincial business groups are treated 
as highly politically embedded business groups. To capture the impacts of the 
institutional environment, I utilized the subnational (provincial) characteristics of 
China’ MOIT, specifically, business-group-supportive policies and marketization of 
Chinese provinces. I defined organizational failure as the event in which the business 
group lost its control over its largest listed affiliate. Using data on 48 business groups 
with listed affiliates during 2000–2008, I conducted Cox regression analyses. It is 
found that highly politically embedded business groups have higher failure 
likelihoods than their counterparts; such a disadvantage, however, become weakened 
in regions where supportive policies are implemented comprehensively and in regions 
characterized by high degree of marketization. This chapter provides a useful 
approach to investigating the population dynamics within business groups during the 
MOIT by focusing on important organizational features of business groups and 
characteristics of the institutional environment. 
In Chapter 5, I examined the effects of diversification on the performance of firms 
(both group affiliated firms and independent firms) and the impacts of group 
affiliation on the diversification effects using data on 62 listed firms in the Chinese 
textile industry during the period 2001–2005. One purpose of the chapter was to 
verify the findings of previous studies on diversification and business groups in 
emerging economies. Furthermore, it is known that Chinese business groups in the 
period were experiencing renewal of their governance structures, such as the 
incremental listing that involved their listed affiliates deeply. Correspondingly, by 
using this novel empirical setting, the other purpose of this chapter was to enhancing 
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the interpretation of the empirical findings by incorporating IER considerations. 
Employing two measures of firm performance (Tobin’s q and ROA) and entropy 
measures of diversification (both unrelated diversification and related diversification), 
I conducted econometric analyses. The results provide supportive evidence on a 
positive effect of unrelated diversification, which is consistent with mainstream 
studies on firm diversification in emerging economies. Regarding the impact of group 
affiliation, it is found that group affiliated firms perform unrelated diversification 
better and perform related diversification worse compared with independent firms. 
The positive impact of group affiliation on unrelated diversification effect is 
consistent with the findings of previous studies. But for the negative impact of group 
affiliation on related diversification effect, previous studies have not provided 
sufficient insights. I suggest that from the IER perspective, a possible explanation is 
that Chinese business groups’ incremental listing arouses cost that undermines the 
effect of related diversification of their listed affiliates. This chapter therefore 
provides further insights on performance implications of IER for business groups 
during the MOIT. 
Conclusively, these empirical analyses further highlighted the contribution of the 
dissertation by demonstrating fundamental mechanisms underlining business groups’ 
interactions with the institutional environment during the MOIT, which are critical to 
address distinct roles of business groups in given institutional settings. On the other 
hand, these empirical analyses also extend the work of studies on Chinese business 
groups that admit the possibility that Chinese business groups coevolve with the 
MOIT (e.g., White et al., 2008; Yiu et al., 2005), but devote relatively little efforts to 
empirically examining the rationales of their arguments. Besides, the studies on 
business groups, corporate governance and listed firms in China, are relatively 
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plentiful and still growing. This did help us to contrast our findings with previous 
studies using similar definition of variables (i.e., regarding the tradable share ratio of 
listed firms, Jiang et al., 2008; regarding ownership concentration, Lu and Yao, 2006), 
examining similar mechanisms (i.e., regarding performance of high-political-rank 
business groups, Guest and Sutherland, 2010), or providing historical overviews (i.e., 
for incremental listing in China, Naughton, 2006). These efforts assure the generality 
of our findings as the sample used was from a single-industry setting. 
6.1.2 Implications for practice 
Apart from the implications for academic research, this dissertation has clear business 
and policy implications. In the context of MOIT, business groups have to strategically 
renew their embeddedness in the institutional environment as the institutional 
environment keeps evolving towards a market focus. Managers in business groups
33
 
can utilize the insights generated from this dissertation to facilitate their 
decision-making on institutional-embeddedness-renewing strategies. Empirical 
findings in Chapter 3 support an optimistic view that business groups can renew their 
institutional embeddedness during the MOIT. However, it does not mean that IER 
effects can be achieved automatically. Managers should give full consideration to 
strategic complexities of IER as revealed in this dissertation. For example, as 
illustrated by the analysis in Chapter 3, the embeddedness in old dominant 
institutional structures might need to be maintained for a certain long period. 
Managers need to identify those dominant institutions on which their business group 
relies. The process of IER is associated with cost caused by organizational 
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 The implementation of IER will involve managers at all levels in the business group. 
However, it is true that the decision of IER is mostly the responsibility of top managers (in the 
context of this study, top managers in the parent company and the listed affiliated firms).  
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adjustment/resource allocation, which might undermines outcomes of business 
group’s business strategies as revealed in Chapter 5. This is another issue that 
mangers need to consider when deciding the particular IER strategies. 
Particularly, the findings of Chapter 4 have important public policy implications. 
For policy makers in China and many other emerging economies, a challenging issue 
is how to utilize business groups as active agents to promote market-oriented 
institutional changes. It is true that during early periods of the institutional transition, 
the governments have tended to utilize those highly politically embedded business 
groups that have formed a close relationship with the state and deep embeddedness in 
the political regulatory framework as tools for state-led industrialization strategies 
(Carney, 2008). In the context of China, in the early time of the institutional transition, 
almost all business groups are either state owned or collectively owned (White et al., 
2008). A long-term goal of the Chinese government during the past decades is to 
reduce its direct control and intervention over business groups (i.e., by reducing the 
state ownership), and increase the market-oriented capabilities/tendencies of business 
groups. Ecologically speaking, the government expects that business groups with less 
government connections would have higher survival likelihoods. The result of the 
analyses in Chapter 4 (business groups with more government connections confront 
higher failure risk) might implies the accomplishment of the ultimate goal of Chinese 
government. This is a good illustration of guiding the development of business groups 
to coevolve with the MOIT for policy makers from emerging economies.  
Besides, the results of analyses in Chapter 4 also show that although the general 
trend within the sample business groups is that lowly politically embedded business 
groups prosper better, such an advantage is weakened when the marketization degree 
of the institutional environment becomes higher. One possible reason is because lowly 
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politically embedded business groups have less embeddedness in the old dominant 
institutional structures (i.e., fewer connections with the government). This 
disadvantageous situation might hinder the further institutional embeddedness 
renewal and the competitiveness of these business groups. To increase the resource 
that lowly politically embedded business groups can derive from the dominant 
institutional structures, one efficient method that policy makers can consider is to use 
the policy lever. Policy makers can adjust the direction of resource flow in extant 
supportive policies, or, introduce new policies designed to benefit lowly politically 
embedded business groups more explicitly.
34
 
6.2 Limitations and future research 
In Chapter 3, we have been reminded of the importance of a sophisticated analytical 
design in carving out the IER of business groups from the complex background of 
institutional transition in emerging economies. In the context of MOIT, the IER 
performance of business groups tends to be conditioned on a variety of contextual 
issues such as institutional forms, characteristics of the institutional transition, and the 
industry background. Naturally, the derivation of our empirical results from the 
empirical setting of this thesis gives rise to concerns about the generalizability of my 
findings to business groups from other empirical settings. 
Institutional forms. My analyses have focused on governance structure of Chinese 
business groups. The selection of corporate governance institutions as the particular 
institutional forms is suitable for the theme of this research. However, further research 
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 In Chapter 4, it is found that business-group-supportive policies bring more advantage for 
highly politically embedded business groups than for lowly politically embedded business 
groups. 
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can examine the generalizability of my findings by focusing on different institutional 
forms, such as laws and regulations. To verify the effect from the diffusion or the 
adoption of these institutions, business group researchers might need to focus on 
different institutional fields. For the study of Chinese business groups, one possible 
candidate is the Five-Year Economic Plans in China that can be either at the national 
level or be industry specific (National Development and Reform Commission 
[NDRC], 2006). Given the market-oriented consistency between institutional fields 
during the MOIT, we optimistically believe that institutional embeddedness renewal 
mechanisms as revealed in this dissertation will also dominate business groups 
involved in other major fields such as “Five-Year Economic Plans”.  
Characteristics of the institutional transition. China has been regarded as a model of 
successful institutional transition driven by domestic agents. Given the incremental 
nature of the MOIT in China, it is understandable that my empirical results suggest a 
typically gradual IER approach for business groups. I believe that the general 
market-oriented trend within business groups will be robust to specific characteristics 
of the MOIT. However, it is worthwhile for future studies to investigate whether the 
strategic pattern of IER will differ when given a different MOIT setting. Particularly, I 
suggest that this should include situations where business groups’ institutional 
embeddedness renewal actions are significantly affected by exogenous, punctuated 
environmental shocks, such as Korea in the 1990s.
35
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 Kim et al. (2010) delineate the process by which Korean business groups (chaebol) rebuilt 
their reform-promoting identity after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Kim and his colleagues 
argue that the market-oriented isomorphic pressure within the population of Korean business 
groups tends to be disturbed by the institutional frictions caused by the financial crisis. 
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Industry background. For broad institution-based studies of business groups, a 
challenging, perhaps critical, issue is how to represent institutional mechanisms and 
simultaneously address the industrial context properly. In this dissertation, I have 
limited the examination of IER effects to a single-industry setting, the textile industry, 
known as a major conventional and competitive industry in China. The main theme of 
this dissertation is about fundamental institutional strategic mechanisms; institutional 
topics highlighted in this dissertation (governance structures, enterprise reform, 
business-group-supportive policies, etc) are rarely industry-specific. Therefore, I 
believe that my findings will not be sensitive to industry specifications. However, it is 
also worthwhile if future research can consider other industries such as new emerging 
high-technology industries (e.g., E-commerce, Biology, and Eco-industry) and 
protected industries (e.g., Telecommunications and Petroleum), or use large 
multi-industry samples.  
Another limitation of my empirical analyses is the measures of business group 
performance. Profitability of the core listed affiliate (Chapter 3) and losing control 
over the core listed affiliate (Chapter 4) have been used as proxies for business group 
performance (economic performance and organizational failure, respectively). It is 
worthwhile to use more direct, business-group-level measures (e.g., profitability and 
market exit of business groups) in future research although it will go back to the issue 
of data availability ultimately. Finally, this dissertation has majorly utilized 
subnational contexts in large emerging economies (subnational region as specific 
institutional field for business groups and other agents), to depict the collective-level 
IER process (Chapter 3) and institutional dependence of fundamental organizational 
features of business groups (Chapter 4). Other typical interactive contexts (e.g., 
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professional organizations of business groups) could be utilized in future studies to 
enrich our understanding of the interaction between business groups and the 
institutional environment in emerging economies. 
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Appendices 
Appendix to Chapter 1 
Debate on the temporal decrease of business group advantages 
This is a phenomenon that has been reported in many emerging economies 
undergoing market-oriented institutional transition(e.g., Carney et al., 2009b; Kedia et 
al., 2006; Kim et al., 2004; Koo and Maeng, 2005; Lee et al., 2008; Zattoni et al., 
2009). 
The reasoning of IBVBS takes an environmentally-deterministic position. First, 
business groups inherently lack institutional entrepreneurship. This is mainly because 
they are embedded in the old, less-market-enhancing institutions, and the resources 
derived from institutional relations are vitally important in emerging economies where 
the external resource market is underdeveloped. Therefore, it is difficult for business 
groups to become motivated and enabled to escape from the cage of “stuck to the old 
institutions.” However, if they do not escape, the resources derived from institutional 
embeddedness will decrease temporally (Kedia et al., 2006), but the accompanied 
costs exposed by these obsolete institutions (White et al., 2008; Yiu et al., 2005) and 
organizational inertia caused by lack of institutional entrepreneurship (Kim et al., 
2004) will persist. As a result, after a certain length of time, business groups, which 
are conservative organizations, will lose their legitimacy and advantages in the 
institutional structure and market. 
This is, however, theoretically debatable. From an institutional strategy perspective 
(Lawrence, 1999), the “temporal decrease” of business group advantages may tell a 
very different story: in an institutionally contextualized environment of the emerging 
economy, what the institutional embeddedness brings to the organization can either be 
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impeding or supporting as the embeddedness in these formal and informal relations is 
strategically adjustable (Meyer and Lu, 2005; Roth and Kostova, 2003). Under such 
circumstances, the distinctive institutional strategies that business groups take will 
underpin the organizational foundation of both the value-creation potential of 
market-centered strategies and the long-run prospering of business groups (Carney, 
2008; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Kim et al., 2010), but, are almost inevitably 
accompanied by organizational costs that exert a negative influence on their 
performance in markets (Meyer and Lu, 2005). If this negative influence is more 
likely to aggravate in some periods of the institutional transition, a “temporal 
decreasing” trend may also be possible, but it does not necessarily point to the 
ineffectiveness or failure of market-oriented institutional strategies of business 
groups. 
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Appendices to Chapter 3 
Table A3.1 The distribution of business groups across Chinese provinces, 2000–2008 
Province 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Beijing 136 207 202 246 274 280 257 260 254 
Tianjin 173 172 174 176 175 162 123 109 117 
Hebei 59 62 66 61 75 69 61 53 49 
Shanxi (Jin) 40 44 39 45 46 52 53 59 58 
Inner Mongolia 30 28 24 23 24 22 39 40 37 
Liaoning 67 68 70 66 65 73 87 94 96 
Jilin 42 47 49 41 39 36 33 33 33 
Heilongjiang 105 88 79 79 72 41 47 49 48 
Shanghai 106 132 138 165 158 153 160 177 183 
Jiangsu 148 179 181 178 182 202 213 225 228 
Zhejiang 281 269 262 276 287 329 385 419 436 
Anhui 69 70 70 64 76 75 88 77 83 
Fujian 257 245 228 239 249 240 235 261 252 
Jiangxi 50 37 48 48 48 48 41 41 42 
Shandong 345 339 299 292 283 330 305 306 288 
Henan 171 118 112 108 115 116 109 110 102 
Hubei 44 45 44 41 43 57 59 60 66 
Hunan 31 40 38 39 38 38 41 38 41 
Guangdong 138 154 144 143 135 159 154 150 156 
Guangxi 25 20 25 25 27 29 33 34 52 
Hainan 12 9 10 10 10 8 9 9 7 
Chongqing 44 49 48 50 48 46 45 41 40 
Sichuan 88 83 75 67 80 78 74 85 90 
Guizhou 12 13 14 12 13 15 15 15 13 
Yunan 30 35 34 34 40 36 41 40 48 
Xizang 5 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 5 
Shanxi (Qin) 60 64 57 58 54 51 44 44 45 
Gansu 21 23 27 31 32 29 28 29 26 
Qinghai 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 21 20 
Ningxia 22 21 18 19 19 16 19 16 20 
Xinjiang 20 21 23 26 27 25 28 25 36 
Total number 2655 2710 2627 2692 2764 2845 2856 2926 2971 
Note: Data derived from NBSC (2009b, pp. 131–132). 
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Table A3.2 The percentage of business groups adopting limited liability company parent 
company enterprise form in Chinese provinces, 2000–2008 (%) 
Province 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Beijing 4.4  3.9  3.5  11.8  16.1  21.4  18.3  19.2  18.5  
Tianjin 54.3  51.2  56.9  56.3  56.0  56.8  43.1  37.6  41.9  
Hebei 15.3  19.4  19.7  19.7  30.7  27.5  29.5  30.2  28.6  
Shanxi (Jin) 27.5  38.6  38.5  44.4  45.7  48.1  50.9  42.4  44.8  
Inner Mongolia 16.7  21.4  20.8  21.7  37.5  36.4  56.4  57.5  59.5  
Liaoning 19.4  17.6  18.6  27.3  30.8  38.4  46.0  48.9  51.0  
Jilin 11.9  17.0  26.5  22.0  25.6  33.3  30.3  30.3  30.3  
Heilongjiang 25.7  30.7  29.1  31.6  33.3  29.3  34.0  34.7  35.4  
Shanghai 33.0  24.2  33.3  36.4  40.5  43.8  44.4  46.3  47.5  
Jiangsu 22.3  29.6  30.9  40.4  44.0  50.5  58.2  59.1  61.0  
Zhejiang 45.2  50.6  52.7  58.7  57.8  60.2  63.4  65.4  65.8  
Anhui 15.9  15.7  21.4  35.9  40.8  36.0  46.6  45.5  45.8  
Fujian 39.7  35.5  39.9  44.8  49.0  51.7  49.4  52.5  54.4  
Jiangxi 16.0  13.5  18.8  27.1  41.7  43.8  31.7  34.1  35.7  
Shandong 29.3  28.9  30.4  38.7  40.6  47.3  52.1  53.6  53.5  
Henan 21.6  25.4  34.8  43.5  40.9  42.2  50.5  51.8  48.0  
Hubei 6.8  11.1  9.1  14.6  23.3  28.1  28.8  28.3  33.3  
Hunan 9.7  17.5  15.8  15.4  15.8  21.1  14.6  18.4  19.5  
Guangdong 10.9  11.7  11.1  14.0  17.8  22.6  24.0  22.7  24.4  
Guangxi 20.0  15.0  28.0  28.0  25.9  34.5  30.3  32.4  30.8  
Hainan 58.3  66.7  70.0  60.0  50.0  37.5  22.2  22.2  28.6  
Chongqing 50.0  44.9  45.8  42.0  41.7  37.0  35.6  34.1  35.0  
Sichuan 23.9  34.9  42.7  38.8  38.8  42.3  52.7  45.9  53.3  
Guizhou 25.0  30.8  35.7  41.7  46.2  46.7  46.7  53.3  53.8  
Yunan 10.0  17.1  29.4  29.4  30.0  30.6  31.7  32.5  43.8  
Xizang 60.0  50.0  40.0  33.3  0.0  33.3  33.3  33.3  20.0  
Shanxi (Qin) 30.0  23.4  24.6  29.3  33.3  35.3  31.8  29.5  28.9  
Gansu 0.0  8.7  29.6  25.8  28.1  44.8  50.0  51.7  53.8  
Qinghai 33.3  58.3  50.0  54.2  45.8  50.0  50.0  47.6  45.0  
Ningxia 22.7  14.3  11.1  0.0  21.1  31.3  42.1  50.0  60.0  
Xinjiang 25.0  38.1  30.4  34.6  33.3  40.0  50.0  56.0  58.3  
Note: Data derived from NBSC (2001b–2009b). 
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Table A3.3 The percentage of business groups adopting joint stock company parent company 
enterprise form in Chinese provinces, 2000–2008 (%) 
Province 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Beijing 3.7  1.9  1.5  2.0  1.8  2.5  2.7  3.5  4.3  
Tianjin 5.2  6.4  6.3  7.4  7.4  6.8  7.3  7.3  6.8  
Hebei 5.1  3.2  4.5  6.6  9.3  11.6  11.5  13.2  16.3  
Shanxi (Jin) 25.0  18.2  17.9  15.6  15.2  15.4  13.2  15.3  15.5  
Inner Mongolia 20.0  25.0  12.5  13.0  16.7  22.7  17.9  17.5  16.2  
Liaoning 7.5  7.4  8.6  12.1  12.3  12.3  6.9  6.4  6.3  
Jilin 23.8  25.5  22.4  24.4  23.1  22.2  24.2  27.3  27.3  
Heilongjiang 28.6  23.9  29.1  25.3  26.4  19.5  14.9  18.4  14.6  
Shanghai 6.6  12.9  14.5  13.9  12.0  13.1  12.5  11.9  9.8  
Jiangsu 21.6  17.3  16.0  13.5  12.1  10.9  8.5  9.8  12.7  
Zhejiang 17.4  17.5  18.7  19.2  19.5  18.8  19.0  18.4  17.9  
Anhui 20.3  15.7  11.4  9.4  11.8  14.7  11.4  10.4  13.3  
Fujian 7.4  7.3  7.5  7.1  7.6  6.7  6.8  6.1  6.3  
Jiangxi 10.0  8.1  12.5  18.8  10.4  12.5  14.6  7.3  4.8  
Shandong 20.6  17.4  19.1  20.5  20.8  14.5  13.1  12.7  14.6  
Henan 23.4  13.6  14.3  18.5  18.3  18.1  16.5  16.4  17.6  
Hubei 29.5  24.4  20.5  22.0  30.2  28.1  28.8  30.0  27.3  
Hunan 29.0  27.5  26.3  33.3  31.6  31.6  24.4  23.7  22.0  
Guangdong 18.8  14.9  18.8  18.9  19.3  22.6  22.1  25.3  26.9  
Guangxi 20.0  15.0  16.0  8.0  7.4  13.8  18.2  23.5  26.9  
Hainan 16.7  0.0  0.0  20.0  20.0  12.5  44.4  44.4  57.1  
Chongqing 11.4  12.2  12.5  10.0  8.3  10.9  11.1  7.3  10.0  
Sichuan 28.4  19.3  18.7  17.9  18.8  17.9  14.9  15.3  10.0  
Guizhou 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.7  13.3  13.3  7.7  
Yunan 20.0  20.0  17.6  20.6  22.5  22.2  24.4  25.0  22.9  
Xizang 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Shanxi (Qin) 23.3  21.9  24.6  22.4  22.2  17.6  20.5  22.7  22.2  
Gansu 23.8  21.7  18.5  16.1  15.6  10.3  14.3  13.8  15.4  
Qinghai 16.7  0.0  8.3  16.7  12.5  25.0  25.0  28.6  20.0  
Ningxia 31.8  23.8  22.2  26.3  21.1  18.8  5.3  6.3  5.0  
Xinjiang 15.0  14.3  17.4  15.4  14.8  16.0  14.3  12.0  13.9  
Note: Data derived from NBSC (2001b–2009b). 
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Table A3.4 The percentage of business groups adopting traditional non-SOE parent company 
enterprise form in Chinese provinces, 2000–2008 (%) 
Province 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Beijing 2.2  1.9  2.0  2.4  4.7  2.5  1.6  2.3  3.5  
Tianjin 10.4  8.1  2.9  1.1  1.1  1.2  0.8  5.5  2.6  
Hebei 5.1  4.8  4.5  6.6  5.3  4.3  3.3  3.8  2.0  
Shanxi (Jin) 2.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.2  3.8  3.8  8.5  8.6  
Inner Mongolia 0.0  3.6  4.2  4.3  4.2  0.0  2.6  2.5  2.7  
Liaoning 4.5  2.9  1.4  0.0  0.0  1.4  1.1  1.1  1.0  
Jilin 2.4  4.3  4.1  4.9  5.1  2.8  3.0  3.0  3.0  
Heilongjiang 7.6  4.5  3.8  2.5  4.2  2.4  4.3  4.1  4.2  
Shanghai 2.8  3.0  2.2  2.4  4.4  3.3  2.5  1.1  2.7  
Jiangsu 15.5  10.6  10.5  9.0  9.3  9.4  9.4  8.9  5.7  
Zhejiang 16.4  13.0  13.0  9.1  8.7  8.8  6.0  5.3  5.5  
Anhui 2.9  2.9  2.9  3.1  6.6  4.0  1.1  1.3  2.4  
Fujian 23.3  22.4  18.4  16.7  14.1  12.5  10.6  8.8  7.9  
Jiangxi 2.0  8.1  4.2  4.2  6.3  8.3  2.4  2.4  2.4  
Shandong 16.2  14.5  14.4  10.3  8.5  10.3  5.9  6.2  5.2  
Henan 5.3  5.1  3.6  1.9  3.5  6.0  3.7  6.4  7.8  
Hubei 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Hunan 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.4  0.0  0.0  
Guangdong 5.8  3.2  2.8  3.5  2.2  3.8  2.6  2.7  3.2  
Guangxi 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Hainan 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  12.5  22.2  11.1  14.3  
Chongqing 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Sichuan 1.1  1.2  0.0  0.0  6.3  7.7  0.0  1.2  1.1  
Guizhou 8.3  15.4  14.3  8.3  7.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Yunan 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.4  0.0  0.0  
Xizang 0.0  25.0  0.0  33.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Shanxi (Qin) 3.3  3.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Gansu 9.5  8.7  3.7  3.2  9.4  3.4  3.6  3.4  3.8  
Qinghai 4.2  0.0  4.2  4.2  4.2  4.2  4.2  0.0  0.0  
Ningxia 0.0  0.0  5.6  5.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Xinjiang 10.0  0.0  8.7  3.8  11.1  4.0  3.6  4.0  2.8  
Note: Data derived from NBSC (2001b–2009b). 
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Table A3.5 The percentage of business groups adopting traditional SOE parent company 
enterprise form in Chinese provinces, 2000–2008 (%) 
Province 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Beijing 36.0  67.6  67.3  59.8  55.1  48.9  50.6  47.7  47.6  
Tianjin 4.6  4.7  3.4  4.0  3.4  2.5  4.9  13.8  15.4  
Hebei 5.1  6.5  9.1  9.8  5.3  5.8  4.9  3.8  4.1  
Shanxi (Jin) 12.5  11.4  10.3  4.4  4.3  5.8  3.8  3.4  5.2  
Inner Mongolia 20.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.5  2.6  2.5  2.7  
Liaoning 16.4  8.8  10.0  12.1  9.2  5.5  6.9  6.4  6.3  
Jilin 16.7  14.9  16.3  14.6  7.7  5.6  6.1  6.1  6.1  
Heilongjiang 23.8  22.7  19.0  16.5  12.5  19.5  14.9  14.3  12.5  
Shanghai 18.9  27.3  14.5  12.1  12.0  11.1  14.4  10.7  11.5  
Jiangsu 15.5  14.5  14.4  9.0  7.1  5.9  1.4  2.7  1.3  
Zhejiang 10.3  5.9  5.3  2.9  2.8  2.1  2.3  1.7  1.8  
Anhui 8.7  4.3  7.1  6.3  0.0  2.7  3.4  0.0  0.0  
Fujian 13.6  13.5  11.8  7.9  7.6  6.7  5.5  5.4  4.4  
Jiangxi 56.0  54.1  45.8  29.2  29.2  20.8  24.4  31.7  33.3  
Shandong 19.1  16.5  14.4  11.6  11.0  7.3  7.2  6.5  5.6  
Henan 18.1  16.1  9.8  9.3  11.3  9.5  2.8  1.8  2.0  
Hubei 9.1  11.1  9.1  17.1  16.3  15.8  15.3  15.0  16.7  
Hunan 16.1  15.0  21.1  12.8  10.5  10.5  24.4  21.1  19.5  
Guangdong 32.6  28.6  23.6  23.1  23.0  17.6  14.9  14.0  12.8  
Guangxi 24.0  25.0  16.0  12.0  14.8  6.9  6.1  2.9  1.9  
Hainan 16.7  22.2  20.0  20.0  20.0  25.0  11.1  11.1  0.0  
Chongqing 9.1  6.1  6.3  6.0  8.3  4.3  2.2  2.4  5.0  
Sichuan 10.2  10.8  4.0  4.5  6.3  7.7  9.5  10.6  10.0  
Guizhou 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.7  6.7  6.7  7.7  
Yunan 23.3  22.9  11.8  17.6  15.0  11.1  4.9  2.5  2.1  
Xizang 20.0  0.0  40.0  0.0  50.0  50.0  33.3  16.7  40.0  
Shanxi (Qin) 20.0  14.1  15.8  17.2  18.5  15.7  13.6  11.4  13.3  
Gansu 33.3  26.1  14.8  16.1  6.3  3.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Qinghai 12.5  8.3  8.3  8.3  20.8  8.3  8.3  9.5  15.0  
Ningxia 4.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Xinjiang 0.0  9.5  0.0  7.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.8  
Note: Data derived from NBSC (2001b–2009b). 
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Table A3.6 Results of robustness examinations with enlarged sample 
 Dependent variable: Firm return on sales (FMROS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant –0.691 –0.603 –0.496 –0.590 –0.793 
 (0.424) (0.420) (0.481) (0.470) (0.496) 
Collective-level effects      
PRLLC 0.060 0.076   0.204 
 (0.116) (0.115)   (0.126) 
PRJSC 0.484** 0.461**   0.503*** 
 (0.189) (0.187)   (0.186) 
PRTNSOE   –0.111 0.101 0.008 
   (0.291) (0.298) (0.307) 
PRTSOE   0.358** 0.357** 0.438*** 
   (0.151) (0.148) (0.158) 
Organizational-level effects     
BGLIST 0.105* 0.104* 0.069 0.072 0.076 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) 
FMTS –0.092  –0.068  0.002 
 (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.077) 
FMOC  0.245***  0.241** 0.229** 
  (0.091)  (0.094) (0.103) 
Control variables      
BGIC –0.365*** –0.366*** –0.342*** –0.345*** –0.343*** 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.079) 
BGGW 0.022 0.026 0.024 0.027 0.028 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
BGSZ 0.039** 0.028 0.033 0.030 0.033 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
FMLEV –0.211*** –0.199*** –0.233*** –0.226*** –0.221*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) 
      
Observations 321 321 321 321 321 
R2 (within) 0.267 0.283 0.266 0.282 0.304 
Notes: Using enlarged sample (including seven business groups fully listed before the sample period); 
coefficients from fixed-effects regressions; year dummies included in all specifications; standard errors 
in parentheses: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendices to Chapter 4 
Table A4.1 List of textile business groups in the sample 
 Business group Status  Business group Status 
1. Anhui Huamao Group  25. Jiangsu Sanfangxiang Group  
2. Anhui Wanwei Group  26. Jiangsu Sunshine Group  
3. Baoding Swan Chemical Fiber 
Group 
 27. Jiangsu Wujiang Silk Group  
4. Black Peony Group  28. Jiangsu Wuzhong Group  
5. China Shenma Group  29. Jiangxi Textile Group F 
6. China Textile Resources Corporation  30. Jilin Chemical Fiber Group  
7. China Worldbest Group F 31. Luthai Group  
8. Dandong Chemical Fiber Group  32. Nanshan Group  
9. Dayang Group  33. Ningxia St. Edenweiss International 
Enterprises Group 
F 
10. Fujian Tiancheng Group  34. Shanghai Chemical Fiber Group F 
11. Furun Holding Group  35. Shanghai Dragon Group  
12. Guangdong Kaiping Polyester 
Enterprise Group 
F 36. Shanghai Haixin Group  
13. Guangdong Meiya Group F 37. Shanghai Sanmao Enterprise Group  
14. Guangdong Xinhui Meida Nylon  38. Shanghai Shenda Group  
15. Hangmin Group  39. Shanshan Group  
16. Hailan Group Corporation  40. Shijiazhuang Changshan Textile 
Group 
 
17. Heilongjiang Longdi Group F 41. Union Developing Group of China  
18. Hongdou Group  42. Veken Holding Group  
19. Huacheng Group F 43. Wanjie Group F 
20. Huafang Group of China  44. Weifang Julong Chemical Fiber 
Group 
F 
21. Hubei Chemical Fiber Group F 45. Xinxiang Bailu Chemical Fiber 
Group 
 
22. Hubei Maiyard Group  46. Youngor Group  
23. Hunan Huasheng Industrial & 
Trading IMP. & EXP. Group 
 47. Zhejiang China Light & Textile 
Industrial City Group 
 
24. Inner Mongolia Erdos Group  48. Zhejiang Golden Eagle Group  
Note: F=Failed business group. 
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Table A4.2 Top ten shareholders of the core affiliate of a sample business group 
 
Share- 
holder 
Type 
Number of 
shares 
Share- 
Holding 
Ratio 
(%) 
Share 
type 
Non-tradab
le shares 
Pledged 
/frozen 
Shares 
Veken Holding Group 
State- 
owned 
87,169,200 29.70 
Non- 
tradable 
87,169,200 0 
Ningbo industry 
investment Co., Ltd. 
State- 
owned 
51,350,000 17.50 
Non- 
tradable 
51,350,000 0 
Ningbo Textile Holding 
Co., Ltd. 
State- 
owned 
18,000,000 6.13 
Non- 
tradable 
18,000,000 0 
ITOCHU Corporation 
 
7,800,000 2.66 
Non- 
tradable 
7,800,000 0 
Shanghai Nanfang Real 
Estate Co., Ltd.  
4,280,000 1.46 
Non- 
tradable 
4,280,000 0 
Hangzhou Isheng Trade 
Co., Ltd.  
2,720,000 0.93 
Non- 
tradable 
2,720,000 0 
Hangzhou Tianmushan 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.  
2,600,000 0.89 
Non- 
tradable 
2,600,000 0 
Ningbo Yinsheng 
Investment Co., Ltd.  
2,550,000 0.87 
Non- 
tradable 
2,550,000 0 
Hainan Pulin Investment 
Management Co., Ltd.  
2,000,000 0.68 
Non- 
tradable 
2,000,000 2,000,000 
Shanghai Jiashida Trade 
Co., Ltd.  
1,080,000 0.37 
Non- 
tradable 
1,080,000 0 
The second-largest shareholder (Ningbo industry investment Co., Ltd.) and the third-largest 
shareholder (Ningbo Textile Holding Co., Ltd.) are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Ningbo Industry and 
Trade Asset Management Co., Ltd., and are therefore wholly state-owned companies. 
The listed company is unaware if there are any associations among the top 10 shareholders or they are 
of the parties acting in concert. 
Source: Annual report 2005 of Ningbo Veken Elite Group Co., Ltd. (Ningbo Veken Elite Group Co., Ltd. 
[Ningbo Veken Elite], 2006, pp. 4–5).  
Notes: Ningbo Veken Elite is listed on Shanghai stock exchange (Company code: 600152); it is the 
core affiliate of Veken Holding Group, a sample business group included in this study. 
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Table A4.3 Statistics on business-group-supporting policies: an illustration 
Business-group-supportive policies 
Proportion of business groups provided the policy 
in the province, 2005 (%) 
Beijing Shanghai 
Comprehensive investment autonomy 90.00 89.54 
Overseas financing rights  31.79 22.22 
Provision of security to foreign entities  77.86 78.43 
Independent import and export rights  67.14 65.36 
Consolidated tax payment  30.00 30.07 
Rights to contract overseas projects  56.07 50.98 
Rights to approve foreign business affairs  47.86 16.99 
Rights to establish technology/R&D centers  47.86 44.44 
Rights to establish financial companies  9.64 3.92 
Supportive policies  50.91 44.66 
Notes: Data source is NBSC (2001b–2009b); figures of Beijing and Shanghai provided for illustration. 
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Table A4.4 Marketization degree of Chinese provinces during 2000–2008 (NERI Index) 
Province 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Beijing* 4.64 6.17 6.92 7.50 8.19 8.20 8.54 9.02 9.58 
Tianjin 5.36 6.59 6.73 7.03 7.86 7.65 8.28 8.59 9.19 
Hebei* 4.81 4.93 5.29 5.59 6.05 6.51 6.84 6.94 7.16 
Shanxi (Jin) 3.39 3.40 3.93 4.63 5.13 5.06 5.56 5.91 6.18 
Inner Mongolia* 3.59 3.53 4.00 4.39 5.12 5.26 5.89 5.91 6.15 
Liaoning* 4.76 5.47 6.06 6.61 7.36 6.97 7.56 7.97 8.31 
Jilin* 3.96 4.00 4.58 4.69 5.49 5.76 6.20 6.55 6.99 
Heilongjiang* 3.70 3.73 4.09 4.45 5.05 5.33 5.61 5.76 6.07 
Shanghai* 5.75 7.62 8.34 9.35 9.81 8.97 9.63 10.27 10.42 
Jiangsu* 6.08 6.83 7.40 7.97 8.63 8.60 9.39 10.14 10.58 
Zhejiang* 6.57 7.64 8.37 9.10 9.77 9.57 10.37 10.92 11.16 
Anhui* 4.70 4.75 4.95 5.37 5.99 6.56 7.15 7.48 7.64 
Fujian* 6.53 7.39 7.63 7.97 8.33 7.94 8.42 8.59 8.78 
Jiangxi* 4.04 4.00 4.63 5.06 5.76 6.26 6.64 7.10 7.48 
Shandong* 5.30 5.66 6.23 6.81 7.52 7.87 8.24 8.47 8.77 
Henan* 4.24 4.14 4.30 4.89 5.64 6.58 7.11 7.38 7.78 
Hubei* 3.99 4.25 4.65 5.47 6.11 6.42 6.85 7.05 7.33 
Hunan* 3.86 3.94 4.41 5.03 6.11 6.25 6.74 6.86 7.18 
Guangdong* 7.23 8.18 8.63 8.99 9.36 9.04 9.72 10.10 10.25 
Guangxi 4.29 3.93 4.75 5.00 5.42 5.40 5.71 5.90 6.20 
Hainan 4.75 5.66 5.09 5.03 5.41 5.36 5.66 6.36 6.44 
Chongqing 4.59 5.20 5.71 6.47 7.20 6.64 7.26 7.40 7.87 
Sichuan 4.41 5.00 5.35 5.85 6.38 6.63 6.95 7.30 7.23 
Guizhou 3.31 2.95 3.04 3.67 4.17 4.61 4.94 5.40 5.56 
Yunan 4.08 3.82 3.80 4.23 4.81 4.88 5.57 5.82 6.04 
Xizang 0.00 0.33 0.63 0.79 1.55 0.30 0.29 1.63 1.36 
Shanxi (Qin) 3.41 3.37 3.90 4.11 4.46 4.37 4.71 4.82 5.66 
Gansu 3.31 3.04 3.05 3.32 3.95 4.32 4.58 4.82 4.88 
Qinghai 2.49 2.37 2.45 2.60 3.10 3.09 3.29 3.54 3.45 
Ningxia* 2.82 2.70 3.24 4.24 4.56 4.47 5.10 5.44 5.78 
Xinjiang 2.67 3.18 3.41 4.26 4.76 4.86 4.87 5.04 5.23 
Notes: Data derived from Fan et al. (2011); * indicates that provinces in which sample business groups 
were located. 
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Source: Annual report 2005 of Ningbo Veken Elite Group Co., Ltd. (Ningbo Veken Elite, 2006, p. 6).  
Notes: Ningbo Veken Elite is listed on Shanghai stock exchange (Company code: 600152). This listed 
company is the core affiliate of Veken Holding Group, a business group included in the sample of this 
study; the annual report also disclosed important information such as legal representatives, registered 
capital, and founding date of the business group. 
Figure A4.1 Property relations of the core affiliate of a sample business group 
 
 
Ningbo Municipal 
Government 
Ningbo Ningshing Group 
Co., Ltd. 
Ningshing (Ningbo) Assets 
Management Co., Ltd. 
Veken Holding Group 
Core affiliate 
(Ningbo Veken Elite Group 
Co., Ltd., company code: 
600152) 
Ningbo Minfeng 
Investment Co., 
Ltd. 
Ningbo Xinlian 
Investment Co., 
Ltd. 
100% 
90% 
 25% 
 29.7% 
 24%  24%  23.38% 
Ningbo huatai 
Investment Co., 
Ltd. 
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Appendices to Chapter 5 
Table A5.1 Results of robustness examinations using Herfindahl diversification measures 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Tobin’s Q ROA  Tobin’s Q ROA 
UDIV 0.792 ** –0.082 **  –0.306  –0.103 * 
(0.359)  (0.041)   (0.501)  (0.059)  
RDIV 0.260  –0.017   2.286 *** 0.167 ** 
(0.308)  (0.035)   (0.636)  (0.074)  
UDIV × GP      1.874 *** 0.033  
      (0.634)  (0.074)  
UDIV × GP      –2.580 *** –0.231 *** 
     (0.705)  (0.082)  
LEV –0.224  –0.128 ***  –0.058  –0.117 *** 
(0.343)  (0.039)   (0.332)  (0.039)  
SIZE –0.106  0.025   –0.084  0.028 * 
(0.135)  (0.016)   (0.131)  (0.015)  
GROWTH 0.026  0.024 *  0.019  0.023 * 
(0.108)  (0.012)   (0.105)  (0.012)  
          
R2 (within) 0.636  0.171   0.665  0.197  
Notes: Coefficients from fixed-effects regressions; year dummies included in all specifications; 
standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A5.2 Results of robustness examinations using narrow-spectrum definition of the textile 
industry 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Tobin’s Q ROA  Tobin’s Q ROA 
UDIV 0.700 *** –0.043 *  0.479  –0.006  
(0.187)  (0.022)   (0.299)  (0.036)  
RDIV –1.109 *** 0.018   0.093  0.060  
(0.304)  (0.036)   (0.715)  (0.086)  
UDIV × GP      0.320  –0.054  
      (0.344)  (0.042)  
RDIV × GP      –1.499 * –0.049  
     (0.795)  (0.096)  
LEV –0.095  –0.134 ***  –0.084  –0.137 *** 
(0.323)  (0.039)   (0.321)  (0.039)  
SIZE –0.072  0.025   –0.054  0.027 * 
(0.129)  (0.015)   (0.129)  (0.016)  
GROWTH 0.012  0.024 *  –0.005  0.024 * 
(0.104)  (0.012)   (0.103)  (0.012)  
          
R2 (within) 0.672  0.171   0.679  0.177  
Notes: Coefficients from fixed-effects regressions; year dummies included in all specifications; 
standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; diversification variables are entropy 
measures.  
 
Table A5.3 Distribution of business segments of sample firms in the textile industry 
  CSIC 17 CSIC 18 CSIC 19 CSIC 28 CSIC 26 CSIC 63 
Broad/narrow spectrum  B/N B/N B/N B/N B B 
Number of firms  44 28 2 19 6 27 
Proportion (%)  70.97 45.16 3.23 30.65 9.68 43.55 
Notes: B=broad-spectrum textile industry; B/N indicates that the two-digit CSIC industry falls into the 
scope of both the broad-spectrum and the narrow-spectrum textile industry; Proportion=100×Number 
of firms/Total number of firms in the sample.
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